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Abstract
This study uses an anthropological perspective to investigate everyday lived experience of
women borrowers and entrepreneurs (in the informal economic sector in Ibadan, Nigeria)
relating to microfinancialization. Study such as this becomes important given the popular Yoruba
metaphor “owo komulelanta” (“Placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”) women
borrowers use to express their experience particularly in their attempts to make repayments of
MFB loans. Hence, there is a need to pay close attention and listen more carefully to operators of
the informal sector and borrowers of MFB loans. This study employs ethnographic mixed
methods to generate data in various marketplaces in Ibadan metropolis and its environs including
MFBs/MFIs. Specifically, data were collected using participant-observation, observation,
informal interviewing, informal conversational interviewing, unstructured interviewing, focus
groups discussion, surveys methods and information from policy documents. The findings show
that market vendors and women borrowers strategically explore and exploit different means of
microfinancialization i.e. the tripod of microfinancialization; MFB loans, CICU loans, and
ROSCA savings and credit shares. The tripod of microfinancialization is sine-qua-non to the
survival and sustenance of among operators of the informal economic sector. Consequently, the
vagaries of everyday lives in conjunction with the experience of loan repayment and fear of
default subjected borrowers/group lending members to a realization that members’ presence is
not as important as the availability of their dues/repayment. This conception brought about
popular saying such as “Ko’wo pe ni…ki se ko’ju pe” (“Weekly/monthly repayment is a ‘must’
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but attendance/physical presence at meetings is not the main priority”). Based upon ethnographic
findings, I have argued that neoliberal capitalism weakens the essence of group solidarity. Also, I
argued that being in debt under the microcredit scheme of MFB put a burden on the borrowers
and limited their ability to function well. But, as I pointed out, despite this, many borrowers still
turned to MFBs for loans. One of the major reasons was that borrowers have access to relatively
huge capital. In conclusion, inspite of the afore-stated issues, microfinance appears to be a
central plank in Nigerian government policies and in the strategies of the formal private financial
sector in the country. Therefore, I have advocated for an approach that centers on the experience
of informal sector operators and petty commodity producers. I have done so for future
anthropological research on topics close to the subject of this dissertation.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Women call it [a microfinance bank] loan) “owo komulelanta”
(“Placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”) because of what they
go through whenever they default on their weekly repayment: They
take some of them to the market area in public, placing a basket on
their hands and placards on their neck to beg for money.

The quote above provides one of the reasons why this study is important. The quote comes from
an interview session I conducted with one of the participants in this study. The Yoruba language
metaphor “owo komulelanta” (“Placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”) has assumed
everyday use, particularly among operators of the informal economic sector in Ibadan, Nigeria,
who are the subjects of this study. Of course, meanings alluded to with the popular concept “owo
komulelanta” (“Placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”) are ostensibly antithetical to the
overall declared mission of the initiators of microfinance loans. Starting in the 1990s
policymakers and practitioners threw their weight behind the birth of “the new world of
microfinance” (Lont and Hospes 2004, 3) with the ultimate belief that it is possible to reach out
to the poor and at the same time build healthy financial institutions (Balkenhol 2006; Bateman
2000; Green 2012; Johnson and Rogaly 1997; Morduch 1999, 2000; Otero and Rhyne 1994;
Rahman 1999a, 199b; Robinson 2001; Weber 2000). An assessment published in 2017 shows
that 3,700 microfinance institutions provide services to about 230 million people in more than
100 countries around the world, and over 84 percent of them are women (Gul, Podder, and
1

Shahriar 2017). However, the complexity of this reality lies in the fact that scholars have also
pointed out that even when non-governmental aid programs are full of good intentions they often
turn out to worsen the situation of the poor (Barry-Shaw and Oja Jay 2012; Corbett and Fikkert
2012). Scholars such as Suman Ghosh and Eric Van Tassel have demonstrated the tremendous
growth in investment flows accruing to the microfinance industry making microfinance banks
(MFBs) and microfinance institutions (MFIs) less dependent on grants and donations in recent
times.
Based on these identified opposing realities, studies such as the present one, “‘Placing
our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern’: A Critical Study of Microfinancialization in the Lives of
Women in the Informal Sector in Ibadan, Nigeria,” is worth doing particularly from an
anthropological perspective. This is because, first, there is a need to pay close attention and listen
more carefully to operators of the informal sector and recipients (borrowers) of MFB loans.
Second, a critical study like this one stands to generate political debate by the various
stakeholders in microfinance initiatives. And third, any policy recommendations based on
empirical data, particularly generated during a rigorous ethnographic study, would serve as the
basis for new social and economic structures designed to improve the lives of microfinance
borrowers. Giordon Mathews, Gustavo Lins Ribeiro, and Carlos Alba Vega (2012), in their
edited book Globalization from Below: The World’s Other Economy, referred to the informal
sector as “globalization from below” and also pointed to the fact that “globalization from below
may best be studied not through economic statistics, but rather through ethnography” (2012, 3).
Although later in this dissertation I critique the notion that the informal economic sector is
opposed to and separated from the formal economic sector – I operate with the assumptions that
capitalism depends on an array of non-economic processes and institutions for its reproduction

2

and that the formal economic sector is dependent on the informal sector to provide it with
“cheaper” goods, services, and labor – as an unwarranted emphasis on dualism and oppositeness.
To this end, this study contributes to much needed specific ethnographic depictions of socioeconomic processes inherent in the informal economic sector. Hence, a “detailed examination of
people in their daily lives and living” (Mathews, Ribeiro and Alba Vega 2012, 6) – of women
informal sector market vendors in Ibadan, Nigeria, their structural conditions in the context of
“microfinancialization,” and their strategies in managing microfinance as part of their overall
economic survival strategies – is what I offer here.
It is important to point out that some studies have provided serious critiques of the
acclaimed success of microfinance initiatives. For instance, in the edited book by Thomas
Dichter and Malcolm Harper What’s Wrong with Microfinance? (2007), contributors discussed
some important problems and raised fundamental questions the initiators need to address if
microfinance will ever lead to broad economic growth and development. In 2017, in another
major edited book by Milford Bateman and Kate Maclean, with a Foreword by James K.
Galbraith, Seduced and Betrayed: Exposing the Contemporary Microfinance Phenomenon, the
contributors citing many cases argue that microfinance policies have exacerbated poverty and
exclusion, undermined gender empowerment, underpinned a massive growth in inequality,
destroyed solidarity and trust, and overall manifestly weakened those local economies of the
Global South in which it has become prominent. These critical studies include applied
anthropology produced at the University of South Florida (Levine 2003). I discuss this literature
in greater detail below.
The present study further unpacks the issues raised in the critical literature on
microfinance initiatives and limitations by providing ethnographic evidence generated during
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fieldwork among operators in the informal economic sector in Ibadan. In support of the earlier
critiques, I present perspectives from the women borrowers themselves and suggest that any
critical evaluation must include an account of their experiences.
The Research Focus and Rationale
This study contributes to the literature and theoretical debates in anthropological
political economy (Carrier 2012; Heyman 2013; Robotham 2012; Roseberry 1988, 1989; cf.
Ortner 1984), particularly on the informal economy and its relationship with the formal economy
(Allen 1998; Boeke 1942, 1953; Bohannan 1955; Dichter and Harper 2007; Geertz 1963; Gilbert
1998; Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2006; Hart 1973; Harris and Todaro 1970;
International Labour Organization 1972; King 1996; Lewis 1954; Marris and Somerset 1971;
Mathews, Ribeiro and Alba Vega 2012; Neuwirth 2012; Packard 2007; Rado 1973; Singer and
Jolly 1973; Steele 1972; Williams 2013; Yusuff 2011), debt and finance (Dunn 2004; Howe
1998; Lowrey 2006; Maurer 2012; Mauss 1954; Nugent 1996; Peebles 2012; Taussig 1987;
Truitt 2007; Zelizer Viviana 1994); neoliberal capitalism (Harvey 2005); as well as transnational
feminisms (Alexander and Mohanty 2012; Blackwell, Briggs, and Chiu 2015; Briggs,
McCormick, and Way 2008, 629-30; Chakrabarty 2009; Frye 1983; Mohanty 1988; Smith 1978;
Spivak 1988; Scott and Marshall 2009; Scott 2007). As well, this study serves as a call for
policymakers in that it raises specific policy implications around issues of financial inclusion and
empowerment programs.
In addition, this study is important because it points out some methodological issues
in conducting ethnographic research in marketplaces, and I propose an approach that centers on
the informal sector operators and microfinance borrowers themselves (more discussion in
Chapter 6) as a way of engaging research rooted in development interventions. For instance, the
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quote cited at the beginning of this chapter captures the attitudes of a great many supposed
“beneficiaries,” as they are termed by promoters of microfinance and by the owners of MFB
capital, of microfinance initiatives in the form of MFB loans. The informant discussed her
personal experience while others talked about similar experiences as played out in their everyday
life as borrowers. The MFB borrowers interpret the supposed “help/intervention/empowerment”
from the viewpoint of policymakers and implementers based on their own very different reality.
Hence, the significance of this study lies in presenting a critical as well as a holistic
understanding of the issues of microfinancialization as played out in the world of market vendors
and petty commodity traders who inhabit the informal economic sector in Ibadan.
A Brief History of Financial Institutions in Nigeria
Historically, commercial banks are the precursors to microfinance banks in Nigeria.
The first British bank to establish itself in colonial Nigeria was the African Banking Corporation.
This bank later became the Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) and according to Chibuike
Ugochukwu Uche “the bank was keen to lend to Africans as well as Europeans” (Uche 1999,
669). However, the BBWA faced challenges by a later entrant, the Anglo-African Bank (which
later became the Bank of Nigeria), which was “founded by interests closely linked to a powerful
combination of the British merchant houses. The two banks finally closed ranks in 1912 via a
merger” (Uche 1999, 669-670). It is important to note that there were contentions that the foreign
banks in colonial West Africa lent much less to Africans, be it individually and corporately, than
they did to the Europeans and most Africans obtained credit from non-bank sources (Falola
1995). Some of the reasons attributed to the unhelpful attitude of the foreign banks – aside from
colonial racism and exclusionary practices – include the lack of unambiguous title to assets used
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as collateral, the high rate of bad debts experienced with African transactions, and the relatively
high cost of handling large numbers of individually small transactions (Uche 1996).
The imposition of colonial rule in Nigeria availed the British government the
opportunity to put in place an economic and political system (see Falola and Adebayo 2017) for
the smooth running of the territory in support of their interests. For instance, around 1880 formal
legislation had been put in place in Lagos. And the colonial government demonetized certain
coins in circulation to make British coins more prominent. For example, there were other
general-purpose currencies such as brass rods, manillas (a form of money made of bronze or
copper), and cowries (shell money, typically Cypraea moneta native to the Indian Ocean, used in
some parts of the country) in Nigeria even in the pre-colonial and pre-banking period
(Hogendorn and Gemery 1988) but those were phased out with the introduction of British silver
and gold coins. Also, recent work by Falola and Adebayo attests to the fact that “the Yoruba
example has reinforced the point that African societies had currencies that performed the same
functions as modern currency” (2017, 46). However, as the economy expanded over time
“cowries were replaced by modern (colonial and postcolonial) currencies that were more
portable and had a greater convertibility” (Falola and Adebayo 2017, 46).
The new regulation recognized as legal tender only British gold and silver coins and a
few of foreign gold coins. The major resultant effect of transporting the legal tender (currencies)
to Nigeria from London was the interest charges building up in London while the coins were in
transit and during slack trading periods when the coins were stored locally in safes. Another
contributing factor to the demand was the fact that Africans usually melted down such coins for
use as jewelry (Uche 1997). The idea was that the establishment of an institution such as a bank
which would reduce the cost of importing and distributing the silver coins as well. In 1871, the
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British incorporated the Bank of West Africa in London under the Joint Stock Companies Acts
of 1862 and 1867, and there were first two branches in Lagos and Sierra Leone. The moving
force behind the establishment of the African Banking Corporation in Nigeria was George
William Neville. He was the Lagos manager of the Elder Dempster Company, which was then in
control of the shipping business on the West African coast and therefore heavily involved in the
importation of British coins into the colony (Fry 1976; Uche 1999).
In contrasting indigenous institutions with the formal and modern sector of banking
Toyin Falola recognized the value system that “justified and promoted credit organizations in
southwestern Nigeria during the colonial period.” According to him, some indigenous practices
that are considered “irrational behaviors” can suitably be explained based on “the value system
underlying money and lending.” For instance, the rich’s conception of a credit institution lies in
the idea that “a credit institution did not provide an opportunity to obtain money for
consumption, but also for investments and capital formation. [While] to the poor, it provided a
slim opportunity for accumulation, although its major function was to raise loans to meet urgent
socio-economic demands and avoid the embarrassment of poverty” (Falola 1995, 162).
Furthermore, he also pointed to “the appropriation of elements of the formal sector by
the indigenous credit institutions” (Falola 1995, 162-163). I argue such appropriation was
inevitable particularly due to the experience of colonialism and capitalism. This colonial period
ushered in “great changes, which included, among other things, the establishment of a new
political authority, bureaucracy, and an economy that revolved around export crops [such as
production of cocoa, kola nut, timber, and palm products]” (Falola 1995, 163; see Atanda 1973;
Ekundare 1973; Falola 1987). For example, E. F. G. Haig provided how cocoa production and
marketing paved way the creation of co-operatives in southwestern Nigeria among organized
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farmers. Cocoa farmers co-operatives were assigned the government staff whose purpose was to
promote adult education of the traditional co-operative kind. According to him, “the individual
farmer member brings his fermented and dried cocoa beans to his village society’s store, where
he is paid the full cooperative price. This rate presents the government fixed price plus a cooperative premium, usually some 10/- per ton, which is the estimated distributable share of the
anticipated surplus on the year’s working. In other words, the individual members who own and
finance the whole cocoa co-operative movement draw their “profit” in advance --- a method
which saves making two separate payments to each member and greatly reduces accounting
work” (Haig 1950, 42).
Today, Nigeria has ten commercial banks with international authorization. One of the
largest commercial banks is First Bank Plc, which commenced business in 1894 in what was
then the British colony. The BBWA changed its name to Bank of West Africa and in 1965 (after
the country gained its independence in 1960) was acquired by Standard Bank. At present, the
country has nine commercial banks with national authorization, two commercial banks with
regional authorization, and five merchant banks. Finally, there is only one non-interest bank in
the country, which operates under Islamic banking principles, and they categorized it as a
medium-sized financial service provider.
MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa include a broad range of geographically diverse financial
services to low-income clients and entrepreneurs. These include NGOs, non-bank financial
institutions, cooperatives, rural banks, savings, and financial institutions, and several commercial
banks (Lafourcade, et al. 2005). Broadly, there are three categories: regulated (banks, regulated
non-bank financial intermediaries, regulated NGOs); cooperatives (financial cooperatives and
credit unions); and unregulated (NGOs, non-bank financial intermediaries, MFI projects, and
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others). The history of cooperative movement is dated back to the nineteenth century Europe,
largely Britain and France (Nwagbara 2018). Cooperative societies are functioning in sustaining
livelihood in various ways such as “the field of production, processing, and marketing: credit and
thrift, whether rural or urban; crafts and village industries; schooling; and purchase and
distribution of consumers’ goods” (Haig 1950, 41). These institutions are found all across subSahara Africa.
Research Setting: The Ancient City of Ibadan
The history of the Yoruba ethnic group in Nigeria attests to some of the contemporary
explanations and suitability of Ibadan for this study. For instance, archaeological and linguistic
evidence suggest the Yoruba migrated to present-day Yorubaland (now southwest Nigeria)
sometime between the eighth and eleventh centuries and established the town of Oyo which
became flourishing city-state. By the sixteenth century, Oyo had become the most powerful
empire in present-day southern Nigeria, controlling trade routes north to Hausa-land (Falola and
Genova 2006). By the eighteenth century, the Oyo Empire rose to its peak, having expanded its
territory over much of present-day Yorubaland. However, during the second half of the
eighteenth century, Oyo faced the onslaught of a Jihad from the north and the rise of Dahomey in
the west which weakened its power. This event of regional instability paved the way for the
establishment of Ibadan after a series of wars in 1840 and it remained an influential empire until
the 1880s. During colonialism, British colonial objectives of resource extraction were aided by a
pacification campaign. This established peace in the region. The colonial administration was
established within the Yoruba area in which Ibadan was considered a colonial administrative
center. This history means that Ibadan has remained a center for trading, finance, and
administration (for detailed information see Chapter Four).

9

Ibadan was the capital of the old western region of Nigeria and the most populated
Yoruba city after Lagos, with a population of over 3.5 million. Its history of urbanism dates to
the pre-colonial period when it emerged as a convergence point for people displaced by the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Yoruba civil wars. Although Ibadan has a large population,
many economic activities in the city have remained at the informal level, especially among the
local community engaged in retail businesses. The poverty level in Ibadan slums like Beere, Oje,
Agbowo, among other densely populated areas, visibly contrasts with the affluence of New
Bodija, Agodi, Jericho and other elite zones of the city. The vast population of women working
in the informal sector helps explain the presence of different microcredit finance banks in the
city.

At the time of this study, the popular microcredit finance banks included the Lift
Above Poverty Organization and Self-reliance Economic Advancement Program, both of which
fashioned their activities along with the Grameen Bank model (more on which in later chapters).
The two of them together had more than 100 loan centers spread across the city. In Ibadan, and
among market women, microcredit loans were a lived reality. Others included Advans La
Fayettee, Seedvest, Crest, and AB microfinance banks. Apart from the preponderance of
microcredit finance institutions, Ibadan has been the center of urban culture production in
southwest Nigeria. The diversified population of the city in terms of ethnic composition and
economic class makes it somewhat representative of sociocultural realities in both rural and
urban communities of southwest Nigeria.
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Research Questions
In 2013, I conducted ethnographic research for my M.A. thesis at the University of
Ibadan to find out why specific trades were organized along ethnic lines in Ibadan. The findings
suggest the “ethnicization” of trade activities and consciousness developed as part of a process of
inclusivity-exclusivity that determined entry into and membership in certain trades (Olayiwola
2018). The study was carried out in three major trade sites within the city, Sabo, Iwo-Road, and
New Gbagi. My specific objectives were to determine the structure and pattern of ethnicallyorganized trades; to determine the historical processes that produced a trade as ethnically
homogenous; to determine the factors that predisposed an ethnic group to a particular trade; to
investigate how each ethnic group preserved its dominance over a trade; and, finally, to examine
the implication of ethnically-organized trade clusters for national integration. What emerged was
that the Hausa dominated Bureau de Change operations, the Igbo dominated the building
materials business, while the Yoruba preponderated in the textile materials trade. While my
initial study among traders served as my entry point into the world of entrepreneurs and market
vendors, the present study aimed at interrogating the term “owo komulelanta” (“placing our
breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”), an allusion made to excruciating pain to describe the
conditions that women borrowers pass through when they try not to default during a loan cycle.
It was against the background of the conditions these traders endured that I embarked on a
critical study of microfinancialization in the lives of market vendors and petty commodity
producers in the informal economic sector in Ibadan. To do so I asked the following research
questions:

1. What is the structure of the microfinance industry in southwest Nigeria in relation to the
state and development planning? How did this develop historically?
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2. What roles do microfinance, credit, debt, and financialization play in neoliberal
capitalism in an underdeveloped country such as Nigeria?
3. What is the nature of the relationship between the formal and informal economic sectors
in Nigeria? How is informality related to microfinance?
4. How is microfinance implicated in the economic strategies of women entrepreneursmarket vendors and petty commodity producers- who inhabit the informal sector in
southwest Nigeria? What are the culturally appropriate mechanisms suggestive of their
economic strategies?
5. How do microfinance borrowers conceive of and negotiate their statuses as debtors in this
cultural context?
In search of answers to these research questions, I conducted dissertation fieldwork in
Ibadan, southwest Nigeria. I conducted pre-field exploratory research in the summer of 2017,
and between October 2018 and May 2019, I did the intensive participant-observation fieldwork
that generated the data for this dissertation. My fieldwork included systematically visiting
marketplaces doing observation and informal interviews among traders and borrowers of MFB
loans. I visited different branches of microfinance banks for observation and interviews. In many
of those branches, I was not allowed to do participant-observation but some of their staff allowed
me to conduct interviews with them sometimes in their office and sometimes I met them in other
places. I interviewed policymakers and civil servants at the government secretariat. I did an
interview with a former commissioner of Oyo State. I was from time to time involved in
informal discussions with political appointees and their assistants. I mingled with traders and
leaders of various market associations. I had the opportunity of attending one of their
inauguration programs (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2) to do observation. I was able to secure an
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appointment with some of their leaders who seemed very busy and highly involved in the
state’s politics. I conducted interviews among members of cooperative societies and
traders who were organizing rotating credit and savings schemes. And I administered
questionnaires among borrowers and loan officers towards the end of my time in the
field. The survey I conducted helped in comparing stories the participants told when with
their actual business choices. My research methods are discussed extensively below.

Figure 1.1: A View of Inauguration Ceremony of Markets’ Leaders Council at Mapo Hall, Ibadan
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Figure 1.2: A View of the Inaugurated Markets’ Leaders at Mapo Hall, Ibadan

Conclusion: Organization of the Dissertation
In this chapter, I have provided a brief overview of the whole dissertation, situating
the research in three main areas of theoretical concern in economic anthropology: 1) The
anthropology of development, including the anthropology of neoliberalism, microfinance, credit,
debt, and financialization; 2) the anthropology of informal economic activities; and 3) the
anthropology of women in the Third World/Global South. Chapter 2 expands on the theoretical
and methodological approaches of the project, grounding the research firmly in approaches from
anthropological political economy and transnational feminisms. I especially address research
question three (What is the nature of the relationship between the formal and informal economic
sectors in Nigeria? How is informality related to microfinance?) in this chapter, highlighting
specific experiences and development plan implementations towards microfinance and financial
inclusion. Chapter 3 provides methodological approaches to the project, including the study
setting and ethical issues. Chapter 4 provides an ethnographic account of the structures and roles
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of microfinance among market vendor entrepreneurs and petty commodity producers in Ibadan.
In this chapter I address research questions one (What is the structure of the microfinance
industry in southwest Nigeria in relation to the state and development planning? How did this
develop historically?) and two (What roles do microfinance, credit, debt, and financialization
play in neoliberal capitalism in an underdeveloped country such as Nigeria?). In Chapter 5, I
describe the identified microfinance strategies as played out among traders and borrowers. I
show how borrowers negotiate their statuses as debtors. In this chapter respond with
ethnographic data to research questions four (How is microfinance implicated in the economic
strategies of women entrepreneurs- market vendors and petty commodity producers- who inhabit
the informal sector in southwest Nigeria? What are the culturally appropriate mechanisms
suggestive of their economic strategies?) and five (How do microfinance borrowers conceive of
and negotiate their statuses as debtors in this cultural context?). And finally, in Chapter 6, which
is the Conclusion, I discuss the potential of this research and how it is positioned in the literature
theoretically and methodologically. I suggest an approach centered on the lives and experiences
of the borrowers themselves is the best way of engaging and evaluating studies as well as
policies that are rooted in development intervention politics. In doing so, I communicate the
suggested views and opinions of the research participants to policymakers and the governments
at many levels.
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Chapter Two: Anthropological Approaches to Women’s Work in the Informal Sector,
Petty Commodity Production, and Microfinance
Introduction
In this chapter I start with a review of relevant literature on African petty commodity
production and market, including the nature of the relationship between the formal and informal
economic sectors in Nigeria. Then I discuss significant theoretical approaches to gender and
development. I engage with the literature on women in development, gender and development,
the feminization of poverty, as well as the feminized informal economic sector. In the next
section, I discuss the main theoretical trends in the anthropology of debt and finance. Also
included is a review of relevant literature related to banks and microfinance institutions,
including rotating credit associations. I develop an approach from political economy. In brief,
political economy most commonly refers to interdisciplinary studies drawing upon economics in
anthropology, political science, law, history, sociology and other disciplines, in explaining the
crucial role of political factors in determining economic outcomes while, at the same time,
understanding the economic basis for political dispensations. While political economy is
interested in distribution, consumption, and exchange, it starts with the study of production and
shows how conditions of production lead to particular configurations of trade, law, and
government. This dissertation is concerned with understanding development policy and the role
of financialization in it, the effects of those policies on the part of the informal sector women
entrepreneur borrowers/debtors, while contributing to anthropological theory in this tradition (for
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example, see Heyman 2013; Robotham 2012; Roseberry 1988). This tradition, in turn, draws
upon Marx and entails Marx’s critique of classical political economy.
A Review of Relevant Literature on African Petty Commodity Production and Markets
The journey of conceptualizing the informal economic sector began in the early 1970s
with the influence of anthropologists, notably Keith Hart. Following Hart’s fieldwork among
Frafra migrants from northern Ghana, his presentation, “Informal Income Opportunities and the
Structure of Urban Employment in Accra, Ghana” at a conference on urban unemployment in
Africa held at the University of Sussex in September, 1971 gave birth to the concept. In 1973,
Hart, a British anthropologist, described a part of the urban labor force, which works outside the
formal market as an informal sector (Allen 1998; Hart 1973; Yusuff 2011). The term “informal
sector” gained prominence when the International Labor Organization’s comprehensive
employment strategy mission sent to Kenya in 1972 published a report, Employment Incomes,
and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. By the 1980s the
informal sector as a concept was proliferating in many of the poorest countries (Dichter and
Harper 2007; ILO 1972; Rado 1973; Singer and Jolly 1973). The International Labor
Organization drew on valuable works in Kenya on petty commodity production, enterprises, and
services. For example, in David Steele’s work, “Hindrances to the Program to Encourage the
Rise of African Entrepreneurship in Kenya Resulting from the Theory of the Dual Economy,” he
referred to the informal sector as “intermediate sector” (Steele 1972, 208). The research
conducted by Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset, African Businessmen: A Study of
Entrepreneurship and Development in Kenya looks at the African businesses and enterprises in
the pre-independence period, particularly loans provided for small-scale producers in the market
areas across the country (Marris and Somerset 1971). Kenneth King emphasized that the concept
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of the informal sector ought to have been adopted in Kenya (East Africa) rather than Ghana
(West Africa) due to its importance in resolving the major crisis in the Kenyan formal sector
employment resulting from the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs. King
recognized that “even if the formal sector of the economy in Africa had continued to expand, the
sheer number of new aspirants that once preferred job sector could not have been conceivably
absorbed” (King 1996, xiii).

However, before its prominence in the 1970s, the concept of the informal sector was a
controversial one. Although, scholars tried to utilize the idea of formality and informality in
different ways to describe the different petty commodity production and markets, particularly in
the developing nations, I argue that most of the attempts geared toward the descriptions and the
conceptual construction of the informal sector have suffered from problems of dualism and
binary opposition. For instance, in the 1940s, Julius Herman Boeke, a Dutch anthropologist,
described a vision of developing nations’ economy as a “dual” economy, constituted of the
market economy part of the world and a part which fell outside (Boeke 1942, 1953; GuhaKhasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2006). In the 1950s, St. Lucian economist Arthur Lewis coined
two-sector model of development in which one sector was constitutive of modern capitalist firms
with a clear agenda of profit maximization, and the other sector he described as peasant
households with different rules of sharing output (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2006;
Lewis 1954). In the same vein, in the 1970s, development experts like Harris and Todaro came
up with the model in development economics which eventually brought the dual economy into
the standard two-sector framework of equilibrium economics (Harris and Todaro 1970).
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During the twentieth century, much of the scholarly works viewed the informal sector
as a leftover from a previous mode of production. Scholars described it as crude, less
sophisticated, traditional, and gradually fading away with the introduction of the modern formal
economy and global capitalism (Geertz 1963; Gilbert 1998; Packard 2007; Williams 2013)
which Williams and Round described as “works registered with the state for tax, social security
and labor law purposes” (2007, 426). However, in the last two decades or so, there has been a
sober recognition that the informal sector remains a prominent part of the economies across the
world. Moreover, it becomes more evident that a significant proportion of employment is in the
informal sector (Bureau and Fendt 2011; Dibben and Williams 2012; Gurtoo and Williams 2009;
Hudson, et al. 2012; ILO 2015, 2018; Ram, Edwards, and Jones 2007; Williams 2004, 2007,
2013; Valenzula 2001; Webb, et al. 2009; Williams and Nadin 2010). For example, current
statistics from the International Labor Organization show that the informal economy in subSaharan Africa contributes 50 to 80 percent of Gross Domestic Products (GDP); 60 to 80 percent
of employment; and 90 percent of new jobs. Precisely, nine out of ten workers in both rural and
urban areas are estimated to engage in informal activities (ILO 2015). In 2000, the ILO’s
statistics indicated that the share of informal employment in the non-agricultural workforce
ranged from 55 percent in Latin America to between 45 and 85 percent in different parts of Asia,
to nearly 80 percent in Africa. More specifically, these figures were: 47 percent in the Middle
East and North Africa, 51 percent in Latin America, and 72 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (Chen
2001; Yusuff 2011). The recognition of the relevance of the informal economic sector has
attracted studies that focus on the documentation of the characteristics of informal enterprises,
employment in the informal sector, as well as their capabilities and prospects (Aidis, et al. 2007;
Dellot 2012; Mróz 2012; Williams and Nadin 2010). In Globalization from Below: The World’s
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Other Economy, Gordon Matthews, and his colleagues (re)conceptualized the informal
sector/economy and christened it globalization from below. They defined it as “the transnational
flow of people and goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and informal, often semilegal transactions, often associated with ‘the developing world’ but apparent across the globe”
(Mathews, Ribeiro, and Vega 2012, 1). Also, Matthews, et al. claimed that “globalization from
below” exists because it solves problems that “globalization from above” cannot in that it
provides employment and enough income for its operators (2012, 2). I agree with them and their
analysis support functions of the informal economy that I argue in favor of and these two
concepts, as operationalized, emphasize cause and effect analysis. However, the term
(globalization from below) itself may suggest the idea of binary opposition, and it presupposes
that one (globalization from above) is better than the other (globalization from below). The only
caution is that by emphasizing relationship such analysis downplays the potential and
significance of the informal sector. Therefore, emphasis on relationship between the formal and
informal sectors should not be overstretched.
Despite this recognition, only a few works consider the need to emphasize contextspecific situations in describing and conceptualizing the informal sector. For instance, Collin
Williams evaluates the proportion of global employment in informal sector enterprises and its
variability across global regions and countries (Williams 2013). Although this attempt served as
a clarion call for much-needed specificity in the conceptualization of the informal sector, it is
still limiting because jobs and economic units are used to conceptualize informality as a
methodological tool. In his words, “if enterprises are the unit used [in defining informal sector],
then the result is to define informality in terms of ‘employment in the informal sector’ (i.e.,
informal jobs and formal jobs in informal economic units). Informality is defined in terms of
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‘informal employment’ if they use jobs (i.e., informal jobs, informal economic units)” (Williams
and Nadin 2013, 3). According to Williams, based upon this logic and in line with what they
agreed upon at the 15th International Conference of Labor Statisticians in 1993, the informal
sector comprises private unincorporated enterprises that are unregistered or small in terms of the
number of employed persons (ILO 2011). I argue that this definition might not be universally
valid. Moreover, I critique the ILO of working in line with the principle of modernization theory,
a perspective which sees the formal sector and the informal sector as a continuum, but with a
deliberate attempt to enhancing one side of the continuum (the formal sector) at the expense of
the other (the informal sector) since modernization assumes erroneously that modernity and
tradition are mutually exclusive.
Based on the proceeding, it is essential to undertake a critical analysis of the concept
of the informal economic sector by identifying different empirical situations. I do this by
examining the situation in sub-Saharan Africa. My contribution here is aimed to fill this gap. I
take into consideration both rural and urban realities in my explanation. I take note of a few
works (e.g., Sethuraman 1976) where scholars, though acknowledging that the deduction of the
analysis of the characteristics of the informal sector should reflect “actual situation” (Sethuraman
1976, 72), predominantly emphasize the urban informal sector. I attempt to avoid the logic of
binary oppositions because most of the studies conducted in and on African societies have fallen
into the pit of analogical deduction whereby modernity is pitted against tradition, capitalist
against pre-capitalist, women against men, state against society, patriarchy against matriarchy,
perpetrator against victim, and so on. I move away from explaining the realities of this study in
the purview and framework of opposites. Instead, I argue for analysis that takes into cognizance
the intricacies of histories and power structures that are constitutive of not only economies –
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formal and informal – but also the subject formation and knowledge production of the actors
involved. I ask how and why subjects, as well as knowledge, are produced, and for whom and by
whom are they produced. It is in the attempt to analytically find an explanation for the empirical
historical processes that the reality of microfinancialization and the lived experiences of women
in the informal sector in southwest Nigeria can be fully understood. I argue further that we need
to emphasize the potentials of the informal sector more than we describe its nature, particularly
as compared to the formal sector. Here, I mean we should be paying adequate attention to what
the informal sector does in meeting the needs of its operators. This will not only demystify the
ideology of binary oppositions and the framework of oppositeness, but also make obvious the
informal sector’s less acknowledged and hidden potentials. A focus on the functionality of the
informal sector rather than an emphasis its nature (Rooney 2019, 165), brings out the material
consequences essential for human survival.
I will incorporate all the literature mentioned in this section into the political
economy approach I espouse. In my analysis I am critical of approaches that overstretched the
idea of binary opposition in describing nature of the informal sector. As I go, I will elaborate on
the functionality of the informal sector particularly by paying attention to context-specificity.
The Nature of the Relationship Between the Formal and Informal Economic Sectors in
Nigeria
In 1955, Paul Bohannan published his article “Some Principles of Exchange and
Investment among Tiv” on the Middle Belt of Nigeria. The significant part of his findings is the
impact of the Western economy on the Tiv’s subsistence, exchange, and investment (Bohannan
1955). There was internal tension due to external influence and contact by the colonial economy.
According to Bohannan, “the new economic system undermined the Tiv ideas of economic

22

exchange based on traditional methods of investment and economic aggrandizement which
demands different modus operandi, action, motives, and ideas” (Bohannan 1955, 60). For
instance, the distribution of goods among them falls into two major spheres, which are “market”
and “gift.” However, the concept of gift in this context does not outrightly fit in with the idea of
a gift in the West, and there are several words for “gift” among the Tiv. The same thing goes to
how the Tiv understand a “market.” The point I am drawing from this example is that the state of
the informal economic sector today can be said to have originated from the ideology that
anything incompatible to the West is seen as “unfit” and must be done away with because the
only correct way is that which leads to modernity. This ideology does reflect in other spheres of
academic writing and policy documents. One such example is the idea of “informal citizens” and
“Informal African settlement” (Kelly and Lechoenyo 2017) as experienced in the case of South
Africa.

Contrary to this ideological tension and analogical deduction of modernity as opposed
to tradition, the potency of the informal economic sector has been so conspicuous. Some studies
have described the informal economy as a social space where people exchange objects, services,
money, as well as other valuables according to the rules of the game which may not necessarily
be in line with the rules set by the state (De Soto 1989; Elyachar 2005; Mahoney 2012). In a
way, the informal sector is considered a flourishing aspect of developing economies (ILO 2011,
2015; King 1996) engendering some neoliberal ideology in that it advocates a diminution of the
state by providing a leeway with which the operators can thrive. In this line of thought, “the
informal sector” is a phrase used to describe the masses of informally self-employed individuals
who strive to survive outside of the formal employment opportunities with the private sector and
the government/state sector (Bateman, Maclean, and Galbraith 2017; Hart 1973; ILO 1972). As
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Elyachar stated, “anthropologists and others, concerned about the fate of the poor in the Third
World, had often expressed admiration for their ability to survive in the face of alienation,
deprivation, and marginalization” (Elyachar 2005, 499). However, what must be considered in
empirical research as well as theoretical constructs is the fact that most of the operators in the
informal economic sector are women, where “a larger part of the vulnerable employment is
composed of females classified as contributing to family workers” (ILO 2015, 54).

Any attempt to undermine the significance and relevance of the informal economic
sector might be seen to underestimate the involvement of women and the potential inherent in
their capability to produce, maintain, and sustain their livelihoods as well as that of their
households. Studies of women in sub-Saharan Africa involved in petty commodity production
and markets (Allen 1998; Wan 2001) and other employment (Hafkin and Bay 1976; Sudarkasa
1981) show how they have been resilient and maintain the sustenance of their household
economy. In situations when African women encounter some global and local events and
realities that have negative consequences on their survival (e.g., Akiwumi 2011; Little and Dolan
2000), empirical studies show they have relied on the strength of group mobilization,
associations, and engaged in cooperation in order to meet their daily needs (e.g., Afonja 1975;
Lebeuf 1963; Rodima-Taylor 2013; Tripp 1994). As Aili Mari Tripp explained the situation of
women in Uganda and Tanzania, “by organizing to meet their everyday needs, women in selfhelp groups, voluntary associations, savings associations, and other such groups are responding
to the fact that they have been excluded not only from formal economies but also from formal
politics. They are ultimately redefining politics by seeking tangible solutions to problems caused
by the vagaries of the market and the failure, negligence, or outright repression of the state”
(Tripp 1994, 128).
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Interestingly, Tripp emphasized much more the consciousness of the women to
mobilize themselves, be it informally or formally, along with building associations irrespective
of their ethnic or religious affiliations. However, the internal dynamics of the associations as well
as the membership that would reveal how women realize empowerment, income generation, and
transformation beyond the shortcomings of the state are yet inadequately explored. In my view, it
is essential to know how women negotiate the different positions with the informal associations
and the formal associations as this may perhaps provide clues on the point of convergence and
divergence between what is considered formal and what is considered informal. Let us direct our
scholarly searchlight at the “fluidity between the formal and informal sectors” (Rooney 2019,
165) by paying attention to not only the historical development of economic behavior but to the
actually existing linkages between sectors and their spatial locations. As I mentioned above,
there has been much attention to the urban informal sector. Meanwhile, scholars have paid little
attention to the relevance of the rural informal sector. For instance, Mimi Wan’s detailed
ethnographic account in “Secrets of Success Uncertainty, Profits, and Prosperity in the Gari
Economy of Ibadan, 1992-94” focused on gari (cassava flour) production in southwest Nigeria.
She analyzed both the growth pattern of gari economy and the commercial practices of the
women traders in the urban centers and markets in the urban centers. However, a majority of gari
production takes place in rural communities, and there should not be a vacuum because our
analysis must cover all the linkages both in the rural and urban settlements, even if the scope of
the research does not consider the rural interface. In other words, studies need to focus on ruralurban linkage and how that constitutes significantly to the informal sector at large, not just the
urban informal sector.
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Some of the issues raised in literature in this section depict ideological tension and
analogical deduction of modernity and opposed to tradition. These issues are in line with the
foregoing argument against the idea of binary oppositeness and a mere description of nature of
socio-cultural phenomena. In constructing my own theoretical model, I argue for functionality of
the informal sector by emphasizing its potential in servicing a nation’s economy as a whole.
Theoretical Approaches to Gender and Development with Emphasis on Women’s
Participation in the Informal Economic Sector in sub-Saharan Africa
Women have been at the center of discourse on development, poverty, and inequality,
both in academic and policy arenas over time. For instance, the Beijing Platform for Action
(BPFA) set to address women’s poverty at the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW,
September 4 - 5, 1995). As it were, one of the principal rationales for such a move was the
awareness that women were as many as 70 percent of the world’s poor. Most importantly,
literature in policy and academics predicted that the level was likely going to rise (Chant 2008,
2010; Pearce 1978). In other words, the efforts geared towards eradication of poverty have used
the logic that efforts must start with solving the problems of women because they were
considered the poorest. As a result of this assumption, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), to mention a few, are all strategies employed to mainstream women
and gender into the structure of poverty eradication globally (Kabeer 2016).

However, there are diverse and competing theoretical positions about the centrality of
women and gender at the core of the debates in development and poverty. Some of the tensions
produced from the different competing scholarly views on gender and development are linked
primarily to the issues surrounding the conceptual constructions of women, female bodies, and
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objectification of women (Lévi-Strauss 1969; McLennan 1865; Oyěwùmí 1997, 2003, 2005b);
domesticity (Hansen 1992); colonization and colonialism (Amadiume 1992; Denzer 1992;
Fadipe 1970; Hansen 1992; Lazreg 2005; Mba 1982); as well as gender ideology (Amadiume
2005; Amadiume and Diop 1989; Diop 1987, 1989, 1991; Kuper 1988; Lazreg 2005; Lorber
1994; Oyěwùmí 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Parpart 1988; Rubin 1975; Staudt and Parpart 1989). In the
following, I bring in a focus on gender by combining a perspective based in an anthropological
approach to political economy and in transnational feminism with four specific topical areas:
women in development (WID); gender and development; feminization of poverty; and feminized
informal economic sector. I use this perspective to explore the theoretical underpinnings central
to the debate around women in the informal economic sector in sub-Saharan Africa with a
specific focus on southwest Nigeria.

The Women in Development Approach: Since the 1970s, there have been different activities
championed by civil society organizations, donor agencies, and governments concerning women
in the development domain. For instance, the 1975 World Conference of the International
Women’s Year in Mexico and the United Nations Decade for Women (between 1976 and 1985)
ushered in the utmost relevance of women in the development debates all around the world. The
focal points were improved education for women, employment opportunities, equal political and
social participation, and increased health and welfare services. All of these are the areas of
interest for the WID movement, and, ultimately, these scholars, activists, and development
planners demanded social justice and equity (equal inheritance and property rights) for women
(Boserup 1970a, 1970b; Edelman 2005; Edelman and Haugerud 2005; Razavi and Miller 1995).
The term “women in development” can be traced to a Washington-based network of female
development professionals (Sen 1990; Tinker 1990, 30). The rationale for the term “women in
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development” was informed by the experiences of these scholars, activists, and development
planners in overseas missions. They developed critiques of “trickle-down” theories when they
argued that “modernization was impacting differently on men and women” (Razavi and Miller
1995, 2). Ester Boserup’s Women's Role in Economic Development (1970) had a huge
contribution because it challenged the assumptions of the “welfare approach” and provided
evidence of women’s importance to the agricultural economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover,
the work revealed the implications of colonial and post-colonial agricultural policies as
facilitators of men’s monopoly over new technologies and cash crops while undermining “female
farming systems” (Boserup 1970b; Razavi and Miller 1995, 4). Although the critique of
Boserup’s argument was equated modernization with industrialization, her contribution
regarding the differential impacts of economic changes on men and women paved the way for
studies on gender and development (Edelman and Haugerud 2005).
Like the women in development approach, the women in development approach has its
criticisms. As Reeves pointed out, the gender and development approach (see below) is
theoretically distinct from the women in development approach; but in practice, some programs
have the elements of both approaches. As Reeves and Baden posited, “while many development
agencies are now committed to gender approach, in practice, the primary institutional perspective
remains focused on women in development approach” (Reeves and Baden 2000, 33). The
women in development approach is limiting because it depicts women as a unit whose claims are
conditional on productive value, having associated increased female status with the value of cash
in women’s lives (Razavi and Miller 1995). Rather than addressing the stereotyped expectations
entertained by men, the women in development approach still has a lot to do concerning how to
tackle the unequal gender relations and roles at the basis of women’s exclusion and gender
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subordination (Bradshaw, Castellino, and Diop 2013). The assumption behind the integration of
the Third World women with their national economy presupposed that the Third World women
were not ab initio participating in the development process of their societies. Thus, women’s
contributions at the level of the household and informal economic sector, as well as political
activities, were downplayed (Koczberski 1998). Such an assumption has negative impacts on the
overall informal economic sector because it sets a stage for the “modernizing project for
women.” With the attendant assumption that women status will only improve only when they
had moved into “productive employment” within the framework of the “modern” sector as
opposed to the “traditional” sector primarily occupied by women in the developing world, and
that it is only when the said Third World women achieved such “upward movement” that they
could achieve self-advancement (Koczberski 1998).
The Gender and Development Approach: One of the critical debates in gender and
development (GAD) arena is premised on the fact that it is problematic to pin down the extent of
women’s poverty with any evident precision, even when there is a preference to use income as
an indicator. In the same vein, scholars argued that female-headed households might not be the
“poorest of the poor” as often claimed. The reason is that data to support the emphasis on the
financial privation among other factors are most scarce (Baden 1999; Chen, Vanek, and Carr
2004; Elder and Schmidt 2004; Marcoux 1998a, 1998b; Rodenberg 2004, 1). For instance, Birte
Rodenberg claims that “a large proportion of the 1.3 billion people living in absolute poverty are
women. Though there is little gender-specific data to substantiate the quoted figure of 70
percent” (Rodenberg 2004, 1). However, Sylvia Chant calls attention to how the idea of poor
female-headed households provided unprecedented recognition of gender on the agenda toward
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poverty reduction. In her words, “marrying gender to poverty reduction has secured resources for
women, so why abandon a term which has proved so fruitful in this regard?” (Chant 2008, 173).
By placing gender and development within the same frame of reference, I understand
“development” as the optimum realization of human livelihood, human potential, and
personhood. In my analysis, I do not consider development as what is entirely external or coming
from outside, alluding to dependent development (Evans 1979). At the same time, I do not
consider it strictly as internally driven. Rather I consider development as efforts geared towards
improvement and enhancement of human livelihood, human potential, and personhood. There
have been, of course, a number of scholarly theoretical positions on development put forward
such as the dependency, modernization, and neoliberalism (see, of many sources, Edelman and
Haugerud 2005; Edelman 2005; Ferguson 1990; Frank 1989, 2010, 2018; Harvey 2007a; Leys
1996). It is critical to emphasize here that gender is not just about women in the same way that
poverty is not just about income (Chant 1997, 2007, 2008; Fukuda-Parr 1999; Jackson 1996).
However, certain nuances of the lived experiences of women in the informal economic sector
could be analyzed (emphasizing on the specifics) and placed into theoretical perspectives under
the rubrics of gender and development.
The gender and development approach fundamentally challenges the existing gender
roles and relations by attending to socially constructed differences and power relationships
between women and men (Moser 2012; Reeves and Baden 2000; Tietcheu 2005) and among
various identities. The argument of the gender and development approach is premised on the fact
that the existing relationship systematically subordinates women not to mention constructs and
enforces heteronormativity to exclude those deemed gender non-conforming. Thus, there is lack
of inclusion of women and others in many international development schemes (Moser 2012;
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Razavi and Miller 1995). As much as the gender and development approach remains relevant,
there are a couple of important criticisms that must be considered. One of those criticisms lies in
the fact that GAD neglects the bonds between men and women and the potential for changes in
gender relationships.
Feminism as a body of knowledge generally refers to historically recent European and
North American social movements initiated to struggle for female equality by challenging
women’s subordinate status, agitating for equal rights and fight against oppression, often but not
always including anti-racism and anti-colonialism among other positions. Oyeronke Oyewumi
argues that “feminism by designation has become a global political project while feminist has a
broader reach in that it needs not to be confined by history; in fact, it describes a range of
behavior indicating female agency and self-determination” (Oyewumi 2003, 1). A kind of
feminism can be used to augment the gender and development perspective. Here, I argued that
feminisms stand against anything considered oppression, which includes subject
formation/constitution, with a focus on gender relations and power but entailing other factors
such as class, “race” and ethnicity, age, status, and so on. This statement is good as far as it goes.
However, there are a few gray areas that need to be clarified. One is the lack of clarity as to what
“oppression” is. Of importance, as well, is the universality and particularity of “oppression” and
“the oppressed.” Second, is the specificity as to whether “woman” means the same thing across
cultures? Third, is the question of whether women’s needs, and yearnings are the same across
cultures? It is in the attempt to provide clarity and answers to these questions that we can resolve
the tension within feminism as a body of knowledge production. My position is that placing
women at the core of development debate is not a bad thing at all, but there have to be some
conceptual clarifications and genuine concerns since there is always a tension between “local”
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and “global” conceptions of women’s aspirations and women’s representation across the global
landscape. A good illustration of this tension connects well with the critiques of the different
kinds of feminism such as Western feminism, Asian feminism, and Black feminism (Steady
1981, 2005), not to mention distinctive feminist schools like the Marxist feminist, radical
feminist, socialist feminist, queer feminist, and so on. I found “oppression” as a common
denominator of all the kinds of feminisms. And feminisms oppose any form of oppression. Here,
my interest was not to go into the nitty-gritty of each of these kinds of feminisms; rather I
explored transnational feminism as a way of engaging the lived experience of women
entrepreneurs – that is, market vendors and petty commodity producers who inhabit the informal
sector in southwest Nigeria.
Transnational feminism is critical of production and institutionalization of knowledge
which includes the formation as well as “the role of national boundaries in the creation of
interdisciplinary programs in the United States” (Kaplan and Grewal 2002; Soto 2005, 114). I
argue that here that feminism stands against anything considered oppression which includes
subject formation/constitution. This statement seems to be straightforward enough to understand
the subject matter of feminism and feminist analysis. However, there are a few areas that need to
be explained. One is the lack of clarity as to what “oppression” is. Of importance, as well, is the
universality and particularity of “oppression” and “the oppressed.” Second, is the specificity as
to whether “woman” means the same thing across cultures? Third, is the question of whether
woman’s needs and yearnings are the same across cultures? It is when we provide clarity and
answers to these questions that we resolve the tension within feminism as a body of knowledge
production and in turn, gender discourse will be less problematic conceptually. My position is
that placing women at the core of development debate is not a bad thing at all, but there have to
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be some conceptual clarifications and genuine concerns since there is always a tension between
“local” and “global” conception of women’s aspirations and women’s representation across the
global landscape. A good illustration of this tension connects well with the critiques of the
different kinds of feminism such as Western feminism, Asian feminism, Black feminism, and not
talk of distinctive feminist schools like the Marxist feminist, radical feminist, socialist feminist,
queer feminist, and so on. To understand women’s oppression, we need to inquire further and be
more self-reflexive of the epistemological traditions and positionality of where such knowledge
is produced to avoid misrepresentation of facts about women. In other words, transnational
feminisms pave the way for all sorts of “alliance, subversion, and complicity within which
asymmetries and inequalities can be critiqued” (Kaplan and Grewal 2002, 74).
The Feminization of Poverty: In this sub-section, I consider the gendered nature of poverty and
gendered poverty. I considered this attempt relevant because women are put at the center of
development discourse because they are perpetually in privation and impoverished even by the
structures of social organizations across cultures which are claimed to be mainly in favor of men.
Also, the birth of the development approaches I have discussed earlier, such as WID and GAD,
came about because women were identified as having a different experience of poverty than that
of men. For example, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) review of the 13
national Millennium Development Goals Reports identified women to be particularly vulnerable
to poverty (Chant 2006; Menon-Sen 2003). Sylvia Chant identifies the three most common
developments in the feminization of poverty to be that “women represent a disproportionate
percentage of the world’s poor,” that “this trend is deepening,” and that women’s increasing
share of poverty “is linked with a rising incidence of female household headship” (Chant 2006,
2).
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“The feminization of poverty” was coined in the 1970s but remained unpopular until its
breakthrough into the “development lexicon” in the mid-1990s when most developing nations
started battling the resultant effects of Structural Adjustment Programs (Chant 2008, 166). The
main critique of “feminization of poverty” as a concept was that it did not consider every aspect
of poverty most relevant to women at the grassroots. Like the development approaches discussed
earlier, the feminization of poverty is equally “insensitive of the differential concomitants”
(Chant 2006, 3) and other implications of poverty for women and men. Women were projected
as a homogeneous population across the board, and by default, their needs were thought to be all
the same. One of the major issues with the feminization of poverty is that financial privation is
given the uppermost priority without any explicit analysis as if it is “just about lack of income”
(Chant 2008, 166). This notion is in line with the argument of some feminist researchers that
over the last 25 years or so scholars have engaged consistently with the importance of more
holistic conceptual frameworks that will encapsulate gendered privation. They have argued that
focus should be shifted to a more inclusive and holistic conceptualization of gendered poverty as
opposed to narrow analogy and schism as a parameter in the analysis of feminization of poverty.
The holistic and more inclusive frameworks should include issues of “capability” and
“human development” perspective such as education (including non-Western education), health,
and infrastructure (Fukuda-Parr 1999; Kabeer 2003; Klasen 2007; Sen 1999, 2014); the
“livelihood” perspective which emphasizes social and material assets (Rakodi 1999; Rakodi and
Lloyd-Jones 2002); the “social exclusion” perspective which highlights the marginalization of
the poor from mainstream society through lack of political participation, social dialogue and
“voice” (Chen, Vanek, and Carr 2004, 5-6); and frameworks which stress the importance of
subjective dimensions of poverty such as self-esteem, dignity, choice, and power (Kabeer 2003;
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Johnsson-Latham 2004; Painter 2004; Rojas 2003; World Bank 2000). Incorporation of the
wider coverage of frameworks is appealing but to make it effective and realistic requires that we
dismantle the different domains of constructive subjectivity both in practice and theory. In other
words, to avoid unwarranted generalizations and a reductionist view of women, we must
acknowledge various historical accounts (which seem natural but are not) that produce women as
subjects with hierarchies of privilege and power. For instance, Karen T. Hansen argued that
“throughout Europe’s colonial experience, the colonizers tried to bring their notions of
domesticity along to new locations” (Hansen 1992, 2-3). Implicit in this argument is the fact that
finding solutions to many of the problems faced by women calls for caution and clarity as to
what was obtainable before, during, and after colonialism and encounters which produce the
different subjects and irregular borders across societies. It can be argued African constructions of
domesticity differ in many ways from their Western time-bound and gender-restrictive
counterparts. The underlying argument and insight provided here are that in any spheres
“attribution of civilizing functions to domestic activities was a product of the colonial
encounters” (Hansen 1992, 2-3).
What this means for a political economy approach is that we must train our historical
lenses to understand the particulars of the situation of women in developing countries. Political
economy provides a holistic perspective by, on the one hand, accounting for the structural forces
that produce poverty in particular populations but also in particular segments of populations. It is
not enough to say, further, that poverty is produced or even that women’s poverty is produced.
We must show how different categories of women are subject to different pressures and
determinative economic and political forces depending on their locations in social relations of
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class, of ethnicity, of geographical location and access to resources, kinship and household status
and structure, and many other factors besides.
The Feminized Informal Economic Sector: Gender and Microfinance
In my discussion here, I argue the informal economic sector is feminized. The
interaction of gender and microfinance as a phenomenon can be considered in light of my
evaluation and critique of the approaches discussed in the previous sections such as “gender and
development,” “women in development,” and the “feminization of poverty.” It is important to
locate women borrowers of microfinance funds in the informal sector to the extent that they
participate there when considering the microfinancialization processes geared towards the
“financial inclusion” of the major operators in the informal economic sector. Arguments for
microfinance to be at the forefront of development policies start with the assumption that most
informal sector operators are women. The next part of the argument is that women lack access to
even meager credit facilities, and that is why they remain poor. Hence, the argument goes, to
take them out of this shackle of poverty there is an urgent need for financial inclusion for women
in the name of microcredit. That is, financialization is the route to eliminate women’s poverty
(Balkenhol 1990, 2006; Otero and Rhyne 1994; Rhyne and Otero 1992; Yunus 1983, 1997,
1999, 2004). This argument has coincided with neoliberal politics (Chang 2002; De Soto 1989;
Green 2012) which see individuals (mostly women) as an autonomous entity capable of
engaging in a “competition-driven market model” as producers and consumers “whose decisions
are motivated primarily by economic or material concerns” (Farmer 2009, 5; see, also, Farmer
2003). There are also contradictions in this neoliberal claim in that it “has little to say about the
social and economic inequalities that distort real economies” (Farmer 2009, 5). Also, the debts
incurred by microfinance-supported entrepreneurs do not make poverty reduction a reality as
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promised (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015; Bateman, Maclean, and Galbraith 2017;
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012; Harper 2011; Roodman 2012; Sinclair 2012).
The gender and finance approach focused on women through the different
development institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and various organs
of the United Nations. Many of their programs and activities are designed to provide small loans
to people in poverty (mostly women) without collateral. Most of these are petty commodity
producers and traders. And there is wide acknowledgment of this sector’s substantial
contribution to the economies of the developing nations. However, in formulating state
development policies, there is often no significant attention paid to context-specificity in the
deployment of several financial inclusion programs and model. In policy and academic arenas, it
has become debatable (due to methodological complexity) to ascertain the efficacy and
effectiveness of microfinance in alleviating poverty. Scholars have not been able to conclude
accurately that microlending model is effective due to lack of empirical evidence (Bateman,
Maclean, and Galbraith 2017; Duvendack and Mader 2017). Then what is the strength of
anthropological, specifically ethnographic, tools in addressing this contending issue? To what
extent does the voice of the people count? How authentic is this voice?
Beyond the “Development Approaches”: Engaging Transnational Feminist Theory
In my view, all the approaches discussed here are limiting in one way or the other
because their assumptions presuppose that women’s needs and aspirations are universally
homogeneous. Overall, there is a lack of attention to the differences among women, an overemphasis on income and neglecting other cultural values and therefore significant points about
gender poverty go unnoticed. At the same time, there exists an assumption that women in the
Third World countries must follow the same paths as their counterparts in the Western World. In
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“Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?,” Abu-Lughod critiqued the idea that only the West
has the capability and wherewithal to speak for Others who do not know what is best for
themselves (Abu-Lughod 2002). This situation explains why significant achievements have not
been recorded even with the different development initiatives (top-bottom, bottom-top, the
participatory approach and so on) geared towards women’s inclusion in the past decades. As
much as equality of any form (including gender equality) is crucial to human existence, its
realization also poses other forms of challenges due to differences in geographies, religions,
cultures, and so on. Susan Moller Okin posed a crucial question in Is Multiculturalism Bad for
Women? “How should we understand a commitment to equality in a world of multiple human
differences, grim hierarchies of power, and crucial divisions of life circumstance?” (Okin, et al.
1999, 5).
We need to pause and to question the politics behind knowledge production and the
construction of history itself. Dorothy Smith has claimed that “the institutionalized practices of
excluding women from the ideological work of society are the reason we have a history
constructed largely from the perspective of men, and largely about men” (Smith 1978, 293).
Here I offered a reminder that not all societies institutionally excluded women, but in many
instances written histories were not constructed by their inhabitants. Eric Wolf points to the fact
that we need to change history because “the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a
totality of interconnected processes. Moreover, inquiries that disassemble this totality of
interconnected processes, and inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to
reassemble it falsify reality” (Wolf 1982, 3) The failure to reassemble history is seen as
deliberate many a time for reasons not far from maintaining hegemony, domination, and control
by the privileged world. In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty argues compellingly that
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“history writing project itself is a European enterprise, founded in epistemologies and
cosmologies foreign to other places before colonization and, to some extent, after” (Briggs,
McCormick, and Way 2008, 629-630; Chakrabarty 2009). In this line of argument, a revisit of
women’s oppression is required, which is the hallmark of feminist theories (Frye 1983). We need
to ask again if women’s oppression is the same across cultures and historical contexts? Is
women’s oppression of the same degree and magnitude even within a similar context? How do
we understand different but interconnected situations? Transnational feminism has responded to
the questions posed so far.
Transnational feminism’s proponents traced their orientation to a new generation of
scholars from the 1930s to the 1960s who channeled their research agenda to decolonization
movements from Latin America and the Caribbean and regions in Africa and Asia. They linked
their orientation to anticolonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James, and Alejo Carpentier
whose texts centered on transnational processes. They retooled familiar narratives like antifascism from the perspective of Ethiopia, and Marxism from the perspective of Black
Nationalism (Blackwell, Briggs, and Chiu 2015; Briggs, McCormick, and Way 2008). Immanuel
Wallerstein proposed his World-System model in the mid-1970s, aiming to connect the debate
over feudalism and capitalism in his critique of deficient economic development in the “Third
World” and other works on how the developing countries are perpetually impoverished (Briggs,
McCormick, and Way 2008; Frank 1966, 2010; Wallerstein 1974, 2004). Another category is
scholars who engaged in the struggle over gender, race, and ethnicity. For instance, peasant and
subaltern studies (the South Asian critique) (Chakrabarty 2009; Spivak 1988). Also included are
scholars who are interested in labor history and migration. In all, their focal points are to
decenter previously territorialized and localized subjects and resisting colonialism and its
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projects in any guise. As it is captured in Transnational Feminists Roundtable, “for feminist
theory, the transnational can function as an analytic that helps us see how processes like
migration, NGO-ization, or environmental degradation cross international borders formed. For
these scholars, the ‘trans’ in ‘transnational’ articulates a different relationship to the nation than
‘comparative’ or international analysis, which re-centers the nation as the unit of comparison”
(Blackwell, Briggs, and Chiu 2015, 2-3). What is meant by transnational feminism differs
somewhat. Here, I provide my own definition. By transnational feminism I mean recognition of
differences even within geographies and the intricacies of assuming “a universal patriarchy and a
common experience of oppression of women around the globe” (Mendoza 2002, 300). For
example, it is not enough to universalize issues even among market women/traders as if all
women in a marketplace experience challenges of everyday lives the same way. There is a need
to allow for dissent views. The more specific and detailed we approach our theoretical paradigm
and conceptual framework the closer we are to solving the problems. This definition, I supposed
will make us surpass mere spread of feminism around the globe to achieve imposition of the UN
agendas (Bunch 2001) and/or focus on a common context of struggle (Mohanty 1992; 1997).
To begin with, transnational feminism and its proponents argue against the writing of
histories and analyses that take national boundaries as “fixed, implicitly timeless, or even always
meaningful” (Briggs, McCormick, and Way 2008, 627). Here, questioning of any circumstances
and historical accounts is possible with the mindset that nature does not give histories, rather
they are constructed, and by implication, they are equally not fixed. Hence, we are to question
any meaning they portend to produce anytime. In Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing
Theory, Practicing Solidarity, Chandra Talpade Mohanty called on scholars to embark on two
major missions, one to deconstruct and dismantle ideology that produced the “Third World
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woman” as a singular “monolithic subject” in some (Western, i.e., the United States and Europe)
feminist texts. And the other is to build and reconstruct feminism, arguing that “unless these two
tasks are addressed simultaneously, Third World feminisms run the risk of
marginalization/ghettoization from both mainstream (right and left) and western feminist
discourses” (Mohanty 1988, 17, 2003). Gender represents a crucial category of analysis for any
study of politics, society, and culture (Scott and Marshall 2009; Scott 2007). Just as Scott
denaturalized male and female, masculinity and femininity, claiming that they are always
cultural ideologies, I suggest that we can see that logic and ideological framework at work in the
construction of the formal sector and the informal economic sector. The formal sector is
prioritized and made to seem better than the informal sector despite the informal sector’s critical
importance in the overall economies of most developing nations. Questioning this ideological
framework that subordinates the informal economic sector is crucial because its implications
extend beyond market formation. And it implies subjective identity because women are the
major operators of the informal economy. Hence women’s economic activity is perpetually
rendered illegal or unreal or when acknowledged it is undervalued.
Transnational feminisms put into consideration the most egregious effects of the
political, economic impact of globalization, what some postcolonial scholars critique as
“capitalist recolonization – the racialized and gender relations of the rule of the state” (Alexander
and Mohanty 2012, 23). Rather than taking the state as given by nature, and better still as natural,
transnational feminist theorists reminded us to see all boundaries as unnatural, be it state-nation
and nation-state, and they are not devoid of sentiments either internally or externally driven. We
must extend this to consider how programs and policies championed by states, non-governmental
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organizations, international organizations, and other regional bodies, including academic
institutions.
I attempt to incorporate transnational feminism into a political economy framework.
I believe the two approaches are compatible particularly in addressing complex formations of
everyday lives that challenge the enhancement of sustainable livelihood of women borrowers
within the informal sector. For instance, everyday reality of women borrowers is entangled with
societal issues resulting from inequality, politics, the state and culture (Carrier 2012). These are
the main areas of coverage of the anthropological political economy. I mean the anthropological
political economy allows us to see clearly the bigger picture as far as the situation of women
borrowers is concerned. However, to unbundle the complex whole which reproduces inequality
amongst other issues, transnational feminism will explicate further particularly by taking into
cognizance not only its “theoretical soundness and political effectiveness” (Mendoza 2002, 295)
but also the major criticisms that led to its birth. Transnational feminism is produced as a
reaction to “global sisterhood” within feminist postcolonial criticisms in Western academia.
Also, it is driven by the desirability of a political solidarity of feminists across the globe that
transcends class, race, sexuality and national boundaries (Mendoza 2002, 295-96). Hence,
transnational feminism has potentials to “articulate the relationship of gender to scattered
hegemonies such as global economic structures, patriarchal nationalism, “authentic” forms of
tradition, local structures of domination, and legal juridical oppression on multiple levels”
(Grewal and Kaplan 1994, 17). In my view, the combination of transnational feminism with a
political economy framework will present a holistic exposition and enhance in-depth analysis of
specific lived experience of women borrowers in a particular location including their history,
culture and development.
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The Main Theoretical Trends in the Anthropology of Debt and Finance
The women informal sector entrepreneurs who are the subject of this study seek
microfinance loans. Therefore, we must consider an anthropological political economy approach,
properly tailored via transnational feminism and the salvageable insights of the women in
development and gender and development approaches, to financialization. Social studies of
finance involve perspectives that combine anthropology, economic sociology, international
political economy, and study of financial markets as well as science and technology studies.
Scholarly debates in economic anthropology have provided various epistemological and
conceptual lenses to enhance the holistic study of debt and finance. For instance, Bill Maurer, a
legal and economic anthropologist, provided a cross-tabulation of literature and conceptual
issues on the subject of finance; he captured the different covariates such as money,
technology/infrastructure, value/derivation, epistemology/ethnography, risk, and apocalypse, all
in relation and in juxtaposition to fiction and reality, “crisis,” ethics, politics, time-space, every
day/otherworldly, and credit (Maurer 2012). In fact, the anthropology of debt can be traced to the
classics in the field. In The Gift, the major anthropological contribution on credit and debt, for
example, the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss described credit and debt as constituting
hierarchy and dominance, though they enhance group solidarity (Mauss 1954). Contending
debates regarding credit and debt in anthropology come up with the idea that credit is considered
productive, beneficial, and liberating – at least for the creditor (Nugent 1996; Truitt 2007; Zelizer
1994).
Meanwhile, on the other hand, anthropologists point out that being in debt is a burden
that sets a limit on the debtor (Howe 1998; Lowrey 2006; Taussig 1987). However, recent
scholarly contribution emphasizes on the dyadic nature of the debt, which presupposes a relation
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with its opposite (credit). It implies that rather than separating the two concepts, the two are
entangled (Peebles 2012). Scholars such as Elizabeth Dunn suggest economic resources while on
transfer maintain status as a credit at one end while at the other end, it stands as a debt (Dunn
2004). More importantly, an attempt to look at the concept of debt and finance, its interpretations
and implications have made it possible for us to break up some of the blankets of generalizations
about “the economy,” “capitalism,” “imperialism,” and “neoliberalism” among other issues.
Debt and finance involve other interconnected arrangements and systems, ranging from the
infrastructures and technical set-ups, the channels, and pathways to the ways-it-gets-done.
Theoretical trends in debt and finance find their roots largely in anthropological
political economy. These theoretical trends are related to issues of subsistence, i.e., the dynamic
interaction of human, environment, technology, social structures, and social organization,
including production, exchange, as well as consumption. Anthropologists have a responsibility of
investigating the complex relations of class, culture, and hegemony, particularly in regions
undergoing complex colonial and capitalist transition in the emerging world system (Roseberry
1989). Don Robotham captured it all in his definition of political economy; “a general theory of
society, inequality, politics, the state and culture” (Robotham 2012, 41). Now, political economy,
especially Marxist political economy, in anthropology has been criticized by prominent
anthropologists. Sherry Ortner’s (1984) critique of Marxist anthropology did point to some
aspects of positive features of political economy. She identified its “openness to symbolic
analyses, its regional focus, and its historical attitude.” However, Ortner’s identification of what
she sees as some of its weaknesses as “too economical, too strictly materialist” (Ortner 1984,
141), not having enough to say about “real people doing real things,” and being too “capitalism-
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centered” (Ortner 1984, 141; cf. Roseberry 1989) present political economy in negatively
stereotypical terms.
Furthermore, most anthropologists associated with political economy do not engage
with classical political economy (from Ferguson and the Physiocrats through Smith, Ricardo and
so on), rather they appropriated Marx; and while some are Marxist, some are not (Leacock 1954,
1979, 1983; Mintz 1959, 1973, 1974, 1978; Nash 1970, 1979, 1981; Roseberry 1989; Wolf 1955,
1956, 1957, 1969, 1971). One exception is Stephen Gudeman, who looked at the Physiocrats, the
Ricardians, and the neo-Richardians (Gudeman 1978, 1980; Roseberry 1989). The emphasis here
is not just about the history of anthropological political economy. However, the point is that the
phenomena under study (debt and finance) require that we look at various causal and connecting
forces and factors, entailing a simultaneous consideration of politics (Wolf 1999), inequality
(Josephides 1985), the state (Godelier 1978) and culture (Roseberry 1989).
Some of the recent theoretical trends in debt and finance straddle the different
domains and perspectives I categorize into three here: First, epistemology/ethnography and risk,
in relation to credit and “crisis” (Graeber 2011; Greenberg and Park 2017; Ho 2005, 2009a,
2009b, 2012; Ortiz 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Poon 2012, 2016; Poon and Olen 2015; Riles 2012; Tett
2012; Zaloom 2004, 2012). Second, money and value/derivation, in relation to ethics and politics
(Amato, Fantacci, and Doria 2003; Amato, Doria and Fantacci 2010; Ho 2005, 2009a; Langley
2008; Tett 2012, 2015; Zaloom 2012). And third is technology/infrastructure, in relation to timespace and fiction/reality (Allen and Pryke 2013; Callon and des Mines de Paris 2012; Pryke
2012; Pryke and Du Gay 2007; Pryke and Allen 2018). These perspectives are relevant enough
to plot the direction at which issues of debt and finance are going even beyond anthropology. At
the same time, they put much emphasis on financial markets and industries particularly at the
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macro and global level with little or no details of the micro and the local realities that are not
within the mainstream of financial market and debt management.
For instance, scholars such as Bill Maurer and Gillian Tett argue that anthropological
political economy can be extremely instrumental in the quest to understanding the contemporary
financial world because of all the micro-level communities that are cropping up around the
financial system. An example of this micro-level community is Collateralized Debt Obligation
(CDO), a structured Asset-Based Security originally developed as instruments for corporate debt
markets, which later evolved into the mortgage and Mortgage-Backed Security markets. Gone
were the days when bankers made loans and kept them on their books. This practice was archaic
and considered inefficient because it exposed the banks to lots of credit risk. The CDO allows
banks to extend loans to property companies in case of any crisis, and they all go down when the
property market collapses. A major rationale for extending loans to property companies is that
they should not concentrate credit-risk in one basket. Hence, they find ways to spread it across
the system. However, this idea of securitization of money and credit is flawed (Maurer 2012;
Tett 2012). The idea is opaque and complex and introducing a new risk into the system. They
argued that it ignores the fact because its rationality is justified in the name of perfect markets.
That is, anything that has a price is tradeable, and consequently, the risk will be spread into the
hands of those fittest to bear it.
The perspectives in anthropological political economy are useful to identify the
fundamental contradictions at the heart of the system that most financial experts (modern
bureaucrats, bankers, and companies executives) do not spot because they are too busy and
confined to their silos and theoretical and political assumptions (Tett 2015). Hence, theoretical
perspectives that argue for an ethnography of micro-level communities as domains of money,
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credit, and “crisis” are required. Just as it is possible for anthropologists to analyze complex
human formations (ranging from households’ livelihood to that of bands, tribes, and states) and
its embeddedness in culture, such analysis is also necessary for the understanding of debt and
finance in the twenty-first century. The ethnographic analysis provided in this dissertation will
explore the connection between the formal and the informal financial institutions as well as the
individuals who patronize them. “Informality entails the institutional effort to organize society
along formal lines,” write economic anthropologists Chris Hann and Keith Hart (2011, 114)
while considering the position held by Keynesians and at least some Marxists that only the state
could lead an economy towards development and growth. My discussion here is focused on
microfinance institutions which activities are equally regulated by the state (but not owned by the
state) with the special mission of providing credit for petty commodity producers and
entrepreneurs. Hence, I capture the often neglected the lived experiences of the clients of the
microfinance bank in the ethnography presented in later chapters.
Much analysis of financial institutions can be Eurocentric and portray the center (the
West) as the main driver of the realities across the world, neglecting the lived experience of
microcredit beneficiaries who have little or no knowledge of how the microfinance banks
domiciled in their communities connect to other bigger and global financial institutions. For
instance, Karen Ho talked about how Wall Streeters leverage themselves and imbibe the
narratives of productivity and risk-mitigation. In the same vein, Ho challenged anthropology’s
conceptual and methodological tendency to approach globalization as a “taken-for-granted macro
context and as an abstract process too big for ethnographic endeavor” (Ho 2012, 1; see, also, Ho
2005). I argued for the dimension that looks at global and local discourse because of the potency
of ethnographic engagements in tracking the global as cultural action pointing to specific
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practices and locales through ethnographic “thick description” (Geertz 1973). The emphasis here
goes beyond delineating the global from local, rather I argue for clarifications on how to connect
the different dots by recognizing the area of deviation, correlation, and the intersection between
local and global realities and lived experiences.
A political economy perspective allows me to make sense of how
microcredit/microfinance revolutionizes itself around the world given the different neoliberal
policies that pave the way for it. As we will see, I argue that taking a critical approach to
analyzing the history of Nigerian pro-development policies and programs shows the value of
scholarly views and theoretical orientations within anthropological political economy: Critical
theory started with Marx, and it continued to the present day. It is concerned with the critique of
modernity, neoliberalism, and it embraces post-development ideologies, which read the whole
development enterprise as an illusion and leave no viable challengers to orthodox development
theory in the field (Munck and O’Hearn 1999).
Defining Microfinance: A Critical Perspective
I begin by clarifying what I mean by microfinance. Recently, Milford Bateman, a
professor of economics, reminded us that the term microfinance “was initially used to refer to
what is now more accurately called microcredit, as microfinance actually refers to a wider range
of micro-financial services, such as micro-savings, micro-insurance, and so on” (Bateman,
Maclean and Galbraith 2017, 13). Microcredit evolved over a few decades, and by the early
twenty first century it included not only credit for the poor but also a myriad of services like
savings, insurance, remittance sending and receipt, and even non-financial services. These
include financial literacy training, skill development programs for clients and borrowers, as well
as scholarship opportunities for their wards (Duvendack and Mader 2017). Primarily, the
48

provision of microcredit (money credit) gives prominence to other activities and interventions
(services) that surface along these lines. These institutions have proliferated across the world,
especially in the Global South. Recounting the achievement of Grameen Bank, Muhammad
Yunus boastfully proclaimed “we have come a long way: from $27 lent to forty-two people in
1976 to $2.3 billion lent to 2.3 million families by 1998” (Yunus and Alan 2007, 2). In 1997
Yunus stated during the Microcredit Summit that they set the projection to reach out to and meet
the needs of 100 million families by 2005.
Therefore, logically, what makes microfinance popular is microcredit. This is why the
term “microfinance” is still in widespread use (Mago and Mago 2009; Mago, Hofisi and Mago
2013; Marcus, Porter and Harper 1999; Rahman 1999a, 1999b; Weber 2000) to describe
microcredit across the development industry, in academic literature generally, and by microcredit
advocates (Bateman, Maclean and Galbraith 2017; Bateman, Blankenburg and Kozul-Wright
2019). The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) described microfinance in the
following words: “the provision of financial services to low-income people. It refers to a
movement that envisions a world where low-income households have permanent access to highquality and affordable financial services to finance income-producing activities, build assets,
stabilize consumption, and protect against risk.”1 CGAP also referred to microcredit as very
small loans to unsalaried borrowers with little or no collateral. In my analysis here, I do not
deviate from this popular view. I refer to microfinance as microcredit provided to women and
men borrowers and petty commodity producers, and I explicitly state if I mean any other
additional services like insurance.

Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. “What is microfinance” (n.d.)., Accessed on January 10, 2017,
https://www.microfinancegateway.org/what-is-microfinance
1
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Critical to the definition of microfinance is the idea that it is a development
intervention designed strictly for the unbanked poor population. And the majority of this
population is said to be women (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, 167; Isern, et al. 2009). Some feminist
scholars have questioned the “rescue narrative” and “female heroism,” which project women as
vulnerable subjects and agent of economic change (Khandelwal and Freeman 2017, 49). In the
entire framework of microfinance, this assumption could not be outrightly claimed to be true,
since other actors (microcredit finance banks management and employees) included also have a
vested interest in making some monetary gains and profit, to ensure the smooth running of the
system and loan recycling process. The entire debates center on rescuing the potential clients but
overlook other issues. In general, from the perspective of anthropological political economy and
transnational feminism, the promotion and proliferation of microfinance is part of defining
poverty as a lack of access to financial instruments and where women are especially targeted for
the activities of these institutions because of presumptions about their realm of familial
responsibility and the ties between their economic activities and household provisioning making
them “good risks” for paying back principal plus interest.
The Nigerian State and the Political Economy of Microfinance
Nigeria has a long history of community finance, microfinance, and Small and
Medium Enterprises (SME) finance initiatives aim at providing financial services to the
unbanked population (Isern, et al. 2009). The government played huge roles in strengthening the
financial sector and overall providing a long-term strategic plan for the country’s development. I
want to remind us here that the histories of any formerly colonized nations are not devoid of their
colonial experience and engagement, even after several decades of independence. Such is the
history of the development of Nigeria.
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Marc Eldelman and Angelique Haugerud traced the notion of development to at least
the late-eighteenth-century rise of industrial capitalism (Edelman and Haugerud 2005). This
period represented the first phase of development. Industrial capitalism, however, for the first
time in history “allowed productive forces to make a spectacular advance” (Larrain 1989, 1) and
thereby enabling people to experience dramatic material accumulation progress. As Cowen and
Shenton posited that development from late-eighteenth to nineteenth-century Europe “was meant
to construct order out of the social disorder of rapid urban migration, poverty, and
unemployment” (Cowen and Shenton 1996, 5). The impacts of this process of industrial
capitalism are felt all around the world over time, and that is why it cannot be cut off from the
history of the development of many nations.
Before the 1950s, there were some significant events recorded in the history of
financialization of the world economy as a result of the aftermath of the Second World War. To
be precise, there was the establishment of the Bretton Woods financial institutions (International
Monetary Fund and World Bank), together with a system of fixed currency exchange rates,
limitations on capital movements across national boundaries, and the institutionalizing of
national economic planning to promote growth. This era represents the second phase of
development (Eldelman and Haugerud 2005). The Bretton Woods Conference had three main
results: First, Articles of Agreement to create the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose
purpose was to promote stability of exchange rates and financial flows. Second, Articles of
Agreement to create the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), whose
purpose was to speed reconstruction after the Second World War and to foster economic
development, especially through lending to build infrastructure. And the last one, the Final Act
of the conference which included recommendations such as an adjustably pegged foreign
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exchange market rate system; members countries pledged to make their currencies convertible
for trade-related and current account transactions and so on.
This historic event ushered in the kind of development approach in which the state is
given sovereignty to control the economy nationally and internationally. This phase of
development witnessed the emergence of a much narrower development theory in the 1950s to
tackle problems such as “how the economies of the colonies of Britain, France, Portugal, and
other European powers, colonies comprising some 28 percent of the world’s population, might
be transformed and made more productive as decolonization approached” (Ley 1996b, 5). Also,
Eldelman and Haugerud (2005) argue that development was wrongly influenced by the
Keynesian idea of public spending as an engine of growth and source of employment. In 1960,
Nigeria received independence from Britain. The Nigerian government pledged for funding to
improve the material circumstances of its citizens from the supranational finance and
government institution like the World Bank, IMF, and UN. A chunk of that fund was channeled
to “modernizing” projects and building of physical infrastructure. And in the 1970s, a third
development phase is said to begin with the breakdown of Bretton Woods controls on capital
movements. This situation led to the weakening of states’ capacities to promote national
development. Particularly the 1971 termination of currency exchange rates fixed to a gold value
through the US dollars, and, in the late 1970s and 1980s, economic neoliberalism was argued by
the financial interests in the Global North as the way toward real development. During this
period, Nigeria was experiencing a series of military coups, with the exception of a civilian
administration between 1979 and 1983. From this point on, military dictators ruled the country
and there was much hardship caused by the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programs.
One of the major critiques of the first three National Development Plans of Nigeria was that they
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only accounted for growth which up until the first decades of the twenty-first century had not
transformed into genuine development of human life.
Here I critique how the development agenda was represented solely by and through
modernization theory. Hence, all the institutional apparatuses are structured to embrace the
economic models and cultural values of the West. Another critique is that programs are designed
based on two disparate approaches: the technocratic and the institutional. The technocratic
approach explores the theoretical and empirical implications of directing the limited available
resources to people with the greatest need. This approach is associated with economists. While
the institutional approach is associated with non-economists, their concern is that in order to
understand why programs for the poor do or do not work we have to look at the institutions not
necessarily the policy design (Besley 1997). However, these two approaches are not enough to
answer the question of why programs work or fail to address the problem of poverty. To answer
this question holistically, we must include critical approaches which explain what is wrong with
the current situation and social order, identify the agents (within and outside) for social change,
and provide practical goals for social transformation (Horkheimer 1982; Marcus and Fischer
1986). In all of these cases, the state and its institutions take the lead in development efforts. But
reliance on the institutional framework may not genuinely solve the problem because in state and
government circles where “institutions” represent modernity (and are engrained in capitalism)
which, in a way, may lead to the further exclusion of already marginalized sectors.
The attempt to liberalize the global economy touched on almost every nook and
cranny of the world. For instance, in 1978, for the first time, Deng Xiaoping embarked on the
mission to liberalize Chinese communist-ruled economy. Deng intended to transform China in
two decades “from closed backwater to an open center of capitalist dynamism with sustained
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growth rates unparalleled in human history” (Harvey 2007a, 1). In the same vein, Margaret
Thatcher, elected Prime Minister of Britain in May, 1979, threw a directive to curb trade union
power and put a stop to inflationary stagnation bedeviling the country for the preceding decade.
Also, in 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States, and he had similar
agenda to curb the power of labor, deregulate the industry, agriculture, and resource extraction,
and liberate the powers of finance both internally and globally (Harvey 2007a). All these global
happenings inform local discourse of development of Nigeria and the country has its share of the
problems. Specifically, the poverty level rose to 50 percent between 1980 and 1985, from 28.15
percent to 46.3 percent. Between 1985 and 1992, there was a drop of about 4 percent, i.e., to 42.7
percent. Unfortunately, by 1996, the level rose to 65.6 percent (Akanji 2006; Soyibo; Alanyande
and Olayiwola 2001). As part of the response to global realities, the Nigerian state has shown
interest in adopting microcredit as an approach to reducing both rural and urban poverty. For
instance, the fourth Development Plan contained policies aimed at poverty reduction. It
emphasized, among other objectives, an increase in the real income of the average citizen, and
more even distribution of income among individuals across the socio-economic group (Soyibo,
Alayande and Olayiwola 2001).
Some of the institutionalized mechanisms include Better Life for Rural Dwellers,
Rural Banking Scheme (People’s Bank and Community Bank, now metamorphoses to
Microfinance Banks), and National Directorate of Employment. Others are the National Poverty
Eradication Program and Bank of Industries. During the years of their operations, each of these
structures gave out billions of Naira in low-interest loans to farmers and grassroots women
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, there are contentions that microcredit schemes of governments have
failed to alleviate poverty at a level that they had initially anticipated. Scholars adduced several
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reasons for the failure of microcredit schemes in reducing poverty. Some of these reasons are the
experimental attitude of the government, lack of proper implementation, poor funding, lack of
experts, and lack of continuity. Other reasons include the interference of a few elites, illiteracy,
corruption, and lack of sincerity of purpose (Ottong 2006).
Neoliberalism and Microfinance
The discussion here will begin with David Harvey’s definition of neoliberalism:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of
the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such
practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It
must also set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and functions
required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the
proper functioning of markets (Harvey 2007a, 2).
The introduction of Structural Adjustment programs (like deregulation, privatization, and
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision) resulted in several negative effects
in virtually all the spheres of life as far as Nigeria is concerned. The neoliberal ideology informs
some sense of individuality and exposes all to a dictate and practicality of the market economy.
Therefore, for everyone to exercise any form of entrepreneurial freedom expected, there must be
provisions for loan facilities, particularly for the poor, among other things. It means that the most
practical way of solving the problem of abject poverty acknowledged is to channel the potentials
of the citizens to a market economy. Hence, it is logical for the government to champion the
course of microfinance as a tool for poverty alleviation. More so, small numbers of highly
effective microfinance programs have demonstrated that low-income clients can use small loans
productively, ensure timely repayments, and are willing to pay high-interest rates for their loans,
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even if, more importantly, clients need savings services as much as or more than credit services
(Akanji 2006). Therefore, microfinance fits well into the neoliberal policy of the government.
However, when the success of microfinance is measured based on the performance of the
microfinance banks and the number of loans disbursed, the tendency is that the real effects of the
loans on the beneficiaries and clients are neglected. It could be true that MFB recorded some
reasonable success but let us ponder Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Lévy’s remark that
“neoliberalization was from the very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class
power” (Dumenil and Lévy 2001, 297; see, also, 2011; Harvey 2007a, 16). By this token, the
success recorded could have genuinely impacted positively on one segment of the society. After
all, the statistics from Nigeria show a huge expansion of microfinance institutions and banks.
Since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance after almost two decades
of unbroken military dictatorship, an increase in the activities of microfinance banks occurred.
Also, there are new microfinance banks that operate like non-governmental organizations
devoted to alleviating poverty among grassroots women. Examples are Lift Above Poverty
Organization, Self-reliance Economic Advancement Program, Advans La Fayettee, Seedvest,
Crest, and AB, and they all have branches across the rural and urban center of particularly the
states in southwest Nigeria. Some of them have branches nation-wide. A World Bank Report of
2005 shows that 53.6 percent of the country’s 150 Million population then was living below the
poverty line, which means this percentage was earning below one US dollar per day. Of these
figures, about 78 percent of them were living in rural areas, while about 67 percent are women in
spite of the proliferation of microfinance banks in Nigeria. What could have accounted for this?
Perhaps we can find an answer to this question by thinking of the process of neoliberalization as
entailing “creative destruction” (Harvey 2007a, 3; see, also, 2007b). Neoliberalism challenges
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traditional forms of state sovereignty, the division of labor, social relations and welfare
provisions, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land, and habits
of the heart. Neoliberalism seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market, and
there are both good and bad consequences. Based on neoliberal processes in the realm of
microfinance, I think it will be quite difficult to grasp the reality of those that are sidelined or
suffering from its negative effects as long as the market situation does not reflect that the demand
curve of microfinance and utilization of microcredit is on the negative side. Therefore, in the
case of Nigeria, Falusi and Oluwasola argue that the subsequent drive towards neoliberalization
after 1980 entailed little material change in the country’s generally impoverished condition.
An example is the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund Decree, whose
objective was to provide cover for loans channeled to agriculture. The rationale for this was to
encourage commercial banks to loan investments in the agricultural sector, particularly among
the rural dwellers. Unfortunately, the main beneficiaries of this program as reported were the
large scale and educated farmers in the poultry business (Falusi and Oluwasola 2001). Also, in
the 1990s, the Federal Government of Nigeria embarked on other initiatives, such as the Peoples
Bank (1990–2002), Community Banks, Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation and
National Poverty Eradication Programs and the Family Advancement Programs. All these
programs largely focused on rural community small-scale financing. Many of them were shortlived and unsustainable due to poor government policies and corporate governance. Specifically,
the federal government of Nigeria introduced some initiatives and programs from 2000 to date
with the hope of being better successes than their predecessors. For example, initiatives such as
the merger of the Peoples Bank, Family Economic Advancement Programs, and Nigerian
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank into the National Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural
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Development Bank. Also, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, and
the launch of the Microfinance Policy in 2005. Microfinance institutions and banks have
replaced the Community Banks in Nigeria since 2005.
Internationalization of the Grameen Bank Model of Microcredit: Is this Idea Really New?
The Grameen Bank is a financial empowerment scheme introduced in Tangail
district, Bangladesh by Muhammad Yunus in 1983, as an initiative of providing credit for “poor”
women with social collateral. Here, I argue the Grameen bank model is an offshoot of the
neoliberal policy internationalized through the recognition of its proponent by the international
community. Dr. Muhammad Yunus, having been awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, was
“wildly celebrated in numerous hagiographic documentaries and has logged many appearances
on popular TV shows, such as The Oprah Winfrey Show (2006), The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart (2006), and The Simpsons (episode 466, 2010)” (Bateman, Maclean and Galbraith 2017,
13). The mass media promoted the microfinance model like no other international development
policy in history (Bateman, Blankenburg and Kozul-Wright 2019; Bateman, Maclean and
Galbraith 2017; Hulme and More 2007). The ovation accorded the Grameen Bank Model by the
international community like the World Bank and other regional organizations like USAID
endeared the government of most developing nations to see it as a way to go.
Through this widely celebrated achievement, many developing nations key into
Grameen Bank Model as a way of liberalizing access to credit facilities for women and petty
commodity producers and in the long run, alleviate poverty. Nigeria is not an exception among
the nations where the microcredit scheme is adopted. The United Nations declared 1996 as the
International Year for the Eradication of Poverty Worldwide, and in the same vein 1997–2006
was declared United Nations Decade for Eradication of Poverty. In line with the spirit of these
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declarations, the Nigerian government embarked on fresh initiatives like the creation of
opportunities, empowerment and guaranteeing of security of the poor to alleviate poverty in the
country. But is the idea of social collateral that gives popularity to microcredit scheme new?
There exists a practice of Rotating Credit and Saving Associations (ROSCAs) across cultures. In
Nigeria, it is known as Esusu, a revolving loan scheme that has parallels with others in West
African countries and elsewhere (Ardener 1964; Ardener and Burman 1995; Geertz 1962). Its
standard operation is tied to social collateral as well as the level of social bonds and confidence
the members have in one another. If anything is new in the Grameen Bank model, it is in terms
of the operation of the microfinance banks: interest rates, the volume of money available for all
the group members to take at any one time, the modality of the loan disbursement, and so on.
Even in the realm of global finance, Bill Maurer suggested that “there is nothing new under the
sun: the number of flows may have increased, but it’s a case of more of the same” (Maurer 2003,
73). In “‘My Friend the Shylock’: Money-Lenders and their Clients in Southwest Nigeria,”
Toyin Falola pointed to three main processes in the organization of credit and loans at the end of
the colonial period. These processes were “the introduction of modern banking and insurance”;
“the continuation of older indigenous institutions”; and lastly, “the synthesis of the indigenous
and alien credit systems.” He reiterated that “modern and alien institutions were forced to
respond to many aspects of indigenous culture and values. At the same time, some indigenous
institutions which survived did so because they were able to ‘modernize’ themselves by
borrowing from alien ideas and practices and by responding to the demands of a ‘new’ colonial
society” (Falola 1993, 403-404). Therefore, we need to have historical depth in our
understanding of contemporary microfinance schemes and their effects. This way, we can see
what existed in the past and what, indeed, is new in an intervention such as the Grameen Bank
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Model. We would then be able to know what could we modify to suit specific context, how we
should modify and adapt it, what could specific improvements/adaptation bring to the
beneficiaries, and more importantly, responding to the current reality would propel the kind of
“anthropology [that] matters” (AAA 2017)2. In any case, an anthropology that is critical of
generalization and hype, recognizes and respects culture-specifics, and above all, an
anthropology that “connects the dots” (Pryke 2012) by emphasizing the importance, as well as
the relevance, of local understandings and local discourses.
Neoliberal ideology pushes individuals (traders, borrowers, and petty commodity
producers) to exercise their freedom based on the dictates of the market. Neoliberal theorists’
main assumption is that the freedom of the market and trades will guarantee the individuals’
freedom. The idea of individual freedom is captivating, and it projects a sense of importance and
self-responsibility. However, it also could be an illusion since the only key to the market
economy is the purchasing power of the various actors in the markets. For instance, Matthew
Arnold, an English poet, and a cultural critic, thoughtfully observed that “freedom is a very good
horse to ride, but to ride somewhere” (cited in Williams 1959, 118; see also Harvey 2007b, 25).
How would an individual who supposedly possesses entrepreneurial freedom to express it
without being financially buoyant? The neoliberal model of microfinance is to be limiting, and
its proponents base the evidence of its progress and positive impacts on the performance of the
microcredit finance banks (profit margin; financial viability and sustainability; loan recovery
strategy and so on) and institutional apparatuses. However, as the ethnography below will show,

2 The

116th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) will convene in Washington, DC, November 29
– December 3, 2017 with the theme “Anthropology Matters.” http://ae.americananthro.org/116th-aaa-2017/
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microfinance as a poverty reduction strategy has many deleterious unintended consequences in
the lives of the borrowing poor in Nigeria.
The Livelihood and Microfinance Approach
Based on the critique that microfinance has not yielded the intended results and
perhaps, arguably, some unexpected outcomes have been recorded, scholars and policymakers
have argued that microfinance should be re-conceived and born again. Hence, the birth of a “new
world of microfinance” (Lont and Hospes 2004). In the 1990s, policymakers and practitioners
championed a course by emphasizing that it is possible reaching the poor and, at the same time,
to build healthy financial institutions. They claim the two missions can occur simultaneously
(Johnson and Rogaly 1997; Morduch 1999; Otero and Rhyne 1994; Robinson 2001; Schneider
1997). The analogy of “the bus and its passenger” (Lont and Hospes 2004, 1) captures the
critique of success of microfinance that microfinance proponents concentrate more on the
performance of the microfinance institution. But they make little or no reference to the lived
experience of the borrowers. By their logic, the bus represents the different frameworks and
outfits through which microcredit is conveyed to the beneficiaries while the passengers are the
beneficiaries themselves. As long as the state of the bus is viable and intact such that it keeps
moving on the road and conveys the passengers to their various destination, the proponents of
microfinance believe that all is well. What happens to the passengers afterward is of less
importance so far as the passengers can resurface to make yet another trip with the bus. Just as
Aminur Rahman, one of the participants in the 2001 Wageningen Conference on Livelihood,
Savings, and Debt, put it: “There is growing fascination with the mechanics of microfinance,
with the vehicle. There is less and less concern about the passengers and their destination”
(Rahman 2004, 1; see, also, Lont and Hospes 2004). However, it is important to recognize that
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there are development efforts of savings-led groups, including cooperative societies and rotating
savings associations in the late 1990s/2000s, led by borrowers who save and loan their own selfregulated funds. Based upon the analogy “the bus and its passenger,” this self-regulated financial
empowerment initiative supports the fact that the “passengers” have an idea of how their goals
can be pursued without external MFIs (see also Ashe and Neilan 2014). Also, it can be argued
that some of the microfinance programs grew out of indigenous models of rotating group lending
(details in the next section) and savings schemes except for the introduction of the concept of
interest to suit their business profit-making agenda. For example, the village savings and loan
programs of Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) in Niger and Oxfam’s
program in Mali.
Therefore, there is a need for an approach that will carry along interests of both “the
bus” (the microfinance institutions/banks’ management and employee) and “the passenger”
(borrowers and clients). A perspective that combines both microfinance and livelihood
approaches will provide some holistic view of the situation of microfinancialization in the lives
of women in the informal economic sector in southwestern Nigeria. Scholars such as Hotze Lont
and Otto Hospes observe that livelihood studies so far have not done much better than
microfinance studies and vice versa (Lont and Hospes 2004). However, the combination of the
two approaches will adequately fill the lacunae identified so far by exploring, describing, and
analyzing savings and credit arrangements. Livelihood-microfinance approach is not limited to
“one kind of transaction (lending), nor one kind of regulatory environment (formal or informal),
one kind of institution (microfinance model or ROSCA) or to one type of capital (financial)”
(Lont and Hospes 2004, 10).
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Savings and credit transactions stand for a wide diversity of money and non-monetary
transactions. The trends of rural development efforts in Nigeria confirm this assertion. Scholars
have critiqued this policy response as rural development programs in Nigeria are influenced by
the capitalistic conception which sees the rural sector and agriculture as a source of surplus
mainly to feed the nation’s urban industrialization-led development strategy (Abumere and
Soyibo 2001; Falusi and Oluwasola 2001). The most significant of these rural development
programs are: Agricultural Development Programs, Operation Feed the Nation, Green
Revolution Program, the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, Better Life
Program, Family Support Program, Family Economic Advancement Program, and the Poverty
Alleviation Program. Given the labels of some of these programs, it is obvious the programs are
narrowed down to sectoral policies in the area of agriculture. I consider this development
strategy problematic because it fails to recognize the linkages between rural and agricultural
development on the one hand, and between rural development and the development of the entire
economy on the other. Such an erroneous notion of development reflects the primary
assumption of modernization theory and practice.
The livelihood-microfinance theoretical approach and critique starts with the view
that every savings and credit transaction is part of a bundle of financial and non-financial
transactions in or through time. This approach properly considers the cultural understanding of
people and the meanings they give to a situation as well as the meaning they make out of a
situation. The current theoretical trends in anthropology of debt and finance largely focus on
formal financial institutions and the financial market professionals. They include global debt
crisis and financial management and issues with Wall Street (Miyazaki 2012; Ortiz 2012a; Tett
2012, 2015; Zaloom 2012); contemporary issues in money and technology (Future of Money
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Research Collaborative, Nelms, Maurer, Swartz and Mainwaring 2018); contemporary global
capitalism and issues of risk (Hertz and Leins 2012; Pryke 2012; Riles 2012). As much as it is
important to research contemporary issues, we must not gloss over the relevance of economic
activities taking place in the core of the rural communities around the world by actors who do
not think of any financial transaction taken place in Wall Street (and other financial management
institutions across the global landscape) as having any effects on their trade activities. How do
you explain to a typical borrower of microcredit where lenders source for the loan given to her?
And in case the (loan turns to bad debt, what happens to the source (microfinance banks)? Even
if it is informal finance (Ghate 1992), where such microcredit loans and credit facilities are taken
care of, isn’t there any connection between the formal finance management and the informal
finance management? We have to trace the missing link by digging into the dichotomous
ideology and oppositeness that keep reproducing formality and informality: the formal economy
and the informal economy; formal finance and informal finance; rural economy and urban
economy; globalization from below and globalization from above (Mathews, Ribeiro and Vega
2012), and so on. In my view, we should conceive of the links and articulations between these
so-called “sectors,” and these can be revealed when attention is paid adequately to their
“operation” (i.e., what they do) rather than their “nature” (i.e., what it is).
Rotating Credit Associations
Rotating credit associations are a worldwide phenomenon (common among men and
women; young and old; rich and poor across rural and urban communities) and appear in many
parts of the world: Africa, Asia, Americas, the Caribbean area, early Europe and the Middle East
(Ardener 1964; Bonnet 1977; Bouman 1977; Geertz 1962; Jellicoe 1968; Levin 1975; Maynard
1996; Seibel 2003; Soen and Patrice 1972). And in making a better sense of the concept, F.J.A
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Bouman suggests its short form should be ROSCA, which is Rotating Savings and Credit
Association: “the term is especially apt because most participants find the savings discipline
imposed on ROSCA membership an attractive part of the scheme (Bouman 1977, 182).
According to the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, “the basic principle upon which the rotating
credit association is founded is everywhere the same: a lump sum fund composed of fixed
intervals and a whole, to each member of the association in turn” (Geertz 1962, 243). Based on
this assumption, two things are important about ROSCAs: one, is cooperation and mutual
dependability, and the other, is culture-specificity, which is suggestive of the fact that rotating
credit works on this basic principle but may be operationalized differently depending upon the
societal value orientation. Although Geertz definition is “restrictive” and does not allow for the
inclusion of some of the examples presented himself among Javanese (Ardener 1964, 201),
however, it is a reminder that this phenomenon exists across cultures. I emphasize the issue of
culture-specificity because contemporary scholarship must seek caution and pay adequate
attention to minute details (like structural variation, social class configuration and so on) that
distinguish many similar but slightly different circumstances in our study. For example, studies
conducted in West Africa suggested that members of ROSCAs make unfixed amounts as
contributions (Little 1957) and, in some instances, they give a lump sum of money (contribution)
to more than one member (Ardener 1953, 1964). Also, the description reduces the ROSCA
model to a cash payment. There are in fact situations across cultures where cooperation and
mutual dependability is expressed beyond cash economy.
In southwest Nigeria, the Rotating Credit and Savings Association model popularly
referred to as Esusu or esuu in the literature (by my understanding, it is called Ajo in present day
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Nigeria) (Bascom 1952; Nadel 1942; Herskovits 1964), fits into Shirley Ardener’s definition and
comments here:
A simple type of rotating association would be of this kind: Ten men
meet every month and contribute one shilling [naira] each to a fund
which is straightway handed over to one of their members. The
following month another member receives the fund, and so it continues,
members receiving in rotation until at the end of ten months, each
member will have put in ten shillings [naira] and received ten shillings
[naira]. This appears at first sight, perhaps, to be an equitable mechanism
for saving. It will be seen on closer examination, however, that the first
member to receive the fund becomes a debtor to all the other members
and remains one until the last contribution has been made; the last
member to receive it becomes a creditor to all the other members
throughout; while the other eight members move in turn from being
creditors to debtors. As has often been recognized, therefore, the
advantages to all members are not equal. Some of the most important
differences between associations are in the ways in which the advantages
and disadvantages are distributed or balanced between members
(Ardener 1964, 201-202).
Here, Ardner’s comments are well understood. However, there should be a clear distinction in
the analysis of who is considered a debtor all through the cycle and within the rotating credit
scheme and outside of the scheme based on the emic (their interpretation) and etic (our
interpretation) perspectives. I call for caution because of the understanding that members are not
bound together by a philosophy of competition, rather they are moved by the ideology of
financial empowerment and help through a sense of mutual dependability (see Peebles 2012,
226; cf. Mauss 1954; Malinowski 1922; Simmel and Frisby 2004). Contemporary research must
also focus on the conditions which inform decisions as to who takes credit and when among
members. This is why it is so important to pay attention to details and avoid unwarranted
generalization that may discredit our analysis. Even, the Esusu (Bascom 1952; Herskovits 1964;
Nadel 1942), historically associated with the Yoruba ethnic identity, is differentiated on a
number of grounds such as “the number of contributors, the size of the contributions, and length

66

of the interval” from group to group (Bascom 1952, 63). Esusu operates as both a rotating
savings and a credit scheme periodically, such as weekly, fortnightly, monthly, and even a daily
saving scheme (Iganiga and Asemota 2008, 2013).
In Nigeria, the non-institutionalized and informal sources of credit have continued to
be the major suppliers of loans to the rural community (Falusi and Oluwasola 2001). I have
argued that urban-rural “dichotomy” is best understood as a continuum. For instance, Credit
Investment and Cooperative Union is a huge phenomenon in Nigeria in rural and urban
settlements. Referring to it as “non-institutionalized” and “informal” should be clarified because
these cooperative unions operated in rural and urban centers registered under State Ministry of
Trade, Investment and Cooperatives. Their registration equally implies certain regulations and
norms of conduct in terms of their operations. The Credit Investment and Cooperative Union is a
kind of semi-formal ROSCA. “a group of participants who make regular contributions to a fund
which is given, in whole or in part, to each member in turn” (Bouman 1977, 182; Ardener 1964).
I also reiterated the distribution goes beyond monetary substance, and this union exists in bigger
and smaller establishments. Most importantly, we should focus on what makes ROSCA so much
more relevant: accessibility; its procedures are flexible, simple and above all contains effective
mechanisms which regulate membership eligibility, credit rating and payment; adaptability
(Soen 1972); and multifunctional dimension; maintenance of cohesion and facilitation of socioeconomic transition (Bouman 1977); development dimensions (Ardener 1964).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have evaluated and critiqued the relevant existing literature in anthropology and
in related fields of inquiry on the phenomena under consideration in order to construct a
theoretical framework with which to identify underlying structures and causal mechanisms that
67

produce economic relations through microfinance schemes, the articulation of informal and
formal sector economic activity, and the lived experience of informal sector entrepreneurs who
are microfinance debtors. My theoretical commitment is located in the traditions of an
anthropological political economy and of Transnational Feminism. This means, on the one hand,
a materialist orientation that starts with economic production and shows how the production,
distribution, consumption, and exchange of the products of labor, at many levels, structure social
and political relations and institutions. And it means, on the other, a critical perspective as a way
of engaging the lived experience of women entrepreneurs, including market vendors and petty
commodity producers who inhabit the informal sector in Ibadan. This perspective makes us
question why, not accept as “normal,” why differential access to resources, the state, livelihoods,
and even to microcredit is gendered and how social relationships entail differential outcomes for
different gender identities.
More specifically, my argument entails the following points:
1. Given that the economy in Nigeria, in Africa, and in much of the Global South is
based in what has been called the “informal sector” and much of it entails petty
commodity production, I argue that the relationship between formal and informal
economic sectors are one of necessity and dependence rather than one of dichotomy
and separateness. While the sectors might be differentiated and the formal sector
defined as production taking place under the purview of state laws and regulations
and the informal sector entailing production in the absence of those, these sectors are
articulated because of the demonstrable movement of people, goods, and services
between them. The formal sector depends on the informal sector to lower its costs of
production, thus affecting the class struggle, and thus increase the profits for the
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capitalists – and thus ensure the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production.
The informal sector often involves reselling products made in the formal sector at a
markup producing a margin acceptable to micro-entrepreneurs who are able to escape
some or all state-imposed business costs such as taxes and license fees. Petty
commodity producers and sellers often utilize materials produced in the formal sector
in their productive activities which are alternatives to formal sector-produced goods
for consumers. Petty commodity production occurs in capitalist economies such as
Nigeria’s in the form of self-employment by market traders who are the subjects of
this ethnography.
2. Understanding the nature and function of the state is central to the approaches from
political economy and Transnational Feminism alike. The state is conceived of as a
political entity that monopolizes governance and that, under capitalism, functions to
subsidize and regulate capital. The state in the Global South is the main entity
charged with development planning and strategies. In Nigeria, after the forced
embrace of structural adjustment policies and of the ushering in of neoliberal
capitalism, development planning has entailed opening up much of the economy to
rather unfettered capitalist accumulation. Through a consideration of the scholarly
production on gender and development, women in development, and the feminization
of poverty, I argue that the state’s policies have differential effects on different
sectors – classes, ethnic groups, genders – and that this, in turn, produces situations
when women in what has become a feminized informal economic sector have a small
array of choices for the maintenance of their and their families’ livelihoods.
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3. Finally, and following from the previous point, the Nigerian state and the banking
sector have conceived of the answer to poverty as the provision of financial
instruments to facilitate access to credit to micro-entrepreneurs, most of whom are
women. The strategies are clear. From the state’s perspective, this encourages
economic activity and diminishes the state’s responsibility to the poor. From the
banking sector’s perspective, this is a way of, ultimately, extracting surplus value
from poor borrowers at a large scale. Women entrepreneurs are especially targeted
because of their realm of familial responsibilities. However, there are an array of
other microfinance institutions such as ROSCAs where the proceeds are used not only
for family survival but also for further informal sector participation.
This approach will be evident in the presentation of the ethnographic evidence and
the arguments made from that evidence.
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Chapter Three: Research Methods
Introduction
In this study, I have used relevant anthropological methods such as participantobservation and observation methods (Bernard 2011, 2012; DeWalt and DeWalt 2011; Pelto
2016), informal interviewing (Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte 1999), informal conversational
interviewing (Pelto 2016), focus groups discussion (Babbie 2011; Boateng 2012; Kitzinger
1995) surveys (Bernard 2012), and I have utilized information from policy documents. The
different methods of data collection used allowed for consistency because responses for each of
the research questions asked came from more than one data source. I also considered the
potentials of triangulation as a way to create confirmatory redundancy (Lincoln, Yvonna and
Lincoln 2005). As noted by LeCompte and Schensul that “triangulation is not a duplication of
effort; rather it assures that information elicited from each key informant or other data source is
corroborated by information from others - preferably people who have different perspectives on
the subject or who occupy a different position in the project from initial informants” (LeCompte
and Schensul 2010, 180).

Study Setting and Field Site

I conducted the ethnographic fieldwork for this dissertation in Ibadan, Nigeria, the
largest city in Nigeria and the second-largest in Africa after Cairo, a metropolis of over 3 million
people (see Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3), as well as in rural communities on the outskirts of the
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ancient city. Across the city are large outdoor markets where traders sell all sorts of items both in
wholesale and retail quantities. Notable markets in Ibadan include Agbeni, Bodija, Aleshinloye,
Ogunpa, Oja-Oba, Bola-Ige International market (a.k.a. Gbagi), Oje, Dugbe, Basorun, and
Apete. Many of these markets are named after various neighborhoods and districts in Ibadan and
its environs. Also, there are branches of various microfinance banks located close to these
marketplaces.

Figure 3.1: Map of Africa Showing Nigeria3

3

Map of Africa.
https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Africa+showing+Nigeria&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=YYjq0T9h6RxcJM%
253A%252Cvl3W0cnHGee5rM%252C_&vet=1&usg=AI4_kR3dqBZQEhYKXmWJ3KsABBdiIqMnw&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjql5GossrkAhXjxlkKHeECD9sQ9QEwAXoECAMQBg#im
grc=2CCSV29pMIUUmM:&vet=1
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Figure 3.2: Map of Nigeria Showing Location of Oyo State4

Figure 3.3: Map of Oyo State Showing the Study Site5 (Ibadan Metropolis)

4

Map of Nigeria. (Source: Map Uploaded by Isreal Borokini) https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Oyo-State-showingIbadan-Metropolis_fig1_312932618
5

Map of Oyo State (Source: Map Uploaded by Tajudeen Azeez)
https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Oyo+State+Showing+Ibadan+metropolis&tbm=isch&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ah
UKEwio3s2Vu8rkAhVFmeAKHVHfCZUQsAR6BAgIEAE&biw=1536&bih=754#imgrc=KHsn_Fy4ghjQJM:
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Methods of Data Production
Observation and Participant Observation. Participation involves a researcher’s presence at any
given event domain. It implies “near-total immersion when ethnographers live in unfamiliar
communities where they have little or no knowledge of local culture and study life in those
communities through their participation as full-time residents and members” (LeCompte and
Schensul 1999, 92). However, in this research, the communities, as well as the knowledge of
the local culture, are not unfamiliar. Yet, even though I was born in Ibadan and lived there for
over 30 years I could not claim that I had a full grasp of the way of life of the research
population. Therefore, I utilized the observation method both directly and indirectly. Direct
observation involves “watching people and recording their behavior on the spot” while indirect
observation involves “the archaeology of human behavior” (Bernard 2011, 306; Johnson and
Sackett 1998) which is contained in records/documents of the market associations. There are
two main strategies for direct observation of behavior. One approach involves the researcher
explicitly informing research study participants who the researcher is and what the researcher is
doing. In such a situation, potential participants know that they are being observed and this
might affect their behavior. The other approach involves being unobtrusive and nonreactive. In
deciding on my approach, I considered unobtrusive observation inappropriate and unethical
because I believed the participants must be aware as much as possible of my presence and
intention.
Further, researchers filter observation made through her/his interpretive frames. It
implies that observation is not devoid of personal biases and values. Therefore, as LeCompte
and Schensul suggested, I remained scrupulous in the understanding of the research problems
and the formative theoretical framework, as well as my own biases (LeCompte and Schensul
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1999). Hence, being an observer-participant was the most suitable way of having access to
relevant information, particularly among market entrepreneurs and petty commodity producers.
Participant-observation involves a process of learning through exposure to and
involvement in the day-to-day activities of the participants in the research setting (Schensul,
Schensul and LeCompte 1999). Participant-observation is useful, particularly at the point of
entry into the field. It enhances identification of the informants and the building of relationships
with them. Participant-observation provides understanding of the way people organize
themselves, develop values, and prioritize certain practices. It allows an anthropologist to see in
action pattern of etiquette, political organization and leadership, social competition and
cooperation, socioeconomic status and hierarchies. More importantly, participant-observation
endorses the presence of the researcher in the research setting. And it enables the researcher to
witness events that outsiders might not be allowed, thereby have access to situations that are
considered hidden, such as religious rituals and festivals (Bogdewic 1992). H. Russell Bernard
put it straightforwardly: “participant observation involves getting close to people and making
them feel comfortable enough with your presence so that you can observe and record information
about their lives” (2011, 256). Participant-observation as a method was most useful in this
research because it put me at the center of interaction in the marketplaces and enabled me to
collect data and narratives, such as life histories, which were important in trying to understand
the lives of the petty commodity producers and sellers in this study.
Participant-observation as a method enables a researcher to take part in the daily
activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people in order to learn their explicit
(what people are able to articulate about themselves) and tacit (what remains outside of people’s
awareness and consciousness) aspects of their life routines (DeMunck 2009; DeWalt and DeWalt
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2011; Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011). Participant-observation was most relevant in observing
the research settings: marketplaces both in rural and urban communities in southwest Nigeria
such as Agbeni, Beere, Oje, Oja-Oba, Lalupon, Akanran, Ido to mention a few. Some of these
marketplaces have structures with well laid out permanent shops and open stalls see Figures 3.4
and 3.5) where traders display their items, while some are comprised of slightly less organized
(but not fixed) wooden frames and market stall kiosks (see Figure 3.6). In some cases, traders are
seated on benches, and they have tables before them where they display their trade items. The
point I am making in describing the spatial arrangements and configurations of these
marketplaces is that participant-observation was suitable as a method of data collection in such a
scenario. Participant-observation made it possible for me to observe and track events and event
sequences and it allowed more data production activities including counting, census-taking, and
ethnographic mapping (Angrosino 2006; Crane and Angrosino 1974). When research settings are
public or quasi-public (like marketplaces), researchers conduct observation in an “unobtrusive
manner,” identifying, locating, and mapping settings for more systematic semi-structured or
structured observation can take place early in a study and are useful in identifying important
behaviors, events, and people for further investigation (LeCompte and Schensul 1999, 97).
Counting, census-taking, and mapping in this research involve listing and enumerating types of
people; material items they are selling; time and days of operation; description of the stores,
shops, and stalls; other events taking place; as well as locations.
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Figure 3.4: A View of Scout Camp Modern Market, Ibadan

Figure 3.5: A View of Scout Camp Modern Market, Ibadan.
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Figure 3.6: A View of Traders and Displayed Trade Items in Gbagi Market, Ibadan.

Informal Interviewing and Informal Conversational Interviewing. I used informal
interviewing method particularly because it is useful in opening up conversation while doing
participant observation. Informal interviewing involves a total lack of structure or control
(Bernard 2011). This method is useful throughout ethnographic fieldwork for building rapport,
uncovering new topics of interest that might have been overlooked, making a field diary, as well
as writing and developing fieldnotes. For instance, when conducting participant-observation
among women borrowers and entrepreneurs, situations warranted some less formal and rapid
level of conversation where I asked questions (as also suggested by Pertti Pelto) such as the
following: “How does this (ongoing activity) compare with last month’s (same meeting)? Can
you explain to me why that woman interrupted the chairperson just then? Who are the people in
that group over there, the ones who came late? I didn’t understand the part about the ‘fines’ or
‘penalty’ for certain infractions? What infractions are they talking about then? Is there a list of
somewhere of those infractions? And so on” (Pelto 2016, 138). Scenarios
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such as this show the relevance of informal and conversational interviewing, particularly as
complementary at the beginning of participant observation fieldwork. It allowed me to engage in
a face-to-face conversation with the informants and participants.
I used informal interviewing and informal conversational interviewing methods to
collect data from virtually all of the 79 informants at both pre-field and major fieldwork in this
study. We used Yoruba language, English language and Nigerian pidgin.

Unstructured Interviewing. I used the unstructured interviewing method in this study because it
allowed me to sit down with the study participants to hold interviews. It also enabled me to have
minimum control (Bernard 2011) over the responses provided by the informants. This research
involved long-term fieldwork among woman and operators of the informal economic sector and
allowed for unstructured interviewing. The unstructured interviewing method enabled me to
introduce myself and the project, including the organizations sponsoring it as well as the
department and university where I was studying to earn a doctoral degree. It allowed me to
explain issues of confidentiality, how I would protect their privacy, and why their views were
very important to me and my research. It allowed me to seek permission politely to record
interviews by tape-recording and writing, and, most importantly, it enabled me to comfortably
ask how they are, how their day went, how their family is, and some other culturally appropriate
small talk and chat (Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte 1999). Primarily, being a very flexible
method of data production, unstructured interviewing allowed me to move back and forth from
one topic/question to another depending on the interests of the study participants. Most
importantly, the use of the unstructured interviewing method was beneficial to handle difficult
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situations in the marketplaces, where the participants hardly have enough time to have an
uninterrupted conversation.
Unstructured interviewing is multipurpose and adaptable to research engagements in
both the hermeneutic tradition and the positivist tradition. It is useful in studies that require only
textual data and in studies that require both textual and numerical data (Bernard 2011). For
instance, it is very useful in ethnography to develop formal guides for semistructured interviews
and to learn what questions to include in the local language and take most appropriate decisions
(Werner and Schoepfle 1987). In other words, unstructured interviewing is perfect for building
initial rapport with research participants before moving to close the semistructured or structured
interview and extensive communication with key informants.
Also, I used unstructured interviewing method to collect data from about 50
participants at the level of pre-field and major fieldwork. We employed Yoruba language and
Nigerian pidgin throughout the interviews depending on the choice of the interviewees.

Semistructured and In-depth Interviewing. Another form of interviewing relevant for this
research is semistructured interviewing. It is most relevant in situations where I would not have
more than one chance to interview someone. It has similar features with unstructured
interviewing and requires the same skills. However, semistructured interviewing is carried out
with the use of an interview guide. The interview guide is a written list of questions and topics
pertinent to the research and in a particular order. Using this method, “the interviewer maintains
discretion to follow leads, but the interview guide is a set of clear instructions” (Bernard 2011,
158). I used semistructured interviewing particularly with the government officials and former
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political office holders, managers of microfinance banks and loan officers because they had
limited time to give me for an interview.
Semistructured interviewing is a mix of the “flexibility of the unstructured, openended interviews with the directionality and agenda of the survey instrument to produce focused,
qualitative, textual data at the factor level” (Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte 1999, 149).
Researchers do not formulate questions on a semistructured interview guide like that of a survey,
but the interviewees provide open-ended responses and answers. Therefore, the interviewer can
probe further based on personal discretion to generate more responses related to the subject
matter. Some scholars are of the view that semistructured interviewing and unstructured
interviewing are slightly different (Fontana and Frey 1994) while others such as Susan Weller
acknowledge that semistructured interviews play a crucial role in the development of exploratory
models and the preparation for more systematic forms of investigation (Weller 1998). According
to Johnson, “exploratory approaches are used to develop a hypothesis and more generally to
make probes for circumscription, description, and interpretation of less well-understood topics”
(Johnson 1998, 139). I agree that “exploratory research can be the primary focus of a given
design or just one of many components” (Johnson 1998, 139) because it includes semistructured
interviewing which can potentially provide the basis for a survey and other forms of explanatory
research that can test theoretical propositions or general assumptions. This happened, for
example, when I investigated the concept “owo komulelanta” (“Placing our breasts on hot
kerosene lantern”), often used by borrowers and women in the informal economic sector to
represent microcredit loans southwestern Nigeria, to see if the meaning ascribed to it is contested
even among the traders. Semistructured interviewing is useful whenever there is a need to clarify
the central domains and factors in any ethnographic study, to operationalize factors into
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variables, to develop preliminary hypotheses, and to develop a qualitative base for the
construction of an ethnographic survey (Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte 1999).
I used in-depth interviewing in exploring in detail various microcredit loans and
rotating credit and savings association traders and petty commodity producers explore in
sustaining their businesses. This method allowed me to speak closely with people (participants
and key-informants) who have firsthand experience as borrowers and members of various
microlending groups. By using this method, I was exposed to knowledge the world of women
entrepreneurs because there were neither right nor wrong answers as I was willing to learn from
the participants and to know more about what they do including dos and don’ts as related to
microfinancialization. I used a semistructured and in-depth interviewing method to engage some
of the identified key-informants. Key informants are people who are knowledgeable not only
about the culture of the research context but also are willing to share all relevant information,
experience, “recognized special expertise” (Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte 1999, 74) about
the research freely and easily (Bernard 2012; Pelto 2016). LeCompte and Preissler captured it all
by emphasizing that “key informants are individuals who possess special knowledge, status, or
communicative skills and who are willing to share that knowledge and skill with the
researcher… [Also] they frequently are chosen because they have access-in time, space, or
perspective-to observations denied the ethnographer…” (LeCompte and Preissle 1993, 166). Key
informants should be able to talk about the entire community and research population- not just
about themselves. More importantly, there are key informants with some special area of
information like heads of ROSCA, managers of microcredit finance banks, loan officers,
government officials, and the market heads both women and men.
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I used semi-structured and in-depth interviewing methods to collect data from about
21 key-informants at the level of pre-field and major fieldwork. We used English language and
Yoruba language depending on the choice and educational background of the informants. For
instance, many of the informants who are employees of the government and administrators as
well as the loan officers and managers of microfinance banks preferred to grant interviews in
English language while many of the traders preferred Yoruba language and Nigerian pidgin.

Informal Group Interviewing. A group interview is any discussion held between a researcher
and more than one other individual (Schensul 1999). Doing fieldwork in a marketplace often
puts a researcher in a difficult situation where it appears impossible to have a one-on-one
interview with some participants. Such a situation may pose ethical challenges and lack of
privacy in the overall process of the research. However, the use of group interviewing becomes
relevant to validate data collected under such a situation. More importantly, group interviewing
is useful in other ways such as to collect information on a cultural domain, to develop listings for
pile sorts, to identify range of variation in opinions or attitudes on a set of topics, to collect
simple numerical data on reported experiences, or to react to the results of previously collected
data (Schensul 1999, Scrimshaw 1992). I used group interviewing method in this research
because it helped in orienting myself in various marketplaces, maintaining large audience at the
beginning of the research and taking good advantage of talking about my research in traders’
associations' meetings with their permission. It was useful to generate a considerable quantity of
data in a relatively short period from a large number of people than would be possible by
interviewing key informants only. It enabled me to record and analyze group members’ reactions
to ideas and each other. It produced data and insights that would be difficult to access without
the interaction found
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in a group and elicit useful “natural language discourse” that exposed me to learn idiomatic
expressions, trade languages, common terminologies, and communication patterns in the
marketplaces and communities in a rapid and pragmatic manner (Schensul 1999, Morgan 1993,
1996).
I conducted two informal group interviews and we used Yoruba language throughout
the interview period.

Focus Group Discussion. Focus groups discussion has been regarded as the “core datagathering method” in ethnography in the last few decades (Pelto 2016, 97). Russell Bernard
pointed to the fact that the focus group method has been in existence from the 1950s, but “it lay
dormant in academic circles for more than 20 years” (Bernard 2011, 173). Focus group
discussion requires basic guidelines: participants in focus discussions (FGDs) should be a
homogenous group, for example, young married women in their twenties; it includes at least
two or three resource persons, for instance, an experienced moderator and two note-takers;
recording is permitted only with the approval of the participant. Otherwise, note-takes should
try to capture detailed notes; the moderator must have carefully prepared a checklist of topics
and objectives for the discussion; the moderator must explain the purpose of the focus group
discussion, why participants have been selected or invited, and why they are important to the
project; and finally, explain the roles of the facilitators and the recorders (Pelto 2016, Schensul
1999). I used the focus group discussion method to collect data among borrowers within a
lending group and loan officers of microfinance banks.
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The use of focus group discussion allowed me to observe and compare how
participants reacted to issues and questions when they were within the focus and when they were
alone in their various shops/stalls. There are contending scholarly debates on the effectiveness of
one-on-one interviews over focus groups, particularly when sensitive issues are involved. For
instance, scholars argued that “individual interviews are eighteen times more likely to address
socially sensitive discussion topics than the focus groups” (Patton 2002, 289). However, in
market research, Jordan and Dalal emphasized that “focus group data are a good source of
information on what people say about products and perhaps behavioral intentions” (Jordan and
Dalal 2006, 365). In the same way, focus groups have the potential to complement the survey,
and a researcher can convene a focus group to discuss questions for a survey (Bernard 2011,
Schensul 1999). Focus group discussion allowed individual members who constituted a group in
this study asked questions and responded to one another’s comments and opinions. As “a quick
and convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously” (Kitzinger 1995, 299),
participants were able to listen to others’ views and respond according. This method allowed
participants to explore and clarify their views on different topics in ways that would be less
easily accessible in a one-on-one interview.
I conducted six focus groups discussion among borrowers (traders) and lenders (loan
officers and managers) during this study. We used English language, Yoruba language and
Nigerian pidgin depending on preferences of the participants. One of these FGDs constituted
only men (borrowers), while about three FGDs constituted only women (borrowers), and the rest
two FGDs were a mix of men and women (loan officers).
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Archival Research Methods and Secondary Data. In this study, archival research involved
searching for relevant development reports and policy documents from relevant government
ministries, department and agencies (MDAs) as well as non-government bodies such as research
institutions, and documents and reports from market associations, cooperative union and so on.
One of the major advantages of archival research is that it is “truly nonreactive” (Bernard 2011,
334). Also, it involved the use of data and information collected by others: the use archival and
secondary sources of data can further enhance “the comprehensiveness of data collection,
understanding of results, and its cross-cultural and cross-national comparability and
generalizability” (Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte 1999, 201). Specifically, I used archival
research method to provide data for the first research question: What is the structure of the
microfinance industry in southwest Nigeria in relation to the state and development planning?
How did this develop historically? Also, some of the secondary data were used to respond to the
second and third research questions: What roles do microfinance, credit, debt, and
financialization play in neoliberal capitalism in an underdeveloped country such as Nigeria. And
what is the nature of the relationship between the formal and the informal economic sectors in
Nigeria? How is informality related to microfinance?

Ethnographic Survey and Questionnaire. According to Schensul and LeCompte structured
ethnographic data collection moved the process of ethnography beyond the collection of
information about sociocultural consensus and structural descriptions to an examination of
relationships among independent and dependent cultural domains (1999). The ethnographic
survey refers to close-ended instruments and observation schedules designed to collect
quantitative ethnographic data. And it involves 86

transformations of cultural domains to factor and then to variables in the local setting (Schensul
and LeCompte 1999). The use of ethnographic survey and questionnaire allowed me to
triangulate and use the results of quantitative evidence (using comparable coding categories) to
support that of qualitative and data from other sources such as observation, interview and policy
documents, and programs. I used a non-probabilistic sampling technique, such as purposive
sampling, convenience sampling, and chain referral/network/snowballing sampling techniques
(Bernard 2011).
I chose the non-probabilistic sampling method of data collection because of the
unfixed nature of spatial arrangements in many of the marketplaces. And it was difficult to
maintain any form of probabilistic sampling techniques because traders with mobile tables,
benches, and kiosks even within the marketplaces did not maintain the same spot at all times.
Also, there were several traders on the roadside whose locations often change, and it was
difficult to track them and apply probabilistic random sampling. However, in a few modern-day
marketplaces with shops and stalls well laid out and organized, traders were not using those stalls
as they many of them said they needed to move to the old marketplaces and roadside to get their
trade items sold. Therefore, I used a convenient sampling technique to administer questionnaires
among traders.
In all I administered 229 questionnaires among borrowers/traders and 137
questionnaires among lenders/client officers. The questionnaires were printed in English
language.
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Study Participants and Data Analysis
The analysis involved in this research addressed all forms of data I collected based
upon the methods explained in the previous sections. There are only three basic kinds of
ethnographic data: “information about what people say [interviews], what they do [observation],
and what they leave behind in the form of manufactured artifacts and documents [archival
materials]” (LeCompte and Schensul 1999, 1). First, I embarked on cleaning both the
quantitative and qualitative data collected (See Table 3.1 for the summary). I used separate
question guides (See Appendix…and Appendix…) for borrowers/traders and MFB’s loan
officers. I also took pictures among the participants who permitted me.
Table 3.1: Summary of Data Collected for Dissertation Fieldwork (October 2018 - May 2019) &
Prefieldwork (June & July 2017)
S/N
Type of Data
Type of Methods
No. of Units
1
Qualitative
Participant Observation
N/A
2
'''
Interviews
33
3
'''
Indepth Interviews
17
4
'''
Focus Group Discussion
6
5
'''
Informal Discussion
2
6
Total Qualitative
58
7
8
9

Quantitative
Survey: MFB Borrowers
'''
Survey: MFB Loan Officer
Total Quantitative

229
137
466

Furthermore, I coded the qualitative data to generate thematic frames and categories (See Table
3.2) from which I drew inferences and developed a more detailed and specific analysis of the
findings.
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Table 3.2: Summary of Thematic Frames and Categories Coded from the Qualitative Data
S/N
Thematic Categories
1
Blame the Borrowers of MFB Loans
2
Culture and Meaning of Debt
3
Drawing Comparison: MFB Loans, Cooperative Society Loan, and ROSCA
4
Gender Issues and Implication on Microfinancialization
5
Interogating Meaning: "Owo Gbomulelanta"
6
Loan Drive and Loan Recovery
6
Patronage and Financial Inclusion Programs
7
Patronage or a Piece of Advice for the Government
8
Recommendations and Policy Statements
9
Sustaining Finances for a Business
10
Why I Do Not Take MFB Loan

As for the quantitative data collected, I presented the demographic information of the
respondents in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. As I have mentioned earlier, in all, I administered
separate questionnaires (See Appendix… and Appendix…) among borrowers/traders (N = 229)
and MFBs’ loan officers (N = 137).
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Table 3.3: Summary of Demographic Information of the Respondents (Traders/Borrowers)
S/N
Demographic Information Type
Frequency
Percentage
1
Age
18 - 25 years
9
3.93%
26 - 35 years
57
24.89%
36 - 45 years
122
53.28%
Above 45 years
41
17.90%
Total
229
100%
2

3

4

5

6

Sex
Female
Male
Total

178
51
229

77.73%
22.27%
100%

Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Total

18
164
7
40
229

7.86%
71.62%
3.06%
17.47%
100%

Geopolitical Zone
Southwest
Southeast
Southsouth
Northwest
Northeast
Northcentral
Total

151
17
16
14
11
20
229

65.94%
7.42%
6.99%
6.12%
4.80%
8.73%
100%

Religion
African Traditional Religion
Christianity
Islam
Total

24
127
78
229

10.48%
55.46%
34.06%
100.00%

Educational Background
No Formal Education
Primary Education
Secondary Education
Post Secondary Education
Total

79
33
61
56
229

34.50%
14.41%
26.64%
24.45%
100%
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Table 3.4: Summary of Demographic Information of the Respondents (Loan/Client Officers)
S/N
Demographic Information Type
Frequency
Percentage
1
Age
18 - 25 years
23
16.79%
26 - 35 years
102
74.45%
36 - 45 years
11
8.03%
Above 45 years
1
0.73%
Total
137
100%
2

3

4

5

Sex
Female
Male
Total

73
64
137

53.29%
46.72%
100%

Marital Status
single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Total

49
83
4
1
137

35.77%
60.58%
2.92%
0.73%
100%

Religion
African Traditional Religion
Christianity
Islam
Total

3
91
43
137

2.19%
66.42%
31.39%
100.00%

Educational Background
National Diloma/NCE
Bachelor/Higher National Diploma
Postgraduate
Total

22
90
25
137

16.79%
65.69%
18.25%
100%

Ethical Challenges
I encountered some ethics-related issues in this study. Linda Tuhiwai Smith pointed
to the fact that a researcher must be concerned with having a more critical understanding of the
underlying assumptions, motivations, and values which inform research practices (Smith 2013).
Based on this assertion, I would discuss various ethical challenges in the following categories:
Conceptual Issues: Before entering the research site, I paid attention to scholarly debates on
(de)construction of women be it from Western and non-Western perspectives. And the idea that
“modernist ontologies come into conflict with relational ontologies in transnational feminist
research, and not all ontologies can be research empirically” (Falcón 2016, 178). For instance, I
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was cautioned not to generalize what I meant by women and women’s aspirations based on my
knowledge of the research population. Rather, I paid attention to critical arguments in literature
as well as carefully listen to the participants to provide a more specific account of the findings.
Positionality and Reflexivity: Anthropologists and feminist scholars are committed to the idea
that human agency is “powerful and transformative” (Falcón 2016, 175). There were pros and
cons of my positionality at different levels as an insider-outsider (insider- as a Nigerian, and
outsider- as a Ph.D. candidate, a man, and my belongingness to academics). First, I
acknowledged all the unearned privileges I received based on my involvement with the traders
given my years of research engagement in marketplaces in southwest Nigeria. One of the pros
was the easy entry to marketplaces without any tension of mistaken me for a tax force or spy. My
affiliation with academics and being a Ph.D. candidate from the United States endeared traders to
participate in the study. Many of them were willing to introduce me to other traders and that
made chain referral, and snowballing sampling techniques worked perfectly for this study. Many
a time, participants would tell me, “please, remind us when it is time to give loans to traders.”
This statement made me go through the informed consent time over time, and I remained open
and honest all through my stay in the field. Also, I provided the background and purpose of the
study, as well as the potential outcomes of the study. Despite my explanation, some of the traders
asked if I was hired to research by some politicians who give small loans to traders, particularly
at the eve of the general elections. Sometimes, participants misrepresented my position as a
fieldworker; some of them were of the view that I was employed by some MFBs to do a market
survey for them to identify viable customers. To ensure participants were not involved in the
study for any selfish reasons, I kept on explaining the purpose of my study as well as its scope
and limit. I showed them my USF identity card and letter of introduction.
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Benefits and Lack of Trust: Some traders asked about the benefits of participation in the study.
Many of them expressed a lack of trust on the part of the government. I explained to them about
the potential benefits of the study in terms of how it could help in providing sound policy
informed decision both in public and private domains. Many of them reechoed their loss of
interest in governance while some declined to participate in the study. However, some traders
participated not only because of the potential outcomes but also that they are proud of attending
to students doing research generally.
Navigating Local Politics and Power Structure in Marketplaces: There were some ethical
dilemmas in navigating in marketplaces. The major one was how to identify different power
structures within a marketplace because an average trader would like to know if I have consulted
and accepted by the “market authority” usually they would specifically ask if I have met the
“Iya’loja” and sometimes including “Baba’loja” (i.e., the female-head and the male-head). This
situation was problematic in a few cases where I observed that there were paralleled authorities
in the marketplaces. I tried as much as I could to emphasize my purpose in the marketplace, and I
showed them my USF identity card and my letter of introduction. I further explained that I was
interested in speaking with traders of all kinds, particularly traders who have borrowed/taken
loans of any kind. This approach erased any form of harm to dignity and bodily and material
wellbeing of the research population.
The Privacy Issue: In the field, maintaining absolute privacy and confidentiality while
conducting interviews was very challenging. One, the spatial configuration of the marketplaces
often creates some challenges. That is, the construction of the stalls/shops does not permit
privacy (e.g., See Figure 3.1). Also, as I have mentioned earlier, some traders did not feel
comfortable providing information when they were all alone. They often wanted to be sure of
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what information to give and what not to give. Hence, they call on nearby co-traders to join the
conversation/interview. I have anonymized all the informants’ identity in chapters that follow
(i.e. data presentation and analysis) to ensure their privacy is maintained accordingly.

Figure 3.7: The Display of Trade Items at Ojoo Market in Ibadan.

Figure 3.8: The Display of Trade Items Along Roadside at Ojoo Market in Ibadan.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed the ethnographic methods used in the research design,
setting, methodological approaches and ethical implications in the study. I explored mixed
methods in collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. I used ethnographic survey to
support data I collected through participant observation, focus group discussion, and informal
and semistructured interviews. I began the research by allowing the participants to tell their
experiences with no bias expectations or guided questioning toward a particular answer. And I
carefully listened to them. Many of them allowed me to record our conversation and I used
camera to take pictures with some informants and relevant pictures of different scenes and
locations.
It is important to know that doing ethnographic fieldwork in a marketplace could put
a researcher in a very difficult situation for some reasons; one, many a time, having a one-on-one
interview session with participants could be practically impossible. Such situations threatened
privacy issues among other ethical considerations. Two, it created unwarranted suspicion among
the participants because a few of them misrepresented me for someone working for the
microfinance banks. So, they thought I could either favor or work against them. In spite of these
challenges, chain referral/snowballing sampling technique served good purposes in navigating
the marketplaces and speaking with traders and borrowers with firsthand experience without
being panic or taken me for someone coming for loan drive and loan recovery. However, the use
of semi-structured interviewing and informal interviewing methods made me overcome potential
bias and skewness of data collected because of their flexibility and malleability.
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Chapter Four: The Landscape of Lending and Borrowing: The Structure of Microfinance
in Southwest Nigeria

Introduction

I started my trade 17 years ago in my mother’s shop, and I have
experience particularly in selling pepper, tomatoes and all kinds of
vegetables. I began to trade with ₦15,000 [US$42], the loan I
collected from LAPO Microfinance Bank, and my weekly repayment
was ₦750 [US$2.]. Now, my business is growing, and I take a loan
worth of ₦200,000[US$550] from microfinance banks. Also, I
support it with different terms of ‘ajo/esusu’ [daily contributions to
rotating credit associations] and I joined cooperative investment and
credit union to get more money to support my business and offset the
debt.
- Petty Commodity Producer in Ibadan
In this chapter, I use the excerpt above to present the arrangements of and relations
between different means of attending to issues of microfinancialization among the operators of
the informal sector in southwest Nigeria. The market vendors and petty commodity producers in
Ibadan explore various ways of mobilizing microcredit for their businesses. Essentially,
platforms such as 1) microfinance banks, 2) cooperative investment and credit unions, and 3)
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) serve as the bedrock upon which many, if not
all, entrepreneurs rest their businesses. For instance, the informant whose excerpt I present above
emphasized that she combines those three the means of microfinancialization to keep herself in
business. In this chapter, I present what I describe as the bedrock of microfinancialization and its
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peculiarities in the context of this study. I disaggregate the constituents of the bedrock of
microfinancialization operate independently and how the borrowers explore and exploit all these
constituents in ensuring that they have means of funding their businesses. This bedrock I
conceptualize as “the tripod of microfinancialization in the informal economic sector.” In this
study, I show that operators in the informal sector cannot do without the tripod of
microfinancialization, either all sources of credit or only one, to augment their business. The
tripod of microfinancialization has its three constituents operating somewhat independently, but
in the world of entrepreneurs these sources of credit are often combined to make a whole of their
business ventures.
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) describes microfinance as “the
provision of financial services to low-income people. It refers to a movement that envisions a
world where low-income households have permanent access to high-quality and affordable
financial services to finance income-producing activities, build assets, stabilize consumption, and
protect against risk.”6 In Ibadan, borrowers of microfinance bank (MFB) loans primarily refer to
it as microcredit, and they take such from several microfinance banks. Their conception of MFB
loans is closely tied to “the disbursement of tiny loans to the poor so that they can undertake
income-generating activities” (Bateman, Maclean, and Galbraith 2017, back cover). As to the
definition presented by CGAP, it is still debatable whether borrowers have access to “highquality and affordable services or not.” Also, on the question of “services,” it is important to look
at the structure of microfinance as operationalized in the context of this study. I think that such
an attempt will give us detailed lived experience (i.e., the actual) rather than what is expected

Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. “What is Microfinance?” (n.d.)., Accessed on January 10, 2017,
https://www.microfinancegateway.org/what-is-microfinance
6
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(the ideal) or a glimpse of what borrowers experience. Therefore, in my analysis, I aligned more
to the description of microfinance presented by Bateman, et al. (2017).

In a simple term, the operators of the informal sector in southwest Nigeria conceive
of a microfinance bank as a domain where they access microcredit for their businesses. One of
the core values of anthropological research is to put into greater consideration the emic
perspective. That is, the perspective of the anthropologist’s interlocutors – according, of course,
to the anthropologist as there is no non-mediated way of accessing these perspectives. I am not
trying to downplay the essence of the etic approach, or a scholarly, comparative perspective, but
the microfinance model has been at the center of international development discourse for several
decades now (Bateman 2017; Khavul 2010; Mersland, Randøy, and Strøm 2011) but most
studies lack the perspectives from the borrowers. And if that is the case, I think it is high time we
allowed for its definition from its end users (women in the market/borrowers/petty commodity
producers). One thing that resonates in their conception of MFBs is the fact that they make
repayments either weekly or monthly. In my interviews with officers of MFBs, they put a high
premium on members sending their weekly repayment promptly. They emphasized that a
member’s presence is not as important as the availability of her dues/repayment, including her
weekly savings. In our conversation, Mrs. Triple-A made her point in Yoruba language “Ko’wo
pe ni…ki se ko’ju pe” (“Weekly repayment is a ‘must,’ but attendance/physical presence is not
the main priority”). The narrative explains the fact that group members’ presence at their weekly
meetings is not as important as their repayment. Either a member sends her weekly repayment,
or she brings it.
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When I probed further to know why they come up with such a sharp local concept,
she explained:
My own is to collect my money; I don’t have to see any group member…
just let me have my money and my savings. If my group members are not
paying up their debt, you have the obligation as the group leader to
balance up their debts and interest with their savings, and if they come
next time to request for a loan, you tell them that all loans have been
rejected from the headquarters.
The result of this process is as tendency where what started as social bonds of commonality in
the establishment of ROSCAs and other microcredit groups becomes more and more mediated
by money. In cooperative investment and credit unions (CICUs) and ROSCAs, a microlending
group leader is mostly held responsible whenever a member misses her weekly repayment.
Ideally, all the group members are held responsible equally and collectively in such a situation.
Microlending institutions prefer to lend to an already-established group with a designated leader
who will be in charge of making sure that payments are made. This situation is to me analogous
to British indirect rule under colonialism. The authorities appoint local leaders and get those
local leaders to discipline the population. It is a relatively “cheap” way of effecting rule. This
notion of discipline can be deduced from the statement of the informant in the excerpt above.
However, what do you expect when attending the meetings is not considered more importantly
once the members make their repayments? Hence, only a few members who are present would
be dealing with that because their client officer (CO) will not leave until all the weekly
contribution is complete. One of the lessons I pick from the excerpt presented above is, despite
the fact that neoliberal ideology (Chang 2002; DeSoto 1989; Green 2012; Harvey 2007)
presupposes that an individual is open to choices and capable of responsible for/to her/himself in
terms of rational choices s/he makes, yet there are prices to pay in either which way. It is
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important to note that some microlending institutions refer to their staff as client officer (CO)
while some refer to them as loan officer (LO).
For instance, if Mrs. Triple A preferred prompt submission of payment by members
(as at when due) to having them in attendance for meetings, she would bear the consequences of
paying for members who default for one reason or another. On the other hand, if she placed a
high premium on attendance such that group members would have opportunity to bond well and
know current happenings in one another’s lives, then everyone would make her repayments and
see group bonds as an additional value. I argue that the latter choice (high premium on group
attendance of meeting while making their weekly repayments) supports empirical studies that
women rely on the strength of group mobilization, associations, and cooperation formed among
themselves to meet daily needs (Afonja 1975; Lebeuf 1963; Rodima-Taylor 2013; Tripp 1994).
In addition to high emphasis on prompt weekly repayment by group leaders,
borrowers often result to blaming one another for default issues. For example, below are
expressions from some of the informants:

“Some might collect it and not monitor it properly and does not pay
back it may cause problems. If someone collects the money and uses it
for parties or to show off and make new clothes, they might not be able
to pay back. I have heard a lot about people who collect loans and use
the money to buy unnecessary things.”

“The problem is that some traders who take loans don’t know how to
use it. For example, a person who does not have a shop but takes a loan
of over ₦30,000 [less than $100] and expect to still make profit. I do
not think that is possible.”
These expressions imply that members are indirectly enforcing repayments among themselves in
order to allow other members to take turns in their loan applications. To an extent, this practice
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becomes inevitable because new loan applications would not be approved by the loan officers
unless all group members had their repayments up to date. This study illuminates how global
capitalism and neoliberal policies and ideologies weaken the essence of group formation and joint
liability that ought to be enjoyed by borrowers of microfinance group loans. The empirical
evidence from this study shows how group members are encouraged to understand that repayment
of their loans is more important than being available for group meetings and listening to one
another’s concerns both in business/trade and other spheres of life. Therefore, based upon the
evidence presented here it can be argued that global capitalism entails tendencies that undermine
the essence of group solidarity.

Microfinance Banks and their Loan Products
In Chapter 2, I reviewed a broad range of geographically diverse financial services to
low-income clients and entrepreneurs. Particularly, I pointed out that in Nigeria, from the 1980s
on, several state-driven microcredit initiatives were established and up until the time of this study
the Nigerian state showed an interest in adopting microcredit as an approach to reducing both
rural and urban poverty. A document of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009 indicated there were
about 840 microfinance banks in Nigeria as of 2008 (Fabanwo 2008). The distribution of these
microfinance banks across the six geo-political zones of the country depicted the northwest with
57 (6.8 percent); northcentral, 109 (13 percent); northeast, 33 (3.9 percent); southwest, 353 (42
percent); south-south 114 (13.6 percent); and southeast, 174 (20.7 percent). As of the end of
August 2009, 903 microfinance banks had received their licenses with all regulatory incentives,
but the policy objectives, goals, and targets of the banks have not been realized (Cook 2011;
Sanusi 2011).
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Some of these initiatives included Nigeria Agricultural Cooperative and Rural
Development Bank, established in 1972, Rural Banking Programs (1977), and the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund Decree (1976). Also, Community Banks were established to
provide banking and financial services for the rural economies and micro enterprises in urban
centers. Government structured these community banks on communal ownership, and the first
community bank started operations in 1990. And there were 504 community banks by May 2004
(Olaitan 2006). Other policy-related positions held by the government Ministries, Departments
and Agencies (MDAs) such as Central Bank of Nigeria included Sectoral Allocation of Credit
and Concessional Interest: “Until 1996, the Central Bank of Nigeria issued guidelines on sectoral
allocation of credit with concessional interest rates for agriculture” (Olaitan 2006, 3). Also, a
specified percentage of total deposit mobilized in the rural areas were to be lent to borrowers in
such areas to retain returns on investments within the communal setting. Genuinely, these were
some of the efforts the Nigerian government made to ensure the citizenry have access to
microcredit loan facilities. In my interaction with one of the former commissioners in Oyo State,
he pointed out:
In 2020, the Oyo State government and the Bank of Industry have
entered into a partnership for a microlending scheme. The two entities
raised a total of ₦1 billion, with each contributing ₦500 million. But
the account was managed by the Bank of Industry. It was called
BoIOYSG Funds. The interest rate was set at 10 percent, i.e. 5 percent
on the Oyo State’s ₦500 million (US$1.4 million) and 5 percent on
the Bank of Industry’s ₦500 million. To make this fund accessible
and affordable for petty traders in the state, the Oyo State
Government conceded its 5 percent meaning a 5 percent interest rate
on a loan. Another intervention was TradeMoni that entailed the
federal government making efforts to ensure traders would be able to
obtain small loans to equip their businesses.
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These were the different efforts geared towards financial inclusion put in place by the state and
federal governments by the early 2020s. However, there is need to search beyond identified
blueprints in order to know the views of the targeted beneficiaries. In Chapter 5, I present views
from various stakeholders (administrators, politicians, leaders of market associations, traders and
borrowers) in order to understand dynamics of the politics of distribution of common/state
wealth and the dividends of democracy.
As at September 2018, there were 882 licensed microfinance banks in Nigeria.7 The
popular ones have branches across their respective states both at national and regional levels. A
few MFBs with various branches across rural and urban settlements in Ibadan and its environs.
Popular among the microfinance banks are Association for Social Improvement and Economic
Advancement (ASIEA), Lift Above Poverty Organization (LAPO), SEAP Microfinance Bank,
AB Microfinance Bank, Groomy Microfinance Bank, Advance Lafayette Microfinance Bank,
Seedvest Microfinance Bank, Grace and Mercy Microfinance bank, Greenfield Microfinance
Bank, ZEDVANCE Microfinance Institute, FBN Microfinance Bank, and FCMB Microfinance
Bank, to mention a few.
However, borrowers who participated in this study did not mention the FBN
Microfinance Bank and the FCMB Microfinance Bank. But it worth mentioning these two MFBs
because they are a business extension of two major commercial banks (First Bank of Nigeria Plc
and First City Monument Bank Plc) in the country. The ownership of MFBs by these large
commercial banks is suggestive of the idea that microfinance is considered a fertile ground for

Proshare Intelligent Investing. “Licensed Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in Nigeria as at September 30, 2018.”Published10/29/2018
– CBN, https://www.proshareng.com/news/REGULATORS/The-List-of-882-CBN-Licensed-Microfinance-Banks-in -NigeriaAs-At-Sept-30--2018/42497. Of this figure, 326 MFBs were located in the southwest region (Lagos -170 MFBs; Oyo - 53 MFBs;
Ogun - 49 MFBs,; Osun – 29; Ondo - 17 MFBs; and Ekiti - 8 MFBs) of the country.
7
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private investors. This was evidenced in my interview with Mr. Larry, the manager of Triple B
MFI. In our conversation, he discussed the pros and cons of working in any microfinance
institute extensively; he talked about the intricacies of pursuing defaulters and engaging in loan
recovery activities. When concluding his comments, he said:

Despite all the challenges I discussed, MFI is a very lucrative
business. The interest rate is 15 percent for daily lending product and
20 percent for a weekly lending product. For instance, if a customer
collected a loan of ₦20,000 [US$57], ₦1,000 [US$3] will be repaid
daily and it will attract 15 percent, and that will amount to ₦23,000
[US$66] including interest. Also, ten people in a group may need
₦50,000 [US$143] each, and it will be ₦500,000[US$1,428] in total
for the whole group. But we must fix a day in a week for all the
members to make their repayments. For example, if they are to pay
₦2,000 [US$6] per week, they must all contribute it at once. They
will have their leader who will collect it from them and then give to
their CO to make payment to the MFI
An obvious observation of the presence of many of the popular microfinance banks is their
branding style in terms of uniformity of color across branches, localization in large market areas
and central business districts in the city, as well as showcasing of their activities and products on
posters, fliers and big signposts (See Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.1: A View of SEAP MFB (Photo by author).

Figure 4.2: A View of Flier Advertising Products of SeedVest MFB (Photo by author).
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Figure 4.3: A View of Poster Advertising Products of ZEDVANCE MFB (Photo by author).

In Nigeria, microfinance banks (MFBs) are slightly different from microfinance
institutions (MFIs) in terms of loan products and services they render to their customers. MFIs
provide strictly lending services while MFBs provide services such as lending, cash collection,
and deposit. MFBs also issues Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards for their customers to
make withdrawals and deposits. There are a few MFIs and their requirements vary depending on
their mission statement and goal. For example, for the ZEDVANCE MFI one of its requirements
is that a client must have an active salary account and be in paid employment other than personal
business, be a Nigerian, have an employment identity card, and, finally, must possess an official
email address. Its interest rates range between 4 percent and 4.3 percent while some MFIs charge
up to 15 percent and 20 percent. As for MFBs, their interest rates range from 3.6 percent to 6.5
percent. The Central bank of Nigeria regulates activities of the MFBs and MFIs. One of the
managers of an MFB I interviewed expressed his opinion about the issue of regulation:
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“Everything is regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria. To me, MFI is an open-ended name to
capture everyone doing something, and MFB operates cash deposit.” As he said this, he was
shaking his head, and her overall countenance depicted that there might be more to that in the
actual sense. However, he was not willing to express further comments as he asked me to go on
with another question. His comments slightly explained lack of uniformity I observe in the
activities of the MFIs and MFBs, in terms of their loan products and services and interest rates.
The kind of popularity gained by microfinance model largely rests on the assumption
that people (particularly women) will have access to loans without possessing any physical
property to stand as collateral, rather they will enjoy their social collateral (group relationship).
This assumption may not be so in all situations as found out in this study. Here is what an MFB
manager has to say when recounting the stages involved in accessing some loan products in his
branch:
Prospecting, application, loan processing, home visit/business place
visit, the gathering of information, collateral visit [(depending on the
amount involved]. We do not tell our clients to bring collateral, but it
is for them to pledge it upon taking a loan such that if the conditions
are not met, the collateral will be seized.
MFB employees often embark on prospecting activities by marketing their products to traders.
Even if MFBs don’t officially require the presentation of collateral, informally collateral is often
requested (for example, the inspection of household appliances such as televisions, refrigerators,
sewing machines, motorcycles and so on – items of value that can potentially be seized from
defaulters) and this situation demonstrates the difference between the “ideal” and the “actual”
situations as played out in the lived experience of borrowers of microcredit loans. On the part of
MFBs and MFIs, such improvisation of retaining customers’ belongings could be a way of
keeping afloat in business as well. A narrative that runs across lenders’ comments is that
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government policy sometimes is not favorable to MFBs and MFIs. For instance, the government
requirement for MFB and MFI initial capital was changed from ₦100 million (US$286,000) to
₦1 billion (US$2.9 million) in 2020. In addition to this policy, those MFBs that want to operate
beyond a state within Nigeria must have ₦5 billion (US$14.3 million) while to operate within a
single state they must have as a capital base ₦1 billion (US$2.9 million). Therefore, there is a
fear of being squeezed out of business, coupled with the fact that the Central Bank of Nigeria has
closed about 158 MFBs and MFB owners and their employee believe that high default rate is the
cause and it is a major threat to their business.
Other loan products include Daily Saving Scheme Loan (DSS), Kia-Kia Loan, and
Group Loans. The DSS loan helps the account holder to apply for a loan in advance after
operating it for more than a month and the loan cycle lasts two months. The “Kia-Kia” (“very
fast”) loan cycle lasts three months and the interest rate is 3.5 percent. This means that if a
borrower took ₦100,000 (US$286), interest paid monthly is ₦3,500 naira (US$10). Group Loans
require a separate account for a group (not less than five members), and a group must have a
president, secretary, and treasurer who will oversee its affairs. Also, a group must have a
permanent meeting place, and each member in a group must have a separate account. The MFBs
will pay the total equity contribution of a group into their savings accounts. In some MFIs, the
daily lending product has an interest rate of 15 percent, and borrowers make their repayment
daily. And the interest rate on group loan in MFIs is about 20 percent.
On November 8, 2018, I set out around 10:30 a.m., and I got to one of the branches of
Triple-A MFB (name anonymized) within Ibadan metropolis at around 11 a.m. In the banking
hall were people sitting on the left-hand side, and I thought they were customers who had come
for various reasons. The seats were orderly arranged, and people were taking turns as the MFB
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staff were attending to them in the order in which they were seated. I really could not
differentiate the setting from that of conventional/commercial banks. There were at least 40
people waiting to be seen. I could see the staff of the Triple-A MFB was going up and down,
attending to their customers. It was a busy day, I supposed. I spoke with the security personnel I
met at the entrance on my way in, and he asked, “Who do you want to see?” I hurriedly
answered, and I notified him of my mission. He made his way straight to the right-hand side of
the banking hall, and I could see his back view from where I stood. He briefly spoke to one of
the staff members, and in no time he made his way back to me. Again, he asked further, “What
exactly do you want to see the manager or any representative for?” Having explained in detail
this time around, then he gave me an option: If I could wait, the manager would be willing to
attend to me, but she was very busy at that time. I accepted to wait, and he gave me a seat
directly opposite of where their customers were taking turns.
I sat and waited patiently. Then, I seized that opportunity to do some close
observation and I brought out my field dairy. Their staff members were all dealing with a bunch
of papers and making a series of photocopies. As I looked closer, all I could see were copies of
identity cards submitted along with the loan application forms by the customers. After a while,
one of their staff members said in Yoruba but not very loudly (and I heard it clearly, although
she was not talking to a particular person, it was more of general comments and act of thinking
aloud), “Ti won ba fe gba owo noni won ma’ma sare’kiri…” (“It is when they want to take a
loan that they will be running up and doing”). In the end, after I waited for about 45 minutes, the
same security personnel came back to tell me that the manager said I should come later in the
week because she would not be able to attend to me on that day.
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The comment made by the employee of Triple-A MFB during my visit reminded me
of my encounter with some CO/LOs (client/loan officers) who participated in a focus group
discussion I conducted. They all alluded to the fact that giving loans to many of their customers
is the easiest thing to do. In contrast, making repayments by borrowers takes a lot of stress
because some of them are not willing to pay back. Taking microfinance banks’ loan produces
mixed feeling both from the side of the CO/LO (client/loan officer) and the side of the
borrowers. It is a sign of progress and being productive for a loan officer to have a robust
portfolio/ S/he keeps her/his job. However, problems ensue when her/his portfolio has an
unacceptable number of defaulters and bad debts. On the side of a borrower, taking loans often
comes with excitement and eagerness to keep oneself in business. Perhaps this excitement may
not last a loan cycle because repayment begins realistically after a week or two weeks and then
everything depends on the state of market and sales. An implicit mixed feeling on both sides
(CO/LO and borrower) suggested that everyone was attempting to make ends meet. In other
words, efforts made by client/loan officers and borrowers are pointing to their enhancement of
survival. One of the participants in the focus groups discussion shared her experience as a loan
officer:
My experience in microfinance… I studied accounting back in school.
To me, I thought when I graduated, I will get a better job, but after I
graduated, I had no choice than to pick up the microfinance job, but it
wasn’t easy. These people, when you give them money [loan] their
prayer is that you should die so you won’t come back to ask for the
money. In their mind, they are not happy with us, you will give them
money [loan] in ease, but to payback is a problem. Whenever you
want to collect your money, you collect it with a fight, and you will
be wondering someone who came to your office pleading, it isn’t easy
at all.
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As they relayed their lived experience, it is evident that lenders’ employees and
borrowers are frustrated. And this experience is connected to their survival. There are several
similar and opposing views about the common assertion (that no trader can be successful in
business without a strong reliance on the tripod of microfinancialization) coming from the
borrowers. Microlending scheme has provided a platform which encourages competition among
operators; borrowers are willing to use any tactics to ensure that intended loans are given to
them, even if they are less certain of successful repayment all through the loan cycle. On the
other hand, loan officers are happy to receive commendation as performers in their job at least
during loan disbursement, even if they are less certain of successful and timely repayments by
their clients.

The Cooperative Investment and Credit Union
The history of cooperative societies in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial period
when cocoa farmers pool their farm produce to sell at a better price than they had been receiving
because they believed that their intermediaries were not treating them well. But they failed, and
that was why the then-government of the Western Region decided to help them in selling their
produce. Farmers organized themselves into groups. And, officially, the first cooperative society
was established in Nigeria on August 19, 1937. It was registered as the Gbedun Cooperative
Cocoa Sale Society Limited and had 205 original members. They established the Nigeria Cocoa
Marketing Board in 1947. And it was required by a colonial ordinance to assist in the
development of the cocoa industry in Nigeria for the benefit and prosperity of the producers
(Galletti, Baldwin and Dina 1956; see also Jones 1958). The Nigerian state began to regulate the
affairs of the cooperative union about this time. At some point after this period, cooperative
societies/unions were able to secure loans from the government to help their members through
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the cooperative bank established by the Western Region government. The idea is that people can
form cooperative societies which will be under a cooperative union and there will be government
MDAs which will be responsible for the coordination of the affairs of the union, including
registration and ratification. Figures 4.4 and Figure 4.5 illustrate the list of the very first set of
cooperative unions which registered with the Ministry of Trade, Investment, and Cooperatives.
The figures show the unions’ names, the number of members, dates of registration, and the states
in which unions were established within the Western Region of Nigeria. A key informant who
has been serving as the manager of one of the largest cooperative unions in Ibadan since 1995
said they formed the cooperative union in 1979 with ten societies. And when she became
employed as the manager, there were already about 35 societies.

Figure 4.4: A List of First Set of Cooperative Societies registered with the Government of Western
Region in Nigeria (Photo by author).
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Figure 4.5:

A Section of the List Showing Dates, Name of the Societies and Their State
(Photo by author).

The “orthodox cooperative” and “departmental cooperative” are the two categories of
CICUs in southwest Nigeria. The former is a cooperative society/union formed by
traders/artisans/farmers or any group outside of government and private establishments. While
the latter is the type found across government and privately-owned establishments, such as
cooperative societies/unions formed by corporate workers/employees like teachers or any form
of civil servants. Examples of the “departmental” cooperative societies are Federal Cooperative
College Cooperative Investment and Credit Society Eleyele, University of Ibadan Muslim Staff
Islamic Cooperative Investment and Credit Society, University of Ibadan Teacher’s Cooperative
Society, and the Jaja Clinic Cooperative Society. Examples of “orthodox” cooperative societies
include Ifelodun-Orogun Unity Cooperative Investment and Credit Society Agbowo Ibadan, and
the Kajola Cooperative Investment and Credit Society to mention only a few. Generally,
cooperative societies/union usually charge 1.5 percent interest rate on loan facilities given to
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members, and they have a tradition of the “sharing bonus” among members (i.e., whatever
interest they accrue at the end of every business year). Ideally, a cooperative society does not
make “profit.” Rather, it is called a “bonus.” They generate the bonus by taking ₦15 on every
₦1,000 at society level and on ₦10 that is taken on every ₦1,000 at union level. Sharing of the
yearly bonus is dependent on the contribution made by each member. Members who are
interested in obtaining loans take three times of their savings. For instance, if a member saved up
to ₦50,000 (US$143), s/he could be loaned ₦150,000 (US$429), and a borrower payback in six
months. Some CICUs allow members to make repayment for ten months. On the question of the
“orthodox cooperative” and “departmental cooperative,” she (the manager mentioned above)
argued:
When I got here, I met close to 35 cooperative societies, but now it is
going down due to the economic situation and because many
“departmental cooperative unions” are beginning to spring up. Some
departmental cooperative unions’ operation is affecting the orthodox
cooperative because some government employees are running two or
more cooperative societies with the “orthodox” while they still
operate another in their workplace [“departmental”] which is not
good. Whenever they need to borrow money, they return to orthodox,
and they still make money from the departmental cooperative union
they belong. Other members who are self-employed do not enjoy
such.
What I understand from her comments is the idea that a cooperative society is created based on
needs and that a cooperative society is operated both in the formal organizations/establishments
and the informal economic sector. Individuals who are eligible to join a cooperative society
which falls under the category of “departmental” must be employees of such organizations,
either public or private. However, non-employees of organized establishments are not allowed to
be members of “departmental” cooperative societies. In other words, individuals who have
common concerns in terms of financial needs can form a cooperative society which falls under
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the designation “orthodox” and anyone can join. The point made in the last four lines of the
quote in the excerpt above illuminates yet another way in which the informal economic sector
could be taken for granted (yet it services the entire economy with little or no
acknowledgement), and it could be a domain where all and sundry harness economic
opportunities with little or no restriction.
Key to the functioning of a cooperative society is that it is self-financed, and I would
describe it as the association of people who have come together voluntarily to operate based on
equality to uplift their wellbeing. The government MDAs regulate cooperative societies affairs.
In the same way, a cooperative society has rights to make by-laws and provide a copy of them
for the assigned government MDAs. As part of its regulation, a cooperative society must not be
less than ten members; it can be more than ten, but the smaller it is, the easier it is to manage.
Members must share the same views, and it must begin by holding meetings together. In other
words, attending meetings by the members is very important, and everybody must come together
with her/his money and intellect for the benefit of the whole society. In its operation, the general
body must unanimously take a decision, and such decision overrides any decision made by its
executives and principal officers. It is the responsibility of cooperative society members to notify
the Department of Cooperative Services under the Ministry of Trade, Investment and
Cooperative in Oyo State. The first thing to do in the formation of a cooperative society is to
initiate its inaugural meeting, and there will be a representative from the Department of
Cooperatives in attendance. A cooperative society provides the address of its meeting place with
a specific time, and a representative from government MDAs can visit at any time.
It is the responsibility of a cooperative society to choose its principal officers. A
society can have between three and five members as management committee depending on its
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population. The committee may include the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer. A
society must decide on how much members will contribute as shares; members will receive their
shares once a year, and members will decide how much they want. For instance, if they decide to
have ₦10,000 (US$29) as a share for a financial year, no member will have more than ₦10,000
even if they can afford more than the agreed-upon amount. As earlier defined, equality is key to
its affairs and irrespective of the amount a member has, s/he has only one vote. There is
democratic control in its operation, and any member can aspire to be a society’s executive if s/he
has as little as ₦10 as a contribution in society and election must take place every year.
According to a key informant and retired director in the Department of Cooperative Services in
Oyo State, the government put in place some of these decisions as control measures to
discourage some privileged individuals in a cooperative society from hijacking its affairs.
However, the only time members can vote twice is when there is a tie in the election result. And
only the president will decide on how many people will vote.
Also, there is a minimum amount of money that members must pay towards their
savings in a cooperative society. No member must pay less than the amount agreed upon by a
cooperative society general body (which includes all members) on every meeting day. Members
must fix their credit limit as well. A cooperative society often fixes two or three times of their
savings each time members want to apply for a loan. A cooperative society bonus is not subject
to taxation. Members who do not attend meetings pay a fine based upon the general body
agreement on related matters. The government MDAs have the prerogative to provide an annual
calendar for the operation of cooperative societies. For instance, April 1 to March 31 usually is
given, but a cooperative society has the right to alter these dates to suit its purpose. The only
requirement is that decision must be communicated to the assigned government MDA
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accordingly. The government fixes the interest rates for every cooperative society, but a
cooperative society will decide on what to charge as a levy to generate money for recordkeeping’s sake. More importantly, a certain percentage of a cooperative surplus generated every
year should be set aside for the capacity building of the members; such will be used to sponsor
members to attend seminars and workshops.
Government MDAs observe, correct, and inspect records of cooperative societies.
Cooperative extension officers visit cooperative societies and unions from time to time to
provide the required information and education. Also, the government MDAs conduct inquiry
and set up an arbitration panel if need be at any time. For instance, the Oyo State government
currently has over 80 field inspection officers working across the 33 Local Government Areas of
the state. In a time of arbitration, the “award” is whatever the government representative
adjudges over a dispute within a cooperative society. A cooperative society usually has 21 days
to appeal if not satisfied with any award. However, if no party appeals within the period, that
means the party is satisfied. If the party does not obey, then it will go for “enforcement.” This
involves enlisting the services of a lawyer who will take the case to the High Court for
enforcement. It is a convention that cooperative matters are not taken directly to any court
without exploring these stages of arbitration.
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
The tripod of microfinancialization has as its third leg the ROSCAs which I defined in
Chapter 2 above. Traders and entrepreneurs in southwest Nigeria refer to it as “ajo” which may
imply daily, weekly, and monthly contributions depending on their modus operandi. A common
factor in weekly and monthly rotating contributions is that the two types involve a group of
people coming together solely to contribute a stipulated amount of money as a unit or share (this
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is called “ợwợ”). Also, the two allow a member to have it, and it goes on like that until the last
member has her/his own. A member can have more than one unit (“ợwợ”). Members usually
draw a ballot from inception, and every member knows when to take her/his contribution. A
daily contribution is not made on a rotating basis. Ideally, it is purely an informal arrangement
where the contribution collector (either a woman, “Mama Alajo” or a man, “Baba Alajo) would
make her/his way to the market areas and neighborhood to collect clients’ contribution.
Typically, clients take their contribution at the end of each month; the contribution collector will
take a one-day contribution out of a 31 day’s contribution depending on the number of days in a
month. Contribution collectors will provide a yearly card for their clients, and each time a client
makes a payment it will be marked in their cards with signatures as evidence of payment.
What I consider innovative about how traders explore daily contributions in recent
times is the idea that the anticipated sum of a contribution can be given in advance while the
borrowers contribute towards it until the end of the month. The normal (usual) arrangement is
that a trader makes a contribution daily and collects the entire group’s contribution at the end of
every month. As for the contribution collector, a unit of the entire monthly contribution is taken
as charges for savings. For example, if a trader contributed ₦315 (US$1) daily for a month, a
contribution collector would take a unit (₦315 (US$1)) at the end of the month and a trader
would collect (₦9,450 (US$30)) for months that have 31 days. This innovation is bred out of the
competition because some private investors contribute to the scheme as a business. A case
history of my encounter with some participants in this study can provide some insight. As I was
talking with Mrs. Ade, a registered food seller in Scout Camp Neighborhood Market, a woman
came in to see her, and she (Mrs. Ade) gave her some money. In response, the lady opened the
book she was carrying and recorded the transaction in it as she did in a small card given to her by
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my informant. I interjected by asking if she works with any microfinance banks, but she
responded that she is an employee of JT Consult (a pseudonym). Then, I requested her audience,
and she was willing to participate in my study. As we began the interview, she said:
I am a daily contribution collector working for JT Consult, [which is]
a company taking contribution from her customers to ensure they are
disciplined in their savings, and they can get savings at the end of
every month. As a staff, I find a way of giving the anticipated amount
to my customers ahead of time without the knowledge of the
company. Then, my customers are paying their contribution every
day. For example, if a customer is contributing ₦1,000 [nearly US$3]
per day. I would have given such a customer ₦30,000 [US$86] before
the end of the month, and such amount is contributed towards by the
end of the month. If I do not improvise as a marketer, I will not have
any customer, and I will not be able to keep my job.
The situation presented by the employee of JT Consult is suggestive of the idea that she
developed such innovation out of the competition to maintain her clients and sustain her job.
Implicit in her explanation is the fact that unemployment/underemployment is an issue, and
people are locked in the web of survival as they struggle to do anything to sustain even their nonlucrative job. The situation equally may explain why some loan officers of MFBs/MFIs give into
mounting pressure from their supervisors and begin issuing threats to their customers/borrowers
to ensure their jobs are not lost. Investment companies are leveraging on being able to provide
the anticipated sum of the monthly contribution to their customers and that phases out
individuals who solely survive on collecting daily contributions. Some of these companies have
daily, weekly, and monthly products; for a daily product, they give out loans between 1st and 10th
of the month, and the borrowers will be making daily repayment. They design their monthly
product for salary earners. Small investment companies established by individuals (sole
proprietors) are taking advantage of microfinance market situation of daily contribution; they
provide anticipated sum of money for traders and petty commodity producers who are in dire
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need to small credit. Their activities are not as big as that of MFBs/MFIs. However, their
activities are necessarily not new to traders; for example, TJ Consultant agent does exactly what
a daily contribution collector (known in the past) does but a major advantage is that traders can
have access to expected sum of contribution ahead of its maturity time to augment their
businesses. However, there is a kind of predatory process of commercialization occurring in that
some of these sole proprietors take advantage of cheap/surplus labor resulting from high
unemployment rate in Nigeria. The case of TJ Consulting staff depicts for the fear of not losing
her job she has to come up with such strategies of commoditizing loans for her clients.
Vendors’ Strategies for Exploiting the Tripod of Microfinancialization
In this subsection, I consider how the constituents of the tripod of
microfinancialization are understood, explored, and exploited by the market vendors and
entrepreneurs in southwest Nigeria. The evidence I present below is centered on how
microfinance bank loans, CICU loans, and ROSCA savings and contributions are manipulated to
advantage by the operators of the informal economic sector. Virtually all the participants of this
study attest to the fact that their businesses survive on the tripod of microfinancialization.
However, of course we cannot take their position as given and applicable to all traders in all
situations. As we will see below, some traders use all the three constituents which form the basis
of the tripod of microfinancialization while some explore mainly two but, significantly, all of
them use ROSCAs as a major way of providing stable finance for their businesses. We can begin
to understand the roles microfinance, credit, and debt played in neoliberal capitalism in Nigeria
from the narratives of various actors within the informal economic sector. For instance, one of
the traders in Bodija Market expresses her views on mobilizing credit for her business from
different sources:
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Well, I did it consecutively. For example, any time I received money
from my cooperative society contribution, I direct that money into my
business because money is the root of all trades. And Bodija is a
profitable market to have a business, and there is nothing someone
sells here that will not bring profit, but there is no money to put into
the business. Doing only cooperative society contribution will affect
the business negatively. For instance, I contribute ₦30,000 [US$86]
every month toward my cooperative society loan and MFB loan but if
I want to take that amount from my business every month it will
affect my capital. So, I do daily contribution of ₦1000 [over US$3]
and when I collect that at the end of every month, I use it for
repayment of the loans I have taken from the cooperative society. I
also do other rotatory contribution with fellow traders within this
market and I belong to other social groups where will contribute small
amount of money during our meetings… we use everything to
augment our trade activities.
In her situation and as in that of many other traders, she believed there was a need for a constant
supply of funds to go into her business and that the only way to achieve this was by mobilizing
credit facilities from microfinance banks and cooperative societies. There is a consciousness
among traders of how to ensure they are keeping up with their business. Traders survive on
group formation in working the tripod of microfinancialization. In taking MFB loans, forming a
group with fellow traders and people they believe they know very well is key. Also, members of
CICUs invite their friends and close associates to apply for membership in their union before
they are accepted. And as stated in Chapter 2, “ajo/esuu” ROSCAs are organized among people
who have confidence in one another, often with those living in close proximity. Even though
neoliberal capitalism imposes a high premium on individuality, entailing “an idea that the
resolution of every social problem requires the further individualization and financialization of
social provision and intercourse” (Fine 2017, 697), the market vendors and entrepreneurs rely on
group formation in attaining set goals in their respective trades.
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When formulating a borrowing strategy, some market vendors prefer to obtain loans
from cooperative societies rather than microfinance banks. For instance, a market vendor
expressed her views:
If I would advise anybody to choose it would be cooperative society
because of the interest rate disparity between the two. A cooperative
society’s interest rate is lesser than the microfinance banks’, and for
microfinance banks’ loan if you failed to make your monthly
repayment it will accumulate, and their loan officers will take it by
force.
Traders tend to favor seeking loans from cooperative societies not only because of the interest
rate, which is fixed at 1.5 percent. But, also, because the cooperative societies do not treat
defaulters the same way that MFB loan officers will treat them. As some of the participants of
this study put it:
But cooperative is way better because their interest is not so high and
cooperative gives people 6 months to return the money borrowed.
Some people here collect ₦300,000 (roughly US$1000) if they have
₦100,000 (roughly US$300). Microfinance collects repayments
weekly while cooperatives collect repayments monthly. For example,
if someone collects, ₦100,000 the interest is ₦1,500. If the person is
to complete repayment in 10 months and if the person can make
repayment earlier than stipulated they will review the terms of
repayment. The interest of cooperatives is 1.5%. At the end of every
year, they give all their members bonus according to their
contributions. But microfinance banks don’t do that. That is why I
think cooperative societies are better than microfinance banks. Also,
members don’t have to carry plastic feeling embarrassed and going
from one place to another begging for money.
To buttress what the first informant said when drawing comparison about loans taken from
cooperative societies and MFBs/MFIs, the other informant said:
Cooperatives societies are the best. They give people loan to do
business. They don’t just lend people money. You must be a member
for at least 6 months before they can give you money. Cooperative
societies are also very helpful. For example, my mother has been a
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member since and when armed robbers came to her house,
cooperative society helped her by lending her money to start another
business.
According to them, MFBs are of use because they do not ask for collateral. But the problem
arises when borrowers become unable to make their repayment when it is due. Then, the loan
officers move to seize the ostensibly not required collateral in the form of the borrowers’
physical assets when the officers begin to apply pressure on them. Here is what a participant has
to say about this situation:
But MFB A (identity anonymized) bank deals with the Police, if you
don’t pay their money on the stipulated day, they will come and take
you to the Police station where you will be asked to pay your debt
with whatever possession you have. As a matter of fact, before you
join them you will be asked if you have any valuable item at home
that you can use as collateral even MFB B does that too, it is only
MFB C that doesn’t do that, all they do is just to check your shop.
MFB A would even ask your guarantors what they have at home.
When you have their money, you will come back for your item but if
you don’t pay up on time, they will sell your items. What MFB D
does is to parade the debtor in the market square, singing and
drumming and telling people that the person is a debtor and if they
can help her/him, they should pay her/his debt.
Because of this, and because, according to the traders, the interest charged by microfinance
banks is too high (as much as 21 percent), MFB loans are only to be taken in extreme
circumstances.
In the course of my ethnographic fieldwork in Ibadan, I met a 92-year-old man who,
when I told him of my research, said that “all is not new” when it comes to how traders
nowadays mobilize credit facilities and offset their debt. He told me:
When I was young around the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, microfinance
bank did not exist, but illiterates usually contributed money. Then,
they used charcoal to write the amount contributed to a wall. Once it
was thirty, they removed one, this usually served as a commission and
transport fare for those in charge of the money. Then they gave 29 to
the contributor. The arrangement was known as AJO.
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While the level of documentation involved in those days was not like what we have in
contemporary society, the collectors’ commission resembles what obtains in the present. A
collector is entitled to a payment of a unit of (amount of) daily contribution at the end of a
month. According to the old man (this participant), they (the contribution collector) pay sum of
the entire contribution made by a contributor to her/him; therefore, there is no issue of reporting
a debtor. For instance, if a trader paid only 25 times in a mount, s/he would collect sum of the
amount contributed 24 times and the collector would have a unit. As for when a ROSCA
contribution was not made, my informant recalled how ROSCA members usually went to the
defaulter’s compound (a family house with different households of related kin) to report the
defaulter to the compound head. According to my informant:
In those days, people were embarrassed easily, unlike now where
people don’t take going to prisons as something shameful and frown
at by people. Whenever a debtor was reported, the family members
would contribute towards making payment so as not to put the whole
family to shame.
His comments reflect some element of collectiveness to an extent, but this is somehow
incompatible to how societies are structured today in Nigeria. However, it is not a function of
moral failing, mainly it is part of the exigencies of capitalism in that trading has become even
more competitive and this drives many vendors to default, even on ROSCA payment.
individual.
Now, to my informant as well as today’s active market vendors, microfinance banks
are tougher than cooperative societies and do not pity borrowers when it comes to default issues;
they confiscate debtors’ property. For instance, here is an informant’s confirmation to this
assertion:
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like MFB A now if you are supposed to pay back your loan… let’s
say like 10:00 o’clock in the morning and you didn’t then afterwards
they called you to come pay your money, the best thing is that don’t
let them call you back because if you don’t pay on time they will
definitely bring the Police the next day. For you to admit an
individual into a group you have to know the person’s house and also
his movement. As a group leader if you are lending money out for a
group member, you have to let him or her know the terms and
condition that apply to the contract and if they are satisfied then you
could give them the loan with their guarantors present and agree that
they will pay the money if the person refuses to pay up and they all
will sign.
Many traders are of the view that cooperative societies are more lenient in their approach when it
comes to default issues. There are some measures in place to discipline non-repaying members
such as levying fines. More so, borrowers are asked to provide two guarantors before they
approve of any loan. Guarantors must be members of the CICU who have shares and whose
savings are capable of offsetting any debt accrued by a borrower. As for the microfinance banks,
participants describe the experience with defaulters as tough. As mentioned above, they invoke
an image to describe the experience: “Owo komulelanta” (“Putting our breasts on a hot kerosene
lantern”). There is the assumption among vendors that microfinance banks let go of their
debtors/defaulters only if they leave their shops and the city or they are dead.
As much as it is advantageous to have access to microcredit facilities, traders and
borrowers have an idea of the fact that every stakeholder is all out for business and profit-making
either as lenders or borrowers. In this regard, MFB loans are a commodity. And not only because
MFBs take interest on every loan approved but also because they train and retrain borrowers to
understand that payments made towards their interest are more important. As the borrowers
make repayments towards the actual MFB loan, they must not fail in contributing to their
compulsory savings and interest accrued. The bonus generated from loans disbursed by CICUs is
shared among members annually. Even though borrowers believe that CICUs do not charge as
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much interest as compared to MFBs, the rationale for taking ₦15 (around US$0.04) on every
₦1,000 naira (nearly US$3) given out as loan facility is to generate profit. One of the participants
reflected on her experience of MFB loans:
…they are making so much profit…because in a situation when I
borrow ₦50,000 (US$159) and I am paying about ₦62,000
(US$197…that is ₦12,000 (US$38) difference…even commercial
banks will not ask me to pay that. And the ₦50,000 (US$159) they
are just giving me for just two months, and you are collecting
money every week. Their profit is on the high side. In between,
they will ask me to collect the form, collect an ID Card, and at the
end of the day, they will not give me everything…I mean the
₦50,000 naira (US$159) because they will tell me I need to have
some money in my account with them. May be when I want a loan
of ₦50,000 naira at the end I might collect ₦39,000 or ₦40,000
naira (US$129 or US$127) and when I want to pay, I will pay over
₦50,000 (US$159) and it is written that I collected ₦50,000
(US$159) and they will still add interest on that ₦50,000
(US$159). So, on a loan of ₦50,000 (US$159) may be I will end
up paying ₦70,000 or ₦80,000 (US$222 or US$254). And initially
they will not tell all this…like the money in the bank for savings,
ID card… and the form, they will not tell one all that. But the day
they want to give you a loan they will now make all those
deductions.
Hence, loans are a commodity sold out with some profit margins, particularly MFBs. Rather than
seeing loans as an extension of aid, borrowers consider microcredit loans as commodities being
traded out to them.
Representations of “free-market capitalism” by capitalists and their ideological allies
construct a nearly unquestioned assumption that the market is fair enough on the part of all its
operators. Meanwhile, the advocates of free-market capitalism promote the idea that
governments are bereft of ideas in terms of market logic as they seek to secure a lack of
regulation (Chang 2012) while, at the same time, seek government support for their enterprises
whether in the form of guaranteed loans or even enforcement of private property laws. For
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market vendors both lenders and borrowers are driven by the profit motive. But in the opinion of
market vendors in southwest Nigeria, lenders benefit more than borrowers in this kind of
business arrangement. For instance, when expressing her viewpoint, a big store owner in Gbagi
Market claims:
It is like the traders taking loans from microfinance banks are working
and making a profit for those banks…because 75 percent of
customers taking money from them are defaulting…in, which only
death is the reason why a defaulter can be left alone. Although, not
taking loans from microcredit banks affects my biz, but I prefer that to
take it and to use my capital base to make repayment of profit I do not
make. Now, I have been processing a loan from the commercial bank
for more than five months, and they have been posting me without
any positive outcome.

However, they all acknowledge the fact that having access to microcredit is absolutely
critical for taking care of their business needs. Further, that it allows women the economic
freedom and independence they desire. As one said:
Owo ti o ma bo ashiri fun onise owo obinrin ati iyawo ile [The kind of
fund that save women traders/artisans and housewives from shame by
empowering them]. O mu itura wa die [It brings about comfort a little
bit]. And it leads to a reduction of hypertension and untimely death.
Owo ti on bo ashiri ni lopolopo [MFB loan covers a lot of financial
loopholes]. Microfinance loan helps in covering secret, in one way or
the other. In present Nigeria, no one can borrow anyone money except
micro-finance banks, that is what I can say about it.

They express a preference for CICUs over the MFBs given interest rates and
consequences in the face of default. As one vendor expressed:
The two are almost the same. Microfinance banks are also
businessmen with their gain, and they even give gifts to appreciate
highly performed customers occasionally. But cooperative societies
would always have some advantages for their members. For example,
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gifting their members throughout the year. Also, a cooperative society
can give more than what you even need. It is more helpful than
microfinance bank, and it is more lenient if you meet its conditions
and cooperative society always share its gains among members.

Borrowers maintain a position that every stakeholder involved is driven by making of
profit. But one is more advantageous than the other based on the level of control borrowers have
in each of the possibilities posed to them. They believe that profit made by MFBs is going to its
shareholders and investors, and they do not have any control over it. However, they believe that
they have some level of ownership and control as members of CICUs. And all the bonus accrued
annually is shared among members based on individual contributions. In terms of the ways
CICUs operate, market vendors expressed their preference for the at least modicum democratic
participation afforded by membership. They contrast this to how they see MFBs operating.
Microfinance banks have a Board of Directors and other management bodies which take care of
their everyday activities. On an everyday basis, borrowers only interface with a few of MFBs’
staff, particularly the marketing officers, loan administrators, loan recovery officers, and
cashiers/tellers. Besides, the two (MFBs and CICU societies) have different advantages to
borrowers. For instance, it is a must for borrowers to make repayment on the agreed day and
time no matter what in the case of microfinance banks, but this is not the situation with
cooperative societies. Borrowers claim that if they fail in making their repayment, cooperative
societies will not disturb them other than the fact that they (borrowers) will pay dues for not
coming, and this rule applies to all members. Also, in cooperative societies, the two guarantors
needed to when taking loans must be from the group, and each must have a contribution worth
50 percent of the loan they want to guarantee. But in microfinance banks, the two guarantors can
be from anywhere.
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Those market vendors in southwest Nigeria who do indeed obtain loans from MFBs
feel that these loans are helpful because they do not have a better option given the level of
economic hardship in the country. In supporting this position, virtually all of them who embrace
microfinance loans agree that such loans are not the best for market vendors and entrepreneurs
who do not have a capital base. They hold on to this opinion because market vendors without a
capital base will have to use the same loan taken to make timely repayments to avoid
harassment, and nothing will be left to continue the business.
Also, what serves as strength for MFBs is the fact that borrowers take their loans
without collateral. In addition to this feature is the short time required in processing loans
provided customers/borrowers meet all the requirements. The loan officers process their loans
applications within a week or two. Some borrowers point out that experience with microfinance
banks has helped to save towards their business because it is not everyone who knows how to
save. It is a practice introduced as part of MFBs’ operations that borrowers partake in
compulsory saving when having an active loan. Borrowers make these compulsory savings
anytime they make their weekly/monthly repayment, and that helps them in having some money
to themselves after their loan cycle. Also, borrowers who are in financial need while still serving
a loan can fall back on their compulsory savings. Technically, such compulsory savings is
introduced as backup and motivation for borrowers to complete their loan cycle when due
without having to be chased around by their loan officers. At the same time, compulsory savings
as a condition of providing loans is a benefit to the bank because the bank has more available
cash to loan at higher interest rates.

129

Conclusion
In this chapter, I identify and discuss the different means of microfinancialization that
market vendors and petty commodity producers of the informal sector in Ibadan utilize in their
business strategies. I discuss what I call the “tripod of microfinancialization” (MFB loans, CICU
loans, and ROSCA savings and credit shares) and argue that the tripod of microfinancialization
is sine-qua-non to the survival and sustenance of businesses among the operators of the informal
economic sector. I describe what microfinance banks mean to the market vendor participants of
my study. The vagaries of everyday lives in conjunction with the experience of loan repayment
and fear of default subjected borrowers/group lending members to a realization that members’
presence is not as important as the availability of their dues/repayment. This conception brought
about popular saying such as “Ko’wo pe ni…ki se ko’ju pe” (“Weekly/monthly repayment is a
‘must’ but attendance/physical presence at meetings is not the main priority”). Hence, such a
concept of “ko’wo pe ni… ki se ko’ju pe” is antithetical to the realization of group bonding and
cooperation. Therefore, this study illuminated yet another subtle way global capitalism, and
neoliberal ideologies are fast eroding the essence of group formation and joint liability among
other advantages borrowers ought to enjoy through group lending schemes. However, as a way
of adjusting to some of the challenges of microfinance under neoliberal capitalism, borrowers
often engage in a kind of cultural hybridity i.e., intense cultural encounters of all kinds (Burke
2009) embedded in the tripod of microfinancialization. What I mean by this is, for example,
when borrowers take advantage of the tripod of microfinancialization most strategically by
mixing and combining its various constituents such as daily contributions, ROSCAs, and MFB
loans. In a way, there exists a continuum between formal and informal practices and such

130

arrangement is parallel to the continuum between modern individualist and traditional communal
behavior with respect to microfinance loans.
I also argue for thick description (Geertz 1973) of the actual lived experience of
borrowers instead of emphasizing the ideal. In my view, the “ideal” often clouds policy
documents and development plans from the government MDAs. I argue that we need to look
beyond the “ideal” and put a spotlight on lived experience (the “actual”) of the beneficiaries of
these microlending initiatives to have much clearer understanding of this phenomenon. In
furtherance of my position which I described as “beneficiaries-centered approach,” I rely largely
on the informants and participants of this study in the selection of microfinance banks based on
their popularity in the world of microlenders. I also present a definition of microfinance based on
their description of what microfinance is, and meanings are generated based on the emic
perspective.
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Chapter Five: Negotiating Debt: The Microfinance Strategies of Market Vendors and Petty
Commodity Producers in Southwest Nigeria

Introduction
In Chapter 4, I identified the tripod of microfinancialization and described how its
constituents serve as the bedrock upon which entrepreneurs base their businesses. Also, I have
given a glimpse of how these constituents (microfinance bank loans, cooperative society loans,
and rotating savings and credit associations, or ROSCAs) are understood and harnessed by
entrepreneurs to enhance their businesses. I have not only pointed out borrowers’ understanding
of microfinance in contrasts with the definition provided by its initiators locally and
internationally but also argued that it is important to derive its definition from the conception
held by the borrowers. In terms of the roles microfinance, credit, and debt play in neoliberal
capitalism in Nigeria, I have presented various ethnographic narratives, and I have evaluated
those largely based on an approach that emphasizes the emic understandings of the system. In
the present chapter, I put into perspective how borrowers manipulate several means of
microfinancialization as part of their overall economic strategies as entrepreneurs. This entails
how they negotiate their statuses as debtors. In search of a working definition of microfinance
strategies, I refer to any form of pragmatic steps made by the market vendors in everyday life to
enhance their financial capabilities individually and collectively as microfinance strategies.
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There are two sides – lenders and borrowers – and they each have their strategies.
Then I discuss how lenders, especially the MFBs are in the position to dictate the terms of
engagement and further, economic, political, and cultural relationships and combine so that
forms of organization and systems of meanings are shaped by fields of economic, political, and
cultural force. This results in “hegemony” (Kurtz 1996, 103) and how an anthropological
approach to political economy does not require the separation of meaning and symbols from a
materialistic analysis of power relations but, in fact, demands that we understand power as
cultural as much as political-economic (Roseberry 1988). We will see the force of cultural
hegemony that will compel women to work and engage strategies such as using ROSCA shares
to pay back loans. Roseberry’s use of hegemony is “not to understand consent but to understand
struggle, the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and
movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate
themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself. What
hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful
framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by
domination” (Roseberry 1996, 80, emphasis in original).
MFB Strategies
In this section, I discuss various strategies of microfinancialization including the
MFBs’ loan officers views and various means they devise not only to ensure that borrowers
make repayments toward loans disbursed to them but also, to keep their jobs by maintaining a
fairly good performance. I also discuss strategies of providing group loans and the loan drive and
shaming practices. Resulting from these various strategies of microfinancialization are “the fear
of being shamed” and issues related to patronage, clientelism, and financial inclusion.
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The Loan Officers’ Views
Just as the borrowers have found various reasons to put the blame on defaulters
among themselves, loan officers equally blame borrowers on instances of the refusal to make
weekly repayments, taking loans with false information, relocation after loan disbursement,
collection of loans from multiple sources, starting up a group with false membership, and for
selfish interest. As one of the loan officers put it in one of the focus groups discussion sessions I
organized:
So, everybody has what they consider before joining… some also bite
more than they can chew. You can imagine someone who will have to
make different repayments in a week, and some make up to three
repayments in a day. And I think that is part of what clients face that
affects them and when you see someone who takes a loan from
different banks the business will rise once but when they start paying
back the business starts falling.
The statement “some also bite more than they can chew” comes out clearly in what the market
vendors mean by saying borrowers must not be ignorant of business risks. It implies that taking
loans for a business, they know little or nothing about what events can subject them to terrible
situation of losing their business while they still have loans to service.
The reasons market vendors keep patronizing MFBs for loans boil down to one:
access to relatively large amounts of capital. Some vendors are also attracted to the transactional
nature of creditor-borrower relationship with the MFBs because borrowing there doesn’t require
group membership as it does in the case of a cooperative society. Typically, only members who
have spent six months or more as members qualify for loans in cooperative societies and
attendance in a meeting is compulsory for members. Some vendors prefer obtaining loans from
MFBs because the processing period is quicker than other potential sources and there is the
possibility that loan officers have a greater interest in approving loans in order to build up their
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own portfolios, which will enhance their promotion. Furthermore, in support of my argument
that access to a huge amount of money is one of the reasons why many market vendors still
prefer MFB loans to other constituents of the tripod of microfinancialization. Survey conducted
among Loan Officers from the identified MFBs (see Chapter 4) shows (in Table 5.1 and Table
5.2) that MFBs have given loans of at least ₦20,000 (US$60) to over 68 percent of their
borrowers while they have given loans worth of ₦1 million (close to US$3,000) to about 70
percent of their customers depending on their needs and capabilities. Also, of all the 137 Loan
Officers (see Table 5.3) who participated in the survey, 54 of them are of the view that MFBs
have been able to grant loans to less than 40 percent of their customers. Another 44 Loan
Officers think MFBs have been able to grant loans to less than 50 percent of their customers
while only 31 of them believe that MFBs have actually grant loans to more than 50 percent of
their customers. To an extent, this agrees with the opinion of MFBs’ customers and borrowers
who participated in this study when asked about borrowers who actually have obtained loans
from MFBs. In Table 5.4 over 67 percent of 229 borrowers/traders “agree” and over 24 percent
“strongly agree” that many MFBs’ customers have obtained loans. However, over four percent
of them are “undecided” while insignificantly about four percent of them “disagree” and
“strongly agree” that many MFBs’ customers have obtained loans.” Although, the results
presented in the tables does not suggest a strong claim in terms of test of significance and
representativeness of the sample of the population, however, it does show that there exists some
association between opinions of the Loan Officers and the borrowers/traders who participated in
the study. In other words, it further supports some of the claims made based on the quotes above
that borrowers/traders explore MFB loans more than any other constituents of the tripod of
microfinancialization.
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Table 5.1: Percentage of the Least Amount MFBs Granted to Customers
as a Policy

5,000
10,000

Frequency
3
20

Percent
2.2
14.6

20,000
Over 20,000
Total

94
20
137

68.6
14.6
100.0

Table 5.2: Percentage of the Largest Amount MFBs Granted to Customers
as a Policy
500,000
1,000,000
Over 1,000,000
Missing Value
Total

Frequency
12
96
28
1
137

Percent
8.8
70.1
20.4
0.7
100.0

Table 5.3: Percentage of MFBs' Customers Granted Financial Assistance
So Far
10
20
30

Frequency
1
7
54

Percent
0.7
5.1
39.4

50
Over 50
Total

44
31
137

32.1
22.1
100.0

Table 5.4: Many MFBs' Customers Have Obtained Financial Assistance

Strongly Disagree
Disagree

Frequency
5
4

Percent
2.2
1.7

Undecided
Agree
Strogly Agree
Total

10
154
56
229

4.4
67.2
24.5
100.0
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In addition, comment made by Mrs. Ebun (name anonymized) presents a related
perspective:
I don’t join cooperative societies and I don’t take their loan because I
always believe they deceive people and when you save money and
request for it, they procrastinate and then use my contribution/money
for other things and give to other people. Also, I don’t have money at
hand, and I will be expected to save up for a while and keep some
money with the cooperative society before I can be given may be
three times of my savings. You can see that it take a lot of time to be
doing all that. So, these are the reasons why I don’t join any the
cooperative society. As for microfinance bank, I do not have to save
money before they give me loan…although I must provide guarantors
and all that.

Mrs. Ebun, a mother of three girls and two boys, sells retail food items like rice, beans, cassava
grain (garri), fresh vegetables, as well as packed food like semovita, poundo yam and so on. Her
husband has his mechanic’s workshop close to the market where she operates her shop. In her
explanation, she said that it is expected of all members in a cooperative society to start by saving
a certain amount of money on every meeting day. They are to take three times of whatever they
have been able to save up to the time they apply for a loan. Despite this arrangement their
applications will be subjected to other required scrutiny (like presentation of guarantors among
fellow members) based on the rules and regulations of their cooperative societies. In terms of
some of the requirements for taking loans from cooperative societies, another informant, Mrs.
Dada (name anonymized) provided an example:
For instance, in our cooperative society, someone who wants to
collect money [take/obtain loan] would have about two sureties. Let’s
say someone wants to borrow ₦100,000 (close to US$300) now, the
sureties would have about ₦25,000 (about US$80) each, such that if
we add all the sureties’ money together, it will worth at least 50
percent of the loan given to the borrower in case of any event of nonrepayment of the loan…
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Like Mrs. Ebun, several informants are of the view that it takes a while to save up any substantial
amount which will be multiplied by three to make a loan from cooperative societies. For
instance, if a trader needs ₦120,000 (over US$300), she must have saved up to at least ₦40,000
(over US$100). In comparison she is of the view that MFB loans of such amount can be given
without any prior savings as long as other requirements like guarantors, shop location/address are
provided.
The Strategies of Providing Group Loans
As a strategy, borrowers have realized that microfinance banks loans are not
supposed to be taken by traders who have no capital base, and it cannot be used successfully as
startup capital. The assumption behind this strategy is that without any capital base, no daily or
ROSCA contributions can be made successfully, let alone building savings in cooperative
societies which will, in turn, generate a loan. Some of the participants in a focus group
discussion I organized are of the following views:
You know people say a lot of things – “Microfinance bank loan is for
women and men to do business.” It is not for building a house or
paying school fees. Even to businesswomen, it is not a money one
uses in starting a business. Rather, it is additional money to support
the business. Otherwise, the profit made will be used to pay back if
one doesn’t have a capital base and collected the money to start a
business, it won’t be easy at all to pay back because, by the time a
borrower makes the repayment for 23 weeks, all the goods stocked
must have finished. That is why people give it such a terrible name.
(Participant A)
It is not good for people who are just starting a business. It is good for
people who have an existing business and a small capital base.
(Participant B)
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I can’t say I like it or not, but the money isn’t something one can
collect to start a business or if someone has no capital. (Participant C)
Theoretically, two things are pertinent in various strategies exploited in the world of market
vendors and borrowers. One is credit, and the other is debt. Some of the major arguments in the
anthropology of credit and debt held that both credit and debt constitute hierarchy and
dominance even though they enhance group solidarity (Mauss 1954). The lived experience of
traders and borrowers in this study depicts some sense of group solidarity as they exploit various
strategies in ensuring that credit facilities are available for their trade activities. They rely largely
on group formation in mobilizing microcredit through daily contributions, weekly/monthly
ROSCA contribution, as well as joining the cooperative society to build savings which will, in
turn, generate future loans for their business. As many of them are skeptical of microfinance
banks’ loans, they still take advantage of their group loans.
However, there are some intrigues of group solidarity, which sometimes work against
members, particularly in microfinance banks’ lending scheme. For instance, members are forced
to pressurize defaulters among themselves because failure to make their repayments when they
are due will impact negatively on others, particularly those who are ready to receive their loans.
Hence, they employ several means possible to make their defaulting members and borrowers
look for money by force. Recounting some of the things that are likely to happen to any
defaulting members, Madam Abi (name anonymized) said:
…but during repayment time if within a week a member is unable to
meet up, she faces hell and embarrassment even from other members.
They will collect the money by force that very day because of other
members who need to collect their loans. Sometimes, if the loan
officers are involved they will give the person a new basket, push her
to the market/public place, forcing her to beg for money/help just to
meet up to make her repayment for that very week. Aside from that
they can take the person to their office, lock her up in the toilet
expecting her family to come for her and help her to make repayment.
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I have argued above that neoliberal capitalism weakens the essence of group solidarity.
Practically, members do not see their attendance in weekly meetings as important if they can
raise money for their repayment and send it to the group leader on or before the date of their
meeting. What becomes eroded in this process, among other things, are the values attached to the
coming together of members to exchange trade ideas and market experience. Many traders now
express a preference for the relative anonymity of commercial loan transactions. In my
interaction with one of the microlending group leaders, she emphasized the importance of
prompt repayment claiming that the microfinance bank loan officer assigned to their group has
zero tolerance for default: “Ki owo pe ni, ki se ki oju pe [I quoted a trader in chapter 4 to the
effect that “weekly repayment is a ‘must,’ but attendance/physical presence is not the main
priority” and I paraphrased the quote here as “repayment is a must, but attendance is not a
compulsion”]. Many of the microfinance group leaders clearly expressed this view in the course
of my fieldwork.
The lived experience of the market vendors and borrowers supported Marcel Mauss
classical argument that credit and debt constitute hierarchy and dominance (Mauss 1954). On a
more general level, throughout a loan cycle, borrowers are at the mercy of their loan officers
anytime default looms. Also, some group leaders are said to have assumed a de facto authority
and whatever they decide with their loan officer is the final over any members, particularly on
matters related to loan disbursement. For example, here is an excerpt from my conversation with
a group leader:
Yes, it is because some people lack good manners. If I see a loan
without interest, I would borrow it and pay. I am not so nice. I make
my members pay by force if they don’t want to since the money
doesn’t belong to me. In my group, we are up to 30 now. In the three
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groups, I belong, we do not lend money to members until they sign
and bring a guarantor.
This borrowers’ lived experiences negate another anthropological debate regarding credit and
debt which presupposes that credit is considered productive, beneficial and liberating at least for
the creditor (Nugent 1996; Truitt 2007; Zelizer 1994). Rather I argued in support of the fact that
being in debt with microfinance banks put a burden on the borrowers and limit their ability to
function well (Howe 1998; Lowrey 2006; Taussig 1987). Also, it is evident in my key
informant’s comments: “Some of them have blood pressure in their young age. Some of them die
and suffer while some of them run away.” That is, the informant is saying that market vendors
who take microfinance bank loans find it very tough to put their lives together. She is in general
skeptical of taking any kind of loan. As a leader, she discourages women from taking
microfinance bank loans because the interest rate is too high. However, despite the
discouragement, women vendors never desist in exploiting microfinance banks loan
opportunities opened to them. But why? In addition to the strategies I have discussed, I engaged
anthropological political economy in providing answers to this critical question in the sections
that follow. Anthropological political economy paves the way for the understanding of
phenomena encapsulated in everyday lives of market vendors and borrowers vis-à-vis the
confluence of politics and economics (Wolf 1999), the structuring of inequality (Josephides
1985), the role of the state (Godelier 1978), as well as cultural dominance (Roseberry 1989).
The Loan Drive and Shaming Practices
It is part of the business risk… I am not the type who sits in the office
24/7/ If someone didn’t pay up and they call me to the scene, I will try
to know when the person will be paying once the person isn’t a
chronic defaulter. For instance, if a person is supposed to pay ₦5,000
[US$14.29] every week; …week one she didn’t pay, week two she
came with ₦3,000 [US$8.57], week three she came with ₦2,000
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[($5.71], week four you don’t even see her so in a month…and where
you are supposed to have paid ₦20,000 [US$57.14], you have only
paid ₦5,000 [US$14.29], having ₦15,000 [US$(43] as outstanding.
So, that kind of customer is a chronic defaulter. Some of them will
just run away, so we have had a different issue with clients, and we
use different tactics on them… That is a human being for you, it will
only take us time, energy and stress. Sometimes we go out in a team
to recover our outstanding loan. This practice is called “loan drive.”

MFB loan officer “Loan drive,” part of the process of loan recovery, is not only a
strategy of ensuring loan repayments but also make loan officers’ portfolios more robust. What
makes these exercises significant is that they determine loan officers’ performance at work and
their job security. A loan officer can only be pronounced a performer by the MFB that employs
them if and only if she or he pursues loan drive and loan recovery such that chronic or perpetual
defaulters are made to make their repayments. In the quote above, the MFB loan officer
described the exercise as “part of the business risk.” I take this to imply that both the lenders
(particularly loan officers) and the borrowers are entangled in this web of “risk” because they are
all involved and engaged in “the use of different tactics” and strategies. In their view, loan
officers do not find such an exercise convenient or enjoyable for them, but they must keep their
jobs and make sure that borrowers make their repayments. According to one of them who
participated in one of the focus group discussions I organized, sometimes they go for loan drive
and loan recovery on Sundays when debtors are not expecting them. And when in the likelihood
that they will meet the borrower’s relatives who will plead on their behalf, the loan officers will
often make those family members to be representatives of the borrowers. In such a situation, “we
will lessen our disturbances on our debtor but on the persons, who stand-in for the debtors we
will heighten our disturbances on such persons if our debtor doesn’t pay,” said one loan officer.
Based on their explanation, they (loan officers) are left with no alternative because some of the
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guarantors their borrowers provided initially sometimes get frustrated and they might have
relocated to another place to avoid any form of embarrassment.
Many of the loan officers agree that the practice of the forced display of placards on
the chests of loan defaulters and forcing them to beg in public for financial assistance in order to
make their weekly repayments is not only harsh but it is also illegal. Borrowers, however, recall
how such a practice was part of their lived experiences. One loan officer said:
I have seen two to three [examples] of that practice [placing placards
on defaulters’ chests and forcing them to beg for money in public]
before as some micro-finance banks’ style. But the truth is, it is a
wrong method of retrieving loan. I use that to threaten people but
haven’t used it before. People do that thinking that defaulters would
be shameful and get the repayment made.
Many loan officers are reticent to employ such a drastic practice as they are aware that many of
their more educated borrowers will know of legal recourse should they pursue such action. But I
recall in my visit to one of MFB branch that pasted on the wall were pictures of and information
of the bank’s “chronic defaulters” for bank customers, including prospective borrowers, to see
when they come into the office. When I looked at the pictures and inquired about them, the
manager said to me: “I hope you know that we will not allow you to take pictures of those
images posted there. Those are meant to discourage other customers from defaulting, and we
don’t want their information out there.” This is one of the pragmatic steps and tactics loan
officers take in trying to ensure that their borrowers make their weekly or monthly repayments
towards their loans. Thereby, they believe, the rate of default will be drastically reduced.
The fact that the manager does not want the information on their defaulters
(particularly those posted on the board in their office) to be publicly available indicates that the
banks understand that some of their customers might be positioned to pursue legal action to
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protect their rights. For example, section 34, sub section 1 of Nigerian 1999 Constitution (Fourth
Republic) states thus:
Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person,
and accordingly (a) no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment;
(b) no person shall he held in slavery or servitude; and
(c) no person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999)8
However, assertiveness of these rights in everyday live are dependent on individual level of
awareness, literacy and buoyancy to employ service of a lawyer if need be. For instance, one of
the informants who had defaulted in the past explained that when her situation was getting
unbearable, she invited her lawyer to negotiate with the microfinance bank holding her loan.
According to her,
He [her lawyer] told them to please give me some time. But I have
paid up to ₦100,000 [US$286] out of ₦400,000 [US$1,143] and I
requested that they should split it. They came to my shop, and they
saw nothing, so I told them my present [repayment] capacity per
month is ₦10,000 [over $28]. They were not ready to agree at first but
later agreed. Though they don’t do such, their boss is very good. They
put my mind at rest, they were funny and caring. They visited at
different times, and I was happy about that, but the so-called COs
[client officers or loan officers] are ready to embarrass defaulters at
anytime and anywhere.
In this quote, the informant remarks “they visited at different times, and I was happy about
that…” suggest that the officers are willing to assist their borrowers and they want to see them
succeed with their loans. This is in the interest of the loan officers because borrowers’ ability to
meet repayments is what will sustain the loan officer’s job and the jobs of other employees of the

8

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Adopted: May 28 1999. The current Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria was adopted in 1999. It is the fourth constitution since independence from the United Kingdom in October 1960 after those
of 1960, 1963 and 1979. Source: https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/5412
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MFBs. Her other comment “but the so-called COs [client officers or loan officers] are ready to
embarrass defaulters at anytime and anywhere” depicts that the loan officers are acting upon
pressure receiving from their managers and they are, in turn, doing what they can do to get
repayments going and so they, too, are caught in between the managers and the borrowers and
have to put in place a strategy of pleasing the managers and then alternatively pressuring the
borrowers and then being understanding and lenient all in the cause of getting them to make
repayments so they can show the bank managers that the loans in their portfolios are being
repaid. They are willing to do all they can to keep their job due to the experience of mass
unemployment in Nigeria over time (Okafor 2011; Aiyedogbon and Ohwofasa 2012).
In the world of the market vendors and borrowers, the experience of loan drive and
loan recovery provokes them. And many of them believe that it engenders heart attacks and other
adverse physical manifestations. A borrower expressed her opinion while relaying her personal
experience with different MFBs:
I haven’t experienced it before, but I know they do give a basket to
defaulters that they should start begging. They can only disturb, but
once you go to their office to beg their boss, they will later calm
down. When I was in that group, they never complained about me. I
was always stable but the rest of the banks, it was difficult to pay
back. I experienced one before., I was the leader of that group, one of
the members didn’t pay, so they took me to their office. I was sick,
then I couldn’t take my medications. They released me around 5 p.m.,
and I wasn’t the one who owed them. So, loan recovery is the main
issue in the microcredit scheme.
The fear of loan drive and loan recovery influences borrower’s decisions on whether or not to
take MFB loans. As much as the loan officers are willing to issue loans to their customers, they
are equally skeptical and fearful of consequences and negative effects of defaults on their own
performance at work. In the same vein, borrowers are wary of being shamed in public even by
the mere appearance of loan officers during their loan drive. The loan officers are not outrightly
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happy to go on loan drive while the borrowers are not happy to see them. Critically, the practice
of loan drive and loan recovery embodies “spirit of fear and risk” to both lenders and borrowers,
and it seems to be inevitable due to its effectiveness in minimizing defaults. I argue that this
experience implies hegemony backed up by more forceful politics. It seems that the tactics
employed by the MFBs in fact ensure a good record of repayment. As Table 5.5 shows, the vast
majority (over 83.2 percent) of loan officers who participated in the survey agree that members
of a low-income group who have taken MFB loans have been making their repayments
satisfactorily.

Table 5.5: Low-Income Group Repay MFBs' Loans Extended to Them
Satisfactorily
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strogly Agree
Total

Frequency
3
7
10
114
3
137

Percent
2.2
5.1
7.3
83.2
2.2
100.0

It is possible that these tactics, plus the traders’ self interest in being considered a good risk in
order to obtain future loans, plus the overall hegemonic moral and cultural force that compels
traders to repay their loans in a timely manner leads to a few defaults.
“The Fear of Being Shamed”: Borrowers’ Lived Experience and the Meaning of Debt
I was threatened. I was threatened even to the point that their boss
called me severely threatening me [that] they would come to my shop.
But they never came. I was so scared I couldn’t open my shop, but
later I summoned my courage because I have never heard in history
that a debtor was killed because she couldn’t pay back her debt.
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I have shown in the preceding sections that the fear of loan drive and loan recovery
informs borrowers’ decisions on whether or not to take MFB loans. In this section, my
discussion centers on the lived experience of market vendors related to decisions to avoid MFB
loans despite their utility. It also focuses on the borrowers’ strategies of navigating as debtors
despite their fears of loan drive and loan recovery. In the above quote, the voice of the informant,
just as many of them, resonates with the fear of what might happen because of a few months of
defaulting. However, in negotiating their status as debtors, some borrowers have built up a kind
of resilience over time such that they can stay in their business while trying to strategize on how
they will pay up their debts. Others have decided not to take MFB loans. As for those who
remain in their business, they are of the view that staying away from their business could only
make things worse. This position itself suggests that they recognize that taking MFB loans may
not necessarily be good for them but that, rather, it keeps them away from being shamed for not
doing anything. And as one of the informants said: “Traders rely on MFB loans despite some
hardship they are going through when they default. It is not as if taking MFB loans is good, but
people do not have any other means.” To them, everybody lives on loans and even Nigeria as a
country survives on loan. They have built as part of their resilience a position that being a debtor
is neither a curse nor a crime, instead “You would have to apply wisdom, and you would have to
plan properly on how to repay your loans and debt.”
Borrowers may miss their repayment date, but many of them believe that they would
eventually be compelled to pay because, according to one MFB group leader,
Our culture has shaped us to hate embarrassment. Our culture does
not allow us to put our family to shame. I can swear as I speak now
there is nowhere I have collected money and disappointed the
lender… nowhere.
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Here we can see from the group leader’s comments is that, because of the fear of being shamed
by their loan officers, borrowers/debtors go the extra mile to make their repayments. In the same
vein, because of the fear of being shamed for not doing anything to improve their businesses and
make them productive, borrowers consider MFB loans as the right channel where they can get
funds for their businesses. This is evidenced in Table 5.7, which indicates that 51 percent of the
market vendors I surveyed prefer to source funds for their businesses from the microfinance
banks. This is further evidenced by the data displayed in Table 5.3 where 67.2 percent “agree”
and 24.5 percent “strongly agree” that many MFB customers have obtained financial assistance.
Thus, “the fear of being shamed” is a powerful force that guides how borrowers negotiate their
statuses as debtors in this cultural context.
For some vendors their status as a debtor is not completely frowned upon as might be
thought. Their position is a subtle criticism of those other market vendors who tend to be secretive
and shy and prefer not to let people know that they are debtors. They criticize market vendors who
exhibit such traits because, as one told me, “They don’t want people to know the solution…but
now people know the solution which is microfinance loan.” In a way, an MFB loan has gained
popularity among market vendors and petty commodity producers in Ibadan because the vendors
and producers see it as accessible. Even when borrowers take MFB loans as a member of a lending
group they often consider themselves responsible solely as an individual for its repayment. And
the strategies they develop as individuals to ensure prompt repayment all through the loan cycle
are personal and self-developed. For example, it is a common practice among borrowers to make
daily contributions. This daily contribution would be received at the end of every month and it
would be used to augment MFB loans repayment. Some of them are involved in more than one
ROSCA as a way of using part of their ROSCA funds to restock their businesses while using the
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remaining part towards loan repayments. Market vendors and borrowers may have cultivated traits
of being secretive and shy as a strategy developed out of being competitive in their businesses in
the era of neoliberal capitalism. However, the situation seems different when microcredit loans are
disbursed as part of empowerment programs of the state government.

“…But Nigerians See All These Things as Bonanza”: Patronage or Financial Inclusion?
People who have completed their payment are not up to 50. I could
remember, probably August, when I did the overall account, I am
having a deficit of about ₦3.2 million [US$9,143]. And since then,
they did not turn up again, and we have no choice. I was trying to
persuade them to pay. Initially, the plan was that if you refund your
own completely, we will give it to another person so that it will
circulate. We thought people would turn up, but Nigerians see all
these things as a bonanza. They assume it is their right because it is an
initiative by a politician. But this behavior affects so many people.
Despite this, the man did not stop his generosity with them but still
hands out money to them.

In the quote above, one of the personal assistants to a political office holder expressed his
views about the attitude of market vendors and borrowers towards financial inclusion and
empowerment programs. In my perspective, there are a number of political implications to
understand here. First and foremost, based upon the above quote, my informant’s position
underestimates the fact that such empowerment gestures from his boss (a politician) are
manifestations of state policy geared toward poverty alleviation. For instance, members of
Federal House of Representatives in Nigeria are often allowed to provide constituency projects
for their people. In this situation, many would-be beneficiaries may consider this gesture as a
way of benefitting from the dividends of democracy and this might justify their unwillingness to
make repayments towards their loans. However, looking beyond my informant’s opinion about
the attitudes of the so-called beneficiaries, it is not out of place to argue that that the state’s
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policies have differential effects on the livelihood of women market vendors particularly with
respect to class and gender. More so, some of the financial inclusions’ gestures are limiting to an
extent because they are guided by erroneous assumptions which is the major concern of
transnational feminist approach that women’s needs and aspirations are universally homogenous.
Specifically, market vendors are exposed to different life situations given various underlining
factors such as family backgrounds, social networks, and social capital among other things.
The politics of clientelism and patronage motivates such gestures to buy traders’ votes.
At the same time, many vendors use this opportunity to borrow money whenever the country is
drawing towards general elections and transitioning into another political dispensation. The
study participant quoted above is referring to the financial inclusion program organized as part of
the constituency project of one of the National Assembly members in southwestern Nigeria.
Borrowers (mainly women) received loans ranging from ₦15,000 (US$43) to ₦25,000 (US$71).
According to the informants, this loan was interest-free, and it wasn’t involved any loan officer
who would pursue the recipients to make repayments. However, they were expected to keep up
with their repayments such that others (traders/borrowers) could take turns and have such
opportunity as well. They were provided these loans to support their business. They were to
begin to make repayments after three weeks. Irrespective of the amount borrowed, recipients of
the loans were to pay ₦1,500 (over US$4) every week after they have used the loan for at least
three weeks. Perhaps since such gestures do not come to the intended borrowers until the eve of
general elections in Nigeria, they may not have seen it as helping them. Rather the borrowers
consider it as a form of “national cake” and consequently the repayments are not given any due
attention. The term “national cake” is a slogan often deployed by Nigerians to express claim over
material and immaterial resources which are considered everybody’s entitlements particularly
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from the governments at all levels. Hence, such small loans provided at the eve general elections
could be considered a form of “national cake” and since no one ever comes after them
(recipients) to repay.
The statement “they assume it is their right because it is an initiative by a politician”
suggests some sense of entitlement on the part of the vendors who are being targeted for
patronage in exchange for votes. The informant expressed his concerns further: “…the problem
there is that they think it is their right. They believe it is their dividends for supporting the
politician.” Indeed, the market vendors who are involved in actively participating in various
market associations often sing the praises of the politicians who are perceived to be helping
them. For their part, the politicians prioritize traders who are fully involved in political patronage
networks. Both groups find advantage in these relationships. The politicians buy votes during
various electioneering activities and gestures given in the name of “empowerment” through
financial inclusion while traders use their voting potential to exact patronage in the form of loans
they are not expected to pay back.
I think my informant’s assertion that “…despite this, the man did not stop his
generosity with them but still hands out money to them” should be critiqued from a perspective
on the intricacies of the power structure that is constitutive of subject formation. Market vendors
and women in the informal economic sector are often taken for granted and as tools for achieving
political office. When they perpetually remain in the state of economic disempowerment, they
become valuable for furthering the political interests of the ruling class. They become useful and
relevant to these elites when there is a need to mobilize a crowd for political rallies and
campaigns at least once every four years.
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Clientelism and Patronage or A Piece of Advice to the Government?
In the preceding section, I raised the issue of patronage politics, the significance of
traders’ associations, and how traders become instrumental for aspirants and candidates of
various political parties during rallies and campaigns. I have shown how traders themselves
realize some economic advantages by trading their votes, or a promise of a vote, for loans that
are not expected to have to be paid back. In my fieldwork, I observed that traders who occupy
various leadership positions with significant responsibilities across the different associations
seem to be positive and express optimism about their general situation. Their optimism contrasts
with the attitudes of those traders who are not actively participating in traders’ associations. The
latter seem to be pessimistic, while those who are active in the associations probably have
enjoyed some benefits of patronage within and outside of their associations are optimistic. For
example, I witnessed some interesting scenes during the coronation ceremony of the leadership
of a traders association in Oyo state. The event was a major one, having some important political
office holders and prominent members among traders as well as representatives from various
marketplaces across the state. Everyone appeared in a colorful “aso ebi” (as a chosen uniform for
the ceremony) and each tent/canopy was labelled with descriptions of traders associations and
marketplaces they represented (details in Figure 1.2, 5.2, and 5.3). Based upon my observation,
this event was significant enough and suggestive of relative affiliation and patronage between the
state and market associations. Also, the practice of “aso-ebi” among people of West Africa (like
Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba) symbolizes harmony, cooperation, and sense of oneness and mutual
identification. Often such practice distinguishes clusters of identity and representations among
groups in any given event/ceremony such as intergroup weddings, political parties’ rallies, end of
the year parties, and anniversaries among other things (Ajani 2012; Nwafor 2011, 2013).
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Traders appear to be purposively engaging in in politics even beyond Oyo State. For
instance, I called in several times to secure an appointment with the public relations officer of
National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS). It took a while to obtain the appointment.
When we finally met, he started by apologizing for not being able to meet sooner but his words
were revealing:
My brother, I am sorry! I have very tight schedules recently due to my
position in the last few weeks we have been going to different places
within the southwest for one activity or another. I was in Ondo State
last week for the installation of the Iya’loja of the state, and she will
oversee all the markets in that state. Then we moved to the swearingin ceremony of Dr. Kayode Fayemi, the governor-elect of Ekiti State.
From his comments I started to understand the connection between the politics of the state and
the market associations. There is scholarly recognition of distributive politics (Watson 1998,
2000; Omobowale 2008; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, 2010) and pragmatic versus patrimonial
politics (Fourchard 2011; De Gramont 2015; Roelofs 2019) in southwest Nigeria going back to
pre-colonial times. The mobilization of followers and having a great influence on many
followers are main “criteria of appointment to a title” (Watson 1998,46). Political office holders
distribute the wealth of the state based on patronage and clientelism. The logic of seeking
influence among traders through their associations is rational as political candidates with the
highest votes during the general elections occupy the government offices. Omobowale and
Olutayo argue “in Yoruba society, patrons are chosen not only based on their financial clout but
also their good character based on philanthropic deeds and wisdom” (2007, 459). And Agbaje
describes the use of money as “a destabilizer and corrupter” (2002, 5), yet the distribution of
money and other material wealth is still very prominent in political rallies and campaigns during
elections.
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According to my informant, NANTS is an umbrella association for traders throughout
the country. There are seven political zones in Oyo State. Traders organize themselves along
these lines: Ibadan city, Ibadan less city [usually refer to smaller towns in the outskirts of Ibadan
metropolis], Oyo, Ogbomoso, Ibarapa, Oje-Ogun I, and Oke-Ogun II. Up until 2017 there were
six traders’ associations. They were Canteen Workers, Oyo State Men and Women, Trade-Men
and Artisans, Ibadan Joint Traders, National Association of Traders, Artisans, Manufacturers of
Nigeria (NATAMAC), National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) and Oyo State Joint
Traders were created in 2017. Traders organize themselves as a constituted body, and they have a
structure of internal communication and synergy across the state. On November 15, 2018, I
attended a program organized by traders for the inauguration of the executives and installation of
chieftaincy titles on traders in the Ibadan Southeast Local Government (see Figure 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3). The executives are called the Market Leaders Council. There were representatives in
attendance from various local government areas of Oyo State as well as other states within
southwest Nigeria. Many market vendors have confirmed that the current state government
provided them with interest-free microcredit loans in 2014 before the election of his (Senator
Abiola Ajimobi) for a second term. My trader study participants were clear that they expect
similar forms of patronage during every election cycle.
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Figure 5.1: Pages from the Chieftaincy Installation Program
(Photo by author).

Figure 5.2: Traders at the Chieftaincy Installation. The author is on the right, facing the camera and
holding a notebook
(Photograph courtesy of the author).

155

Figure 5.3: Traders at the Chieftaincy Installation (Photo by the author).

The Oyo State government provided ₦50 million (US$142,857) in interest-free loans
to the six traders’ associations in 2013-14 through the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and
Investment. The leadership of the traders’ associations acknowledge that loan recipients who
made repayments are so insignificant (that only a few ever paid back their loans), but they blame
the state government for it. In their opinion, the state governor, Senator Abiola Ajimobi, uttered a
“political statement” when responding to people’s questions and concerns during the campaign
program for his second term in office. According to one of my informants, Sir Kay (name
anonymized) who is a leader of one of the traders’ association, “the governor said traders are not
supposed to pay back the loan, rather it should be recycled [according to an informant, Mr. Oleyo
(name anonymized) who works in the Ministry of Trade, Cooperative, Commerce and
Investment, Oyo State, “loans being recycled means that when the first batch of recipients make
their repayment at the end of a loan cycle, usually after 3 to 6 months, another batch would apply
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for loan and it would be issued from same pool of fund”].” To Sir Kay, the statement is rather
political, and people interpreted it to mean that they are not supposed to make any repayments
toward the loans disbursed to them. In his comment:
Then, the government asked them to return [repay] it. But during
campaign the governor explained that the money was not to be
returned but recycled. But when one talks to traders, we shouldn’t use
English if not it can lead to misunderstanding. They didn’t understand
so one should speak a trader’s native language. Here is what
happened to the loan given to traders by government and some
politics played out as to why people didn’t pay back the loan.

Then he (Sir Kay) said:
Today we have a Bank of Industry, but there is no Bank of Trade, so
NANTS stands to discuss this with the government. We need a Bank
of Trade, and we want the government to leave us out of the Bank of
Industry and [Bank of] Agriculture. As the government does this for
us, we also must pay our taxes.
There is agitation for recognition and a power struggle from the side of the traders as well. For
instance, my informant mentioned that there is a Bank of Industry and Bank of Agriculture but
there is nothing like Bank of Trade. In his opinion, the establishment of such a bank will in no
small measure help the traders. He further emphasized that traders must be involved in its
operation as members of its board of directors because they know themselves as well as their
problems. Therefore, solutions to the problem require traders’ insights. My informant is
representative of the view that traders know the capacity of their fellow members in terms of the
volume of money they can trade with sustainably without providing the temptation to divert
loans to the purchase of things considered unnecessary. This perspective refers to policy and how
any government needs to respond to the needs of traders in terms of financial support. However,
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many traders were frustrated and felt used as an instrument of achieving votes to achieve
political office. As one woman market leader said:
What we are telling them is that there is no money, so people are not
coming to the market to sell. Before in this Bodija market, people
wouldn’t see each other, but now reverse is the case, and we [traders]
in this market are always voting for this so-called government when
contesting. But when they assume office, they will stop having our
will in their hearts. You know that as I am as the Iya’loja I should be
collecting money as my right from the government. We are not
collecting any money from the government. And if anything is going
on in the market about a political campaign, it is the Iya’loja they will
be calling and they are not giving us a bus, we are always boarding
public buses to attend their campaign. I pray that the new governor
coming in will be good for us.

Generally, market vendors claimed that sales were poor. If this is indeed the case, the
poor sales may be because Nigeria was just coming out of recession as the economy picked up a
little bit in 2017 with a growth rate of 0.83 percent9 and real GDP was estimated at 1.9 percent in
2018.10 However, it is somehow debatable whether or not the pace of such growth rate and
economic recovery is slow in translating to development. Also, often businesspeople claim that
sales are slow, that they need more help, etc., when this may or may not reflect reality. Coupled
with the idea that traders have an interest in depicting their sales as slow as they demand more
access to funds, loans, etc. In the quote above, the informant’s expression depicts that many
traders feel neglected after having worked for politicians in mobilizing other traders to vote for
them. The statement “…as the Iya’loja, I should be collecting money as my right from the

9https://qz.com/africa/1219240/these-charts-show-how-nigerias-economy-recovered-in-2017/
10

https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-economic-outlook
(accessed July 27, 2019). Sources: African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2019.
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(accessed July 27, 2019)

government” suggests an expectation of a reward and monetary/material gains as a result of
patronage.
“Men Contribute to the Problem…”: Microfinance and Gender-Related Issues
In Chapter 4, I described MFB loans as the disbursement of a small amount of money
to market vendors and petty commodity producers in pursuit of their trade activities. The Grameen
Bank model invented by Professor Muhammed Yunus presupposes that women are the main target
of microcredit initiative (Yunus 2007). Indeed, in Ibadan the majority of the customers of
microfinance banks are women market vendors and petty commodity producers (see Table 5.6).
More than 76 percent of the loan officers who participated in this study “agree” and “strongly
agree” that mainly women collect MFB loans, particularly, as part of their more general realm of
familial responsibility. In short, they feel that the burden of the family is on them because some
husbands are unemployed but as women in their roles as mothers they feel the pressure to take out
MFB loans as part of a familial strategy. Also, in my observation during the fieldwork, I spoke
with more women than men and generally all the MFB groups I worked with were predominantly
coordinated by women. However, one of the MFB groups coordinated by Madam Iyadun (name
anonymized) has motorcyclists (a.k.a. Okada Riders) as members and they are all men. According
to Madam Iyadun when comparing her experience as a leader:
Loan officers prefer even male members than female members these
days because they make their repayments promptly. Now, this week I
am still calling women members in my second group and they are just
sending their repayments and we have meeting later this evening. But
all the Okada-Riders have sent their money already and the meeting is
tomorrow. One of them just left when you were coming in to meet me
a few minutes ago. You know… they don’t have time to have any
meeting, Okada-Riders just come and drop their money and return to
their parks to face their business. I have the group for more than 2
years now… we don’t have any default… in fact, the loan officer in
charge of that group has never encountered any problem, she is
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always happy because every week she calls me whenever she is
coming and once she gets here I will give all the contribution, she will
count everything and mark our cards… so there is no problem at all.

Table 5.6: MFBs' Customers Are Mainly Women
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly Agree
Total

Frequency
13
13
5
102
4
137

Percent
9.5
9.5
3.6
74.5
2.9
100.0

In one of the focus group discussions I organized, some of the women who participated further
confirmed that women are highly involved in microfinance and many of the banks do not give
men loans because they believe that in case there is a default, men can run away easily and it
might be very difficult to get then unlike when women try to run away. They believe that women
would not run away with their children, thus women are seen by the MFBs as a better loan risk
than men. As one trader said, “taking MFB loans can be very stressful. If I were to be alone
without any children, I would have run away… that don’t kill me, please. But I must consider my
children at the same time.” She fears that loan officers have little sympathy whenever they come
around during a loan drive. A vendor sitting next to the one quoted above said: “The bad habit
they do is coming to one`s shop and start shouting and embarrassing one.”
However, there were opposing views to the assertion that men were worse risks for
default than were women. Some of my study participants drew comparisons of the practices of
two different microfinance finance banks. According to them, one MFB allowed men as
members, but the other MFB BCD did not allow men. Rather, only women could be members of
lending groups. Then based upon their experience, two group leaders (women) emphasized the
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importance of complementarity and advantages in having men and women in the same microlending groups. In their words:
Having men and women in the micro-lending group makes the
members perform well in their repayment. For instance, it is good to
take Okada-riders [commercial motorcyclists who carry maximum of
two passengers and/or goods from one point to another] as members
because they pay their weekly dues well. But Keke-NAPEP riders
[motorized tricyclists who also carry maximum of four passengers
and/or goods from one point to another] are not good candidates for
weekly repayment group because they think they have arrived and
have a better income to sustain extra-marital affairs; hence they
misbehave (Leader I).
Also, men being in lending groups with women will enhance prompt
repayment of loans because men will not like women whom they are
old enough to take as wives to talk down on them (Leader II).
This evidence as well as other evidence provided above suggests that gender processes play
critical roles in the strategies of both lenders and of market vendors. On the part of the women
borrowers, even if they are the ones who are individually and as individual members of
borrowing groups assuming the risks, there is evidence that business decisions are not entered
into alone but, instead, their business decisions are influenced by the opinions of their husbands.
For example, one of the informants who was sharing her views about why she stopped taking
MFB loans for a while told me:
“Hmm… I don’t want it for now because when I was collecting it, I
didn’t want my husband to know about it. I was thinking he wouldn’t
assist me. That was why I did it. Because he won’t assist me and he
won’t be part of it. But when I entered into problems he was aware of
one and he assisted me first because of embarrassment but later
withdrew.”
In the situation of my informant, her husband initially assisted her financially because the default
situation was bringing embarrassment to their family. However, she said she eventually make the
rest of the repayments by herself. The reason she stopped taking MFB loans had to do with the
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sound warning and discouragement from her husband due to potential shaming practices in case
of default. Further, in the case of borrowing groups that have men and women members, there is
a gender dynamic at work because of their pride and fear of being shamed by women members
in the lending groups, men are prompted to make their repayments in a timely manner and
thereby avoiding embarrassment by women.
Despite recognition by the international community that the introduction of
interventions like the Grameen Bank Model creates access to microcredit for women in more
than 100 countries around the world (Yunus 2007), still, there are other context-specific issues
which set a limit to what women market vendors and entrepreneurs could achieve. An informant
who happened to belong to three lending groups and who is a leader of one captured some of the
issues in the following quote:
Men contribute to the problems why MFB loan is called “OwoKomulelanta” [Placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern]. For
instance, I have taken ₦50,000 [US$143] from MFB, and one of the
children is sent back from school, and their father has no money. So,
it becomes the responsibility of the mother to take charge, and she
will have to spend from the loan she has taken for business.

“Dipping Our Hands in All Sources”: Traders Strategies of Exploiting the Tripod of
Microfinancialization in Sustaining Trade Activities
In contrast this section focuses on a number of different and combined strategies
traders employ in order to run their business and pay back the loans (see Table 5.7). Some of
these strategies involve taking loans from microfinance banks either as individuals or members
of lending groups. Traders also source for funds from their friends and family members,
involvement in rotatory savings and credit associations, as well as, cooperative societies. Only a
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few traders pointed out that they have been privileged to receive financial support (goods and
cash) from “Others” (see Table 5.7) which implies that they have informal relationships and
arrangements with maybe wholesalers, distributors, or agents of manufacturers. In other words,
they are provided commodities to sell and make payments within a time frame while they are
expected to make money/profit from it. Table 5.7 shows that 51 percent (116 respondents) of 229
respondents take MFB loans whenever they need to source for fund for their business, and 34.49
percent (i.e., 79 respondents) raise money from friends and families. At the same time, only a
few vendors surveyed reported sources for loans from ROSCA and cooperative societies, i.e., 2.6
percent (6 respondents) and 7.42 percent (17 respondents) respectively. Also, many of the traders
who participated in the study confirmed that they have taken multiple MFB loans at the same
time. For instance, in Table 5.8, over 70 percent of them have taken loans from at least two
different MFBs. In the following sub-sections, I discuss how those strategies play out in
everyday life of the traders given the combination of different sources.

Table 5.7: Where do you source for funds other than your personal account?
Frequency
Percentage
MFB Loans
116
51%
Friends' & Family Supports
79
34.49%
ROSCA
6
2.62%
Cooperative Society
17
7.42%
Informal Sources of Support
11
4.80%
Total
229
100%

Table 5.8: Percentage of Borrowers Who Have Taken Multiple MFB Loans
Frequency
Percentage
Two MFBs
169
74%
Three MFBs
48
21.00%
Four or more MFBs
12
5.00%
Total
229
100%
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MFBs Individual and Group Loans
“I use it [Microfinance bank (MFB) loan] in paying my children’s
school fees. I have four graduates, and all of them went to Bowen
University [a private university] because I was afraid of sending them
to a public university due to the possibility of industrial strike action
by academic and non-academic staff union. So, I have been taken
loans from Life Above Poverty Organization (LAPO)MFB for over
five years now. Recently, I took ₦500,000 [US$1,429]; I used
₦300,000 [US$857] to pay my last child’s school fees and the
remaining ₦200,000 [US$571] I put it in my business. I struggle to
pay back, but with that, I believe my future is brighter. So, my last
child is in Kola Daisi University [a private university] because I could
not afford Bowen University any longer. He is studying political
science, my first-born studied mass communication, second, science
laboratory technology, third, medicine, and fourth, law. I joined a
cooperative society, and when I saved up to ₦150,000 [US$429], I
applied for a ₦450,000 [US$1,286] loan because I am due to take
times three of my savings. In keeping up with the repayment of my
loans, I make a daily contribution of ₦500 [US$1.43] and ₦700
[US$2]. I use the second daily contribution to pay salaries of my
salesgirls and payment of bills for my shops. And this is different
from the bi-weekly rotatory contribution of ₦2,000 [US$5.71].
Petty Commodity Producer in Ibadan

At the center of Orita Challenge Market in Ibadan is a relatively full display of food
materials like semolina, poundo, rice, beverages, tomato paste, noodles, disposable plates, and
other items in sacks and boxes well-arranged under branded umbrellas (See Figure 5.4). Table
5.9 shows a frequency distribution and percentage of other trade items from a survey I conducted
among traders operating in several Ibadan markets. I met the owner of the store and ex-officio
member of the market association. In her statement quoted above, she pointed to how she
mobilized credit facilities for her business and children’s school fees from different sources. She
claimed that a trader must know how to navigate through the available options of microcredit
facilities in sustaining her/his business. Even though MFB loans are not given to provide for
children’s school fees, in her case and as for many of the women vendors taking out a huge
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amount of money from their capital base will easily collapse their businesses. Hence, they
consider the practice of getting a lump sum from microfinance banks a strategy of meeting their
household needs without impacting negatively on their business. Their rationale for this strategy
is that it takes six to eight months to complete a loan cycle with interest. And with existing and
continuous daily contributions they will make monthly repayments to microfinance banks. As for
the cooperative societies, borrowers make repayments without being pressured by other
members. Also, a cooperative society does not make it compulsory for borrowers to pay a fixed
amount towards their loan. Borrowers can pay flexibly, and many of them take advantage of this
feature. To them, a smart trader must know how to manipulate the tripod of microfinancialization
to survive the financial rigors of their trades. The fear of the disastrous experience resulting from
not meeting their weekly/monthly repayments to microfinance banks makes them develop these
strategies.
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Figure 5.4: A View of Orita Challenge Market, Ibadan.
(Photograph by the author)

Table 5.9: A Frequency and Percentage of Trade Items Sold by Market Vendors/Borrowers
Items
Frequency
Percentage
Body and Foot Wears/Hair Accessories
45
19.70%
Provisions (Water, Snacks, etc.) and Chemist Store
74
32.30%
Food Canteen and Raw Food Materials
74
32.30%
Electronics, Phone Accessories and Household Items
27
11.80%
Livestock Feeds
9
3.90%
Total
229
100%

Furthermore, traders attest to the fact that many of them still go ahead to apply for
MFBs’ loans (see also Table 5.7) and sometimes, they blame defaulters among group members.
For instance, here is trader’s view:
Microfinance banks are good, but people misuse the opportunity
sometimes. For example, some women use the loan they have
borrowed to do a funeral, buy clothes, and other things. The problem
starts from there, and they are unable to repay the money. As a result
of circumstances like this, microfinance banks have become stricter,
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and they now seize people’s properties. - Petty Commodity Producer
in Ibadan.
The trader quoted above suggests that even though market vendors popularly refer to loans taken
from microfinance banks either at the group level or individual level as “owo komulelanta”
(“placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”), they still consider microfinance lending
schemes to be of use. They use negative connotation to describe the experience of use of force to
ensure borrowers make timely weekly repayments. However, they blame those borrowers who
default perpetually for not being consistent with their trading strategies and for diverting the
supposed loans to other things considered unnecessary. Then, are things considered
important/necessary homogenous among a population? For instance, one would think that doing
a funeral ceremony of late parents may likely be considered a thing of joy among the Yoruba
people as well as other ethnic groups in Nigeria as it gives a sense of fulfillment. However, such
opinion is far from the imagination of borrowers who are participated in this study. Here are
views from some participants in one of the focus groups:
Borrowers often divert the loans being given (to them) to other nonrelated and less productive things like parties such as naming
ceremony, burial ceremony and so on. But the MFBs have zero
tolerance for default. “For instance, I have been doing this in a long
time, but they don’t have respect for default at all because if you have
been taking loan for 8 years with good track records of repayment,
one day default will make them go crazy with you. (Participant AB)

As for some borrowers, some people collect the money to do some
irrelevant things like buying cloth and the likes. But as for me I
collect it to pay school fees and buy foodstuffs that is because I have a
means of paying back, the banks aren’t forcing us to come and take
loan so they don’t have the blame, the only issue with them is that
they don’t understand customers even if you have been with them for
more than 8years, if you don’t pay once they will disgrace you that is
the only problem with them. (Participant AC)
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Some people take money to do party or buy aso-ebi (uniform for
parties/ceremonies) thinking they would make money from it and in
the end if they default in their repayment, they will be running up and
down. Also, some people complain that when they take loan from a
particular MFB their business go down and they loss their capital.
(Participant AD)
Of course, individuals are expected to provide clothing for themselves. The point I am making
here is that providing oneself basic needs of life is essential, and it gives a sense of meaning to
one’s existence. In the same vein, MFB loans are structured to meet the specific needs of those
who receive the loan. And borrowers are expected to expend loans disbursed to them for
anticipated purposes. Ideally, would the borrowers have been exempted from any form of
pressure and humiliation when their loans are channeled to support trade activities as expected?
The answer to this question would be no because repayment is a must on the due date.
Even though borrowers belong to the same group, they hardly find time to reach out
to others. And when members do not take attendance in meeting seriously, how would they
know about the challenges their fellow members are facing? For instance, an informant
expressed her views by referring to “diversion” as the practice of borrowers diverting their loan
funds to purposes other than to supply their businesses:
Diversion is why people go bankrupt. Some people would borrow
money to expand their business, but they won’t do that, rather, they
spend it on expenses like house rents, electricity, etc. and would only
use the little left for business. How, then, would such a person not run
into a problem? People saying they can’t return loan is a lie, it’s only
because of diversion, and they won’t say this when collecting the
money.

When borrowers are paying their monthly bills with loans taken for business, then we should
know that there is a big problem. And its solution calls for collective efforts rather than blaming
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the borrowers. Also, some market vendors blame borrowers of not having the right “mindset”:
“But if you have the mindset that you owe money and must pay back, and monitor your business,
you might be able to pay back.” The term “mindset” denotes that borrowers are morally obliged
to pay make repayment as at when due even at the expense of anything. By fulfilling this
condition (i.e. right mindset) they have justified that loan disbursed to them are indeed used for
business purposes. They are of the view that being able to meet up with weekly repayment has
to do with the mindset of the borrower. Borrowers are expected to go an extra mile in meeting up
with their repayments. And they must not be ignorant of any business they want to pursue.

Informal Sources of Support. There are informal sources of support through which traders
mobilize funds for their business. These sources include support from friends and family as
well as, ROSCAs. Based upon the preceding evidence, market vendors and entrepreneurs, aside
taking loans from microfinance banks, are open to other options like cooperative societies and
being part of ROSCAs. However, only a few of them consider as a first option loans from
cooperative societies (see Table 5.7). A good number of them rely on friends and families when
raising fund for their business. The idea of getting money (not necessarily a gift but often
borrowed) from family and friends also means that market vendors are engaged in ROSCAs
with their friends and families. For example, Mrs. Abi, a mother of two girls who has been a
widow for more than 4 years explained how her eldest sibling usually assists her:
Haa! if not for my sister things would have gone out of hand for me in
my business. Whenever my sister takes loans from her cooperative
society, she would give me a part of it to support my business. I
would be paying it back to her like “ajo” every week. She is doing
that for me to help me because I am her sibling and she knows I do
not have financial capacity to join that kind of cooperative society let
alone getting a loan. She gave me ₦70,000 (US$200) las month and I
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have been paying back little by little. Also, I still have other relative
members in our house like my sisters-in-law… “a ma n da ajo
papo…” (we do money-contribution together) …that is better because
we all know one another.
The result of the survey shows that only 2.62 percent of those vendors surveyed obtain money
for their businesses from their ROSCA, while 34.49 percent of them depend on money from
friends and family. Virtually all the participants I interviewed say that they find it easy to
organize “ajo,” a kind of ROSCA, with their friends or family members because it requires
people they trust and whom they can reach easily. Then the critical question remains that
practically why do market vendors prefer loans from microfinance banks to that of cooperative
societies?

Cooperative Societies. In one of the interview sessions with the Iya’loja talked about how
she often strategizes in her trade activities drawing comparison between MFB loans and
cooperative society’s loans. According to her:
I prefer a cooperative society’s loan to MFB loan because you pay bit
by bit and you contribute money and build your capital. During their
AGM [Annual General Meeting], you will get money at the end of the
year; it is like profit sharing. You have access to a big investment in
cooperative societies. The repayment is peaceful, unlike MFB loan
repayment. The only thing is that you must be attending meetings. I
am the secretary of Okedepo Cooperative Society.
A major way of supporting her business is by taking loans from the cooperative society. She
combines such loans with the daily repayment and ROSCA contribution. She claims that her
business has been progressing because of the right combination of these two major sources of
finance. However, self-discipline, she claims, is the number one requirement for her trading
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success. She completed her secondary school in 1979 after which she attended a university in
northern Nigeria. According to her, she is the last born of the family, and her mother asked her to
join her in selling provisions. She got married in 1982 and started her own business with ₦5,000
(over US$14) (her share from the lease of her late father’s land). She rented a shop in Kudeti
Area for ₦600 (less than US$2). She bought planks of about ₦40 (less than US$1) to organize
the shop, and in all, she expended ₦200 (close to US$1). The balance of ₦4,800 (close to
US$14) left was used to stock the shop with medicine and provisions such as beverages (milk,
Milo, Bornvita, etc.), toiletries, and soft drinks. She added sales of imported wine to be sold
locally after a while. At some point, she moved to New Gbagi Market selling plastics wholesale.
Then, later she came to Molete Market and returned to the wholesale sale of palm wine.
In contrast, in the excerpt above, the statement “the only thing is that you must be
attending meetings” shows that the cooperative societies do not take members’ attendance lightly
in a meeting because in itself that is the bedrock of group solidarity. Besides, members will know
one another closely and share business ideas and some other useful information that can help
them generally. However, given the statement “I prefer cooperative society’s loans to MFBs’
loans because you pay bit by bit and you contribute money and build your capital” it is not out of
place to argue that the fast-eroding group solidarity at the level of microfinance banks’ lending
group results from pressure to meet up with weekly repayment by members. Members are often
in disarray whenever default is looming, and they are used against one another as a member’s
default will negatively impact on other members. Therefore, I argue group lending as
operationalized by microfinance banks vaguely blankets itself with the notion that women
borrowers rob on one another shoulders in creating empowerment. Rather it constitutes a subtle
threat to their group formation and solidarity, thereby disempowering them.
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Informal Trade Networks and Relationships. Another strategy is to leverage relationships with
other traders, distributors, and manufacturers by building networks and supply chains such that
wholesalers and retailers are getting products supplied while the traders make payment later.
Also, some suppliers operate in trust with traders by giving them money to trade with while
they share any profit made from the sales. A trader pointed out that such an arrangement is
beneficial if sales are encouraging. Borrowers are of the view that all depends on sales
performance irrespective of where they source a loan. And only big traders/wholesalers have
the opportunity of getting big trailers of supply from the distributors and manufacturers. The
retailers buy from them, and when they do they make instant payment. Sometimes, consumers
who come to the market to buy prefer to buy from the retailers. The retailers must pay the
manufacturers at the end of every month. Even though opportunities opened to traders are
determined largely by their status and network of the people around them, one thing they never
compromise as part of their strategy is in making a daily repayment and contribution to a
ROSCA. For instance, one of the Iya’loja (women market heads) said:
I do not take MFB loan because I have dealership/distributorship with
big companies and producers of commodities such as Nigerian
Distillers, Indomie, Nigerian Breweries, Chivita, and Loyal Milk. But
I heavily rely on “ajo ojumo” [daily contribution] and “ajo ose”
[weekly contribution] because I pay back to the companies every day.
In her statement, she pointed to the fact that she makes payment to her distributors at the end of
every business day. The daily contribution provides some resilience, and according to her, she
has been doing this since the commencement of her business in 1982, and this strategy has never
failed.
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Conclusion
I have argued that the influence of neoliberal capitalism on microfinancialization
weakens the essence of group solidarity in the context of Nigerian women’s participation in
microfiance. Based upon ethnographic findings, I have described microfinance strategies as for
any form of pragmatic steps made by the market vendors in everyday life to enhance their
financial capabilities, be it individually and collectively. I showed how MFB loans remain
relevant and utilized by market vendors despite their fear of the consequences of default at any
stage of a loan cycle due to provision of relatively large amount of capital essential for small
businesses. Market vendors and borrowers received a lump sum (which they could not take from
their capital) from MFBs in the form of business loans, but many were forced to use the funds
for what they see as more important household responsibilities such as children school fees. By
utilizing ROSCAs and daily contributions (an amount of money paid to daily collector in which
a contributor collects at the end of every month), they were able to strategically augment their
business’s earnings to meet their compulsory weekly repayment for MFB loans taken. Another
strategy is to get supplies from distributors, make a monthly payment, and receive a commission
on the items sold. However, only relatively few traders had such an opportunity. Such
opportunities were a function of status and social network and thus not open to all traders. Over
70 percent of participants (traders) in this study were of the opinion that MFB loans are not
suitable for startup capital. Rather, such funds should be used to support existing businesses. As
far as group lending is concerned, MFB loan officers took means like loan drive to ensure that
borrowers make their repayments, including making other members of the lending group
pressure defaulters into repaying. No member could be given a new loan even when only one
member misses repayment. But during loan drives loan officers are reticent to make traders beg
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and they don’t perpetuate violence on them. They do, however, try to embarrass them in front of
friends and family into repayment.
Also, I argued that being in debt under the microcredit scheme of MFB put a burden
on the borrowers and limited their ability to function well. But, as I pointed out, despite this,
many borrowers still turned to MFBs for loans. One of the major reasons was that borrowers
have access to relatively large amount of capital. On account of MFB loans as part of financial
inclusion programs extended to people from the state government, many traders as we have seen
saw such gestures as “national cake” which only comes at the eve of national elections. In the
same vein, traders’ views differ depending on whether they occupy positions (or not) within
traders associations. In other words, some market vendors profit from clientelism and
patrimonial politics while some never benefit and these situations among other issues determine
participants’ optimism and pessimism when debating issues of state and financial inclusion
programs among operators of the informal economy.
Based upon the aforementioned points, it is important to remark that traders are
imbued with the idea that if you borrow money you need to pay it back. This idea is related to
what David Graeber describes in one of the chapters (“On the Experience of Moral Confusion”)
of his book, Debt: The First 5000 Years, critiquing the idea that “one has to pay one’s debts
(which I paraphrase here as it is immoral to not back pay one’s debts but not immoral to issue a
stupid loan)” (Graeber 2011, 3). The German socialist playwright Bertholt Brecht presented a
play called “The Threepenny Opera” that debuted in 1928. In it, a character says, “What is the
robbing of a bank compared to the founding of a bank?” which we might take to be something
like “What the crime in robbing a bank to owning one?” this indicates a very different political
sense and morality than saying “We must repay the banks” and “Those who spend loan money
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are bad.” So, reflecting on all this points to political economy because it is the cultural part of
dominance.

175

Chapter Six: Conclusion and Applied Implications

Introduction
In this final Conclusion chapter, I present a conclusion based on data generated as
well as discuss the applied implications of the research. I provide recommendations for future
research as well as recommendations for development planners, microfinance banks (MFBs) and
other related institutions, and potential microfinance borrowers in Nigeria and in other parts of
the world who are stakeholders in the microfinance industry. The overall aim of this research
was to use ethnographic methods to do a critical study of microfinancialization in the lives of
women in the informal sector in Ibadan, Nigeria. As a point of entry, I engaged in the
interrogation of a popular metaphoric local concept, “owo komulelanta,” that borrowers use in
representing their experiences as well as when describing MFB loans. I also have drawn from my
understanding of theoretical paradigms in anthropological political economy, transnational
feminisms, and in applied anthropology
To begin this Conclusion, let us return to the research questions that guided this study and
review the theoretical arguments I deploy as well as the historical and ethnographic evidence:
1) What is the structure of the microfinance industry in southwest Nigeria in relation to
the state and development planning? How did this develop historically?
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Microfinance as a kind of panacea for development has diffused across the
underdeveloped world/Global South, especially with the popularity of the Grameen Bank. This
model with more or less modifications has been adopted by aid agencies, non-governmental
organizations, the private finance industry, and national governments. In Nigeria, the structure of
microfinance built upon historical institutions, formal and informal.
With the coming of colonialism, the pre-colonial money, the cowry, was replaced
with British currency. There were a number of indigenous credit systems that survived and were
transformed during the colonial era. With the emergence of capitalism property acquired
different uses and meanings and was used for collateral to obtain credit. Credit was used to
acquire more land, houses in urban areas, start or expand businesses, acquire prestige goods, to
meet social obligations such as marriages, funerals, and child-naming ceremonies, and also to
pay for necessities such as medical bills and school fees. On the formal side, the British
established banks and these catered to European and Asian traders. Nigerians established formal
banks, starting in the 1930s, with mixed success. On the informal side, indigenous moneylenders
had perhaps always traded in cowry money. And they were only part of the informal system that
Falola (1995) describes. This system included the following features. There was the àjọ and
eṣúsú rotating credit associations (ROSCAs) that have endured and transformed. There was the
practice during the colonial era of growers and marketers of cash crops such as palm oil, cocoa,
and kola nuts using their farmland and yields as collateral in exchange for loans, but where the
creditor controlled the labor of the debtor until the loan was paid off. The òṣómáló was a trader
who encourage buyers to purchase now and to pay later – at relatively high rates of interest. The
pàrò-olówó was a system that the wealthy and salaried workers could use to pledge property for
loans from money lenders. And the sogúndogòjí was a hyper-exploitative practice of exchanging
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an item for another item or for cash with interest rates between 100 and 300 percent. The debtor
required a guarantor who would speak to the debtor’s character and qualities. The colonial
government permitted forms it considered helpful and moved to try to stamp out those practices
of which it did not approve. In addition, in the colonial era principles of the British cooperative
movement came to Nigeria and cooperative societies were established. These provided business
partnerships but also financial services such as a credit union and source of low-interest loans for
members. These continued to thrive into the era of independence and were registered and
regulated by the government.
After getting independence in October 1960, Nigeria was experiencing a series of
military coups with the exception of a civilian administration of President Sheu Shagari between
1979 and 1983. There was much hardship caused by the adoption of the Structural Adjustment
Programs. However, as a response to this situation of hardship Nigerian government adopted
microcredit as an approach to reducing both rural and urban poverty. Hence, the introduction of
neoliberal policies such as Rural Banking Scheme (people’s Bank and Community Banks, now
metamorphosed to Microfinance Banks), Poverty Eradication Program and Bank of Industries.
Since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance there have been an increased in the
activities of microfinance such as at 2008, there were about 840 MFBs in Nigeria (Fabanwo
2008). And as at September 2018, there were 882 licensed MFBs across the six geo-political
zones of the country (see footnote 2 in Chapter 4).
1) What roles do microfinance, credit, debt, and financialization play in neoliberal
capitalism in an underdeveloped country such as Nigeria?
Microfinance appears to be a central plank in Nigerian government policies and in the
strategies of the formal private financial sector in the country. Microfinance is considered a
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fertile ground for private investors in Nigeria. Under conditions of neoliberal capitalism, these
financialization strategies are a kind of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2005;
Luxemburg 2004 [1913]; Marx 1979 [1867]; cf. Bin 2018) entailing processes of the
redistribution of wealth from poor to rich. For finance capital in Nigeria, the expansion of
portfolios into microlending as a business strategy is a way of accumulation of surpluses
produced mainly in the informal sector of the economy and among women market traders and
petty commodity producers more specifically. This sector uses capital accumulation which
represents deposits (investments) as a means of expanding accumulation via the provision of
interest-bearing loans and of the appropriation of surpluses in the form of money. These
surpluses once accumulated by finance capital can be reinvested in the formal and informal
sectors. Thus, micro-financialization becomes a further way of subsidizing capital (see below).
This process, in turn, affects production because it allows capital (although it doesn’t have to) to
divert savings to acquiring new capital (capital expansion), hire more labor (proletarianization),
cheapen raw materials (expand the means of production), and more – all developments necessary
for the continuance of the capitalism mode of production (capitalist accumulation).
2) What is the nature of the relationship between the formal and informal economic
sectors in Nigeria? How is informality related to microfinance?
The relationship between the formal and informal sectors, and even the question of
the existence of a so-called “informal sector” alongside a “formal sector,” has been the subject of
many long debates in the literature across disciplines (for example, see Portes, Castells, and
Benton 1989; Tabak and Crichlow 2000). The apparent increase and acceleration of the
informalization process under conditions of neoliberal capitalism is explained by Bromley and
Wilson (2018, 9) who state:
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In the neoliberal era, the persistence of the informal economy is based on four major
factors: (1) the failure of the formal economy to expand and create full employment, (2)
the overall weakening of the concept and advantages of formality, (3) the formal
economy’s constant generation of temporary, casual, and part-time jobs, and (4) the many
casual labor and microenterprise opportunities that arise in societies with widespread
poverty, expanding professional and upper classes, and large numbers of people seeking a
livelihood.
The present study worked from the perspective that neoliberal capitalism encourages the
exclusion from the formal sector and the casualization of labor within the formal sector, eroding
workers’ rights and benefits. Here, the state intervenes strategically. Sometimes capital and the
state seem to sometimes work at cross-purposes as the state has an interest in documenting,
licensing, and regulating employment so as to acquire taxes but at the same time the mechanisms
of the state exist to further the aims of capital. Further, capitalism depends on non-economic
processes and informal economic activities for its continuance. The informal sector provides
subsidies to the formal capitalist sector (Portes and Walton 1981; Wilson 2005, 2012) by
providing goods and services at a lower cost than if purchased through the formal sector and thus
allowing formal sector wages to stay lower so that capital is not forced to pay a complete living
wage to workers. This subsidy allows for the reproduction of segments of the labor force outside
of the formal capital-labor relationship – that is, the reproduction of the labor of workers who
purchase goods and services in the informal sector and, overall, the reproduction of the working
class.
On the one hand, the present study acknowledges the established argument that the
informal sector seems to provide a mechanism (ILO 2011, 2015; Hart 1973) to make ends meet
for the vast majority of the population who cannot tap from the formal economy in the
underdeveloped nations such as Nigeria. As we saw in the ethnographic evidence presented
above, another way of the informal sector benefiting capitalism is by the deployment of
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informality through the extension of microfinance to the women who have remained perpetually
in poverty supposedly due to the lack of access to credit. Furthermore, I showed that the informal
sector is feminized, and, by extension, the conceptualization of microfinance as “helping
women” could potentially pathologize women. Hence, microfinance necessitates the deployment
of informality, and its target so-called “beneficiaries” are women/borrowers within the informal
economic sector.
3) How is microfinance implicated in the economic strategies of women entrepreneursmarket vendors and petty commodity producers who inhabit the informal sector in
southwest Nigeria? What are the culturally appropriate mechanisms suggestive of their
economic strategies?

This dissertation research has established that access to credit is absolutely critical for
informal sector market vendors and petty commodity producers in southwest Nigeria. It has also
established that without recourse to other sources of credit, these entrepreneurs turn to the
available sources of microcredit for their business strategies. These strategies, in turn, all form
part of what anthropologist Victoria Durant-González (1982) called “the realm of female familial
responsibility” for the Caribbean context. The southwest Nigeria Yoruba socio-economic and
cultural context is distinct from that of the Caribbean where female-headed households are a
preponderance in some islands and a prominent feature of others, but the concept applies well to
encapsulate the socio-economic and cultural forces women informal traders feel and provide
motivations beyond those located in pure business survival and success. This explains why they
sometimes divert loan funds intended for their businesses to such expenses as school fees for
their children.
As we see in the ethnographic description above, capital plays on, and, indeed, relies
on what might be called “cultural” mechanisms. Informal sector traders and petty commodity
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producers are made to feel social shame in MFB loan officers’ “loan drives.” They are also made
to draw upon family and friends for funds not only to purchase supplies for their businesses but
to pay back loans. Further, MFBs are happy to lend money to loan groups knowing the social
pressure exerted on defaulters and potential defaulters helps to guarantee loan repayment – even
if it means defaulters and potential defaulters must draw upon their familial and social support
networks in order to repay their portion of these group loans.
Disappearing are the opportunities that women members have the opportunity to
break out of their daily routine and discuss other pressing issues concerning their lives and
livelihoods (Townsend 1999; Swain and Wallentin 2009; Swain and Garikipati 2019). I suggest
with the date provided that microfinance in this era of neoliberal capitalism in Ibadan southwest
Nigeria has intensified further the idea of individuality – which is antithetical to traditional
societal values rooted in collectivity – and thereby weakens the essence of group solidarity
particularly in search of credit mobilization for entrepreneurship. Rigid repayment conditions
breeds this problem among borrowers in Ibadan. The experience of a Peruvian MFI shows a
similar negative impact in another cultural context (Copestake, Dawson, Fanning, McKay, and
Wright-Ruvolledo 2005). In this research, therefore, the negative effects of this rigid repayment
extend beyond borrowers and the loan officers (whose job is at stake) have their share of it too.
Loan officers panic whenever default looms due to the fear of losing their jobs in a country
undergoing a high unemployment rate. In this research, the experience of borrowers is rooted in
multiple realities and issues such as social status, educational background, rural/urban residence,
local politics, political patronage, and clientelism. These factors are all implicated in
understanding borrowers’ lived experience.
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Overall, the ethnography shows how, “culture” cannot be “removed from the material
process of its creation,” that is, “from the historical process that shapes it and that it in turn
shapes,” and that the “removal of culture from the wellings-up of action, interaction, power, and
praxis” (Roseberry 1982, 1027) makes for an inadequate anthropology.
4) How do microfinance borrowers conceive of and negotiate their statuses as debtors in
this cultural context?
As the ethnography shows, microfinance borrowers are implicated in complex webs of structures
created by emerging finance capital. It also shows that the traders themselves engage in complex
strategies to obtain credit for their businesses, combining personal and group loans from formal
sector microfinance institutions and banks with access to credit provided by their membership in
cooperative societies, family and kinship networks, ROSCAs, and by actively soliciting the
benefits of political patronage in exchange for their votes in state-level elections.
As a result of the completion of the literature review, along with the empirical research
that I conducted among market vendors and petty commodity producers who inhabit the informal
economic sector who are MFB loan borrowers, loan officers (employees of MFBs) as well as
various policymakers, I have come to conclusion that borrowers continue to seek MFB loans in
spite of the account of stringent conditions expressed and experienced confirms that many of
them have no better alternatives from where they can get relatively large amounts of microcredit.
I argue that all of this must be considered if want to explaining the microfinance phenomenon in
its entirety.
The bedrock upon which market vendors and borrowers in Ibadan rest their business
finances is what I described as “the tripod of microfinancialization.” The “tripod of
microfinancialization” includes loans from microfinance banks, cooperative investment and
credit union, and rotatory savings and credit association. Borrowers combine either two or three
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of these sources strategically to keep themselves afloat in their businesses. Of course, the state in
Nigeria has a template of development activities implemented since independence. Those
programs have not recorded many success stories due to various reasons largely connected to the
introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs particularly in the late 1980s. However, I have
critiqued those programs as showcasing the “ideal” with little or no evidence that matches up
with the “actual” (i.e., the real situation of the borrowers).
Borrowers’ description of microfinance aligns with the definition presented by
Bateman, Maclean, and Galbraith as “the disbursement of tiny loans to the poor so that they can
undertake income-generating activities” (2017, back cover). However, when they describe taking
an MFB loan as “owo komulelanta” (“Placing our breasts on a hot kerosene lantern”), borrowers
come about such interpretation in trying to express their difficult experiences metaphorically and
how they build up strategies and resilience of dealing with it as part of their everyday lives. The
whole processes tends to individualize borrowers and break down group solidarity. One of the
strategies of dealing with conditions of scarcity at a group level engenders another local concept,
“ko’wo pe ni…ki se ko’ju pe” (“Weekly repayment is a ‘must,’ but attendance is not the main
priority”). This saying is repeated by borrowers in group loans and refers to the kind of pressure
that group leaders mount on their members to avoid similar pressure to repay the loan from their
own loan officers. The implication of this is that it has members avoid attending group meetings
where solidarity would be reinforced. Group solidarity is a main selling point for several
microfinance programs, even though it is pragmatic by ensuring timely repayment by members.
Market vendors and borrowers take advantage of the “tripod of microfinancialization”
strategically to ensure that they have funds ready for their businesses. MFB loan remain part of
these set of strategies despite being referred to as “owo komulelanta” (“Placing our breasts on a
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hot kerosene lantern”) because an average borrower accesses a relatively large amount of money,
they cannot afford to take from their capital to get more supplies, and in order to take care of
other important household needs. A few of big traders who are well connected are able to obtain
a supply of their trade items on credit and sell over time to offset bills with their
distributors/manufacturers. Informal sector traders and petty commodity producers all realize
that MFB loans are not meant to be used to start up a business rather only by established traders
in order to expand their business. Thus, MFB tend to serve and enrich those traders who are
already established and relatively successful and wealthy rather than providing opportunities for
and serving the very poor (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Stewart, Van Rooyen, Korth, Chereni, Da
Silva,and De Wet 2012; Li, Christopher, and Baiding 2011; Bali Swain and Wallentin 2009;
Garikipati 2012; Zeller, Sharma, Ahmed and Rashid 2001). Therefore, this study contests the
idea that microfinance champions the cause of informal sector and poor women. I have already
pointed to the fact that MFB loans tend to threaten group formation and solidarity among
borrowers.
Applied Recommendations
I have advocated for an approach that centers on the experience of informal sector
operators and petty commodity producers. I have done so for future anthropological research on
topics close to the subject of this dissertation. But I also have done so in order to provide applied
recommendations. By centering the focus on, in this case, the informal sector operators and petty
commodity producers who are involved in microfinance from the position of borrowers, this
approach provides at the same time a critique of the MFIs, MFBs, many international and local
NGOs, along with national state and bilateral state-to-state aid policies and practices involved in
microfinance schemes. Despite stated good intentions, these initiators of microfinance schemes
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have introduced what they believe is the solution to the problems they have in the first place
identified for the people because they need to create a need. These schemes become dominant in
the context of development planning under neoliberal capitalism because they provide
justifications for its operating by promoting as scientific truths examples drawn from especially
the Grameen Bank model in what are really the ideological justifications for the dominance of
ruling classes.
It is my argument that the borrowers are in the best position to share firsthand
experience about any given intervention, project, or program in process. They are uniquely
positioned to understand if the MFIs and MFBs involved in any given intervention, project, or
program have an undisclosed agenda (often undisclosed if incompatible with the political and
economic interests and core values of the borrowers). Now, it is important to recognize that
potentially there exists conflicts of interest among microfinance loan borrowers within a certain
locale, and their voices may not accord with each other nor be capable of presenting a common
view. As this study shows, there are many forces at work that conspire to fragment the solidarity
of microfinance borrowers occupying similar niches of Nigeria’s urban informal economy.
Given the political and economic conditions demonstrated in this dissertation, my
recommendations for Nigerian government agencies, international and local NGOs, private MFIs
and MFBs, cooperative society managers, ROSCA participants, trader organizations, and
individual traders themselves are as follows:
1. The Nigerian government should require public and private MFIs and MFBs to
include significant representation of members of traders associations and of
borrowers themselves at every level of the structures of these entities. There must be
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mechanisms in place for borrowers on these boards to be elected and accountable to
the mass of borrowers.
2. Limits on interest.
3. Community service in exchange for loan forgiveness.
4. Cooperative societies themselves should be allowed to borrow funds that could be
dispersed to members.
5. Limits to uses of shaming, etc.
6. Require ROSCA participation of borrowers.
7. More civic education particularly on rights protection as stated in section 34, sub
section 1 of Nigerian 1999 Constitution.
8. MFBs should invest more in educating their clients (before/during/after) about
specificity of various loan products and also provide timely updates
9. Government should endeavor to generate and provide baseline data of individuals (if
possible demographic information per square kilometer) to aid overall development
planning.
10. Use social science to assess how loans are used and how borrowers are affected.

Based on the common narrative that runs across the interviews and focuses group
discussions with the loan officers and other employees of MFIs and MFBs, I would suggest
future research should focus on functionality of established regulations as well as regulatory
bodies overseeing the affairs of MFIs and MFBs, particularly in Nigeria. What are the loopholes
and blind spots hindering the effective usefulness of some of the regulations? What are the
monitoring mechanisms put in place to ensure effective delivery? What are the criteria of
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selection for inclusion in various financial inclusion programs? Answering all of these questions,
or any one of them, requires ethnographic research to be able to read in between the lines as
different stakeholders within the framework of microfinance in order to understand the larger
processes of neoliberal capitalism and the attendant state formation and governance that
structures the world of Nigerian microfinance.
Future scientific and applied research in Nigeria should be focused largely on the specific
experience of the supposed “beneficiaries” of microfinance loans. Some of these experiences
likely are not covered by obvious quantifiable variables. This is evident not only in the present
study. For instance, a study conducted by Toyin Ogunleye and published in 2017, based on a
critical review of empirical literature, confirms that lending to women improves the repayment
rate in Nigeria (Ogunleye 2017). Of course, it is evident in the present study as well that women
borrowers do anything possible to ensure a prompt and timely repayment. But beyond this
understanding, what is the situation of these supposed “beneficiaries” who have been made to
faithfully and forcefully make their repayments. Do we care about their overall situations? If
politics should “put the last first” then so should applied anthropology.
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Appendix A: IRB Approval Letter

October 12, 2018
Olubukola Olayiwola
Anthropology 4202 E.
Fowler Avenue SOC
15D Tampa, FL
33620

RE: Expedited Approval for Initial Review
IRB#: Pro00036877
Title:
"Placing our breast on a hot kerosene lantern": A Critical Study of Microfinancialization in the
Lives of Women in the Informal Sector in Ibadan, Nigeria.
Study Approval Period: 10/12/2018 to 10/12/2019
Dear Mr. Olayiwola:
On 10/12/2018, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above
application and all documents contained within, including those outlined below.
Approved Item(s):
Protocol Document(s):
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Protocol, Version #1, 8.18
Consent/Assent Document(s)*:
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Verbal Consent for FGD, Version #1,
8. 18
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Verbal Consent, Government Official
Version #1, 8. 18
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Verbal Consent, Questionnaire for
Loan Officers Version #1, 8. 18
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Verbal Consent, Version #1, 8. 18
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Verbal Consent, Version #1, 8. 18
Microfinancialization and Women in the Informal Sector: Verbal Consent, Version #1, 8. 18
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"Attachments" tab. Please note, these consent/assent documents are valid until the consent
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research through the expedited review procedure authorized by 45CFR46.110. The research
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consent is normally required outside of the research context. (Verbal Consent forms).
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in
accordance with IRB policies and procedures and as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the
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Sincerely,

Melissa Sloan, PhD, Vice Chairperson
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Appendix B: Interview Question Guide
General:
➢ Credit mobilization in pre-microcredit years!
➢ Rural and urban flow and experience of lenders and borrowers! Beyond strategies of
survival in both rural and urban areas.
➢ Social meaning of debt! How people (women) use esusu, LAPO etc.? Why and when are
people using this kind of loan? What is the meaning of debt or social exchanges? What
does it mean to owe money?
➢ Household level decision making! Can it be household strategy to use women to access
fund? Who decides to take a loan, amount to be taken, strategies of paying back the loans
etc.?
➢ Social context on how women manage the household! Socioeconomic status of women,
inheritance law, land tenure, divorce rate etc.
➢ How women get to attach to specific microcredit institution and how do they get to know
about it?
➢ How is trust established between the group, its members, and institutions?
Specifics
Traders:
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

How long have you been in business?
What is the current situation of your sales?
How do you source for credit to run business?
Do you know of any microcredit institution around?
Do you belong to any contributory scheme/group (esusu, ajo, etc.)?
Have you ever taken microcredit loan? Can you tell us about your experience when you
take microcredit loan?

Loan Officers:
➢ How long have you been working with your institution?
➢ What is it like to be a loan officer? Challenges of being a loan officer? You most exciting
experience as a loan officer?
➢ Can you share some experience of how you manage your portfolio as a loan officer?
➢ What are your duties and responsibilities to your organization and clients?
➢ What are the necessary requirements for microcredit loan qualification?
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MDAs:
➢ Overview of government activities and interventions towards credit mobilization,
empowerment programs and development strategies in general.

222

Appendix C: FGD Question Guide
Traders/members and leaders of ROSCA/borrowers of microcredit loans:
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢
➢

How long have you been in this lending group?
What is the current situation of your sales?
How do you source for credit to run business?
Do you know of any microcredit institution around?
Do you belong to any contributory scheme/group (esusu, ajo, etc.) other than this?
Have you ever taken microcredit loan as individuals or members of a group? Can you tell
us about your experience when you take microcredit loan as individuals and/or members
of a group?
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Appendix D: Questionnaire: Traders/Borrowers
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, USA
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY
Dear Respondent,
This questionnaire seeks information on “Placing our breast on a hot kerosene lantern”: A
Critical Study of Microfinancialization in the Lives of Women in the Informal Sector in Ibadan,
Nigeria”, being a Doctorate (PhD) Research at the University of South Florida, USA. Your
responses are strictly for research purposes and all responses will be treated confidentially.
Thank you.
TRADERS/BORROWERS
I.
Personal Information
Please answer the following questions as objectively as you can by marking the answer which you
consider appropriate from the options provided.
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.
f.

g.
h.

i.

Age:
45yrs.
Sex:
Religion:

(0). 18 – 25yrs.

(1). 26 – 35yrs.

(0). Female
(0). African-Traditional-Religion

(2). 36 -45yrs.

(3) Above

(1) Male
(1). Christianity

(2). Islam

Educational Background:
(0). No Formal Education
(1). Primary Education
(2). Secondary Education
(3). National Diploma/NCE
(4). Bachelor/HND
(5). Master’s Degree
(6). PhD
Marital Status: (0). Single
(1). Married
(2). Divorced (3) Widowed
Market/Store Location……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….
LGA……………………………………………………………………………………….
State of Origin of the Trader………………………………................................................
Items sold (list)…………………………………………………………………………......
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Account Relationship with Microfinance Bank as:
(0)
Sole/Personal A/c
(1) Partnership A/c
(2) Company /A/c
(9)
Others
,
(Specify)………………………………………………………………………………..
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j.

Nature of Occupation/Business Activities:
(0) Farming
(1) Fishing
(2) Petty Trade
(3) Artisan (4) Commodity Producer
(9) Others
k.
Size of Business – Number of employees/Apprentice:
(0)
Under 2
(1) Under 5
(2) Under 10 (3) 10 above
l.
Type of Space Occupied:
(0)
Shop
(1) Stall (2) Kiosk (3) Tables Stand (4) Others , (specify)
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…..
m.
How many years have you spent in your business?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
n.
How much did you start your business with?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
o.
What is the source of your initial capital?
(0)
Personal Savings (1) Bank Loans (2) Family/Friend Support (3)
Initial
Capital
from
Master
(9)
Others
(Specify)………………………………………….
p.
How much do you trade with?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
II.

General
Please indicate your answer by marking one of the options provided to the following:

1.

Have you ever received loans from any microfinance bank?
(0) Yes
(1) No
If “yes”, proceed to question 2.
If “no”, state why you have not taken loans………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………..then go to question 19.
From how many microfinance banks have you ever taken loans? Please, provide their
names…………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………...
…………………………………………………………………………………………...
What type of microcredit loan have you ever taken?
(0)
Individual loan
(1) Group loan
(2) Both
How much was it the first time you did take the loan?
............................................................................................................................................
How much was the periodic repayment you made?
……………………………………………………………………………………………
What was the interval of the repayment?
(0)
Weekly
(1) Bi-weekly
(2) Monthly
(9) Others , please
specify………..

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
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7.

From
which
of
the
microfinance
banks
was
the
loan
taken?
……………………………………………………………………………………………
When was the last time you did take a loan?
……………………………………………………………………………………………
How much did you take the last time you did?
……………………………………………………………………………………………

8.
9.

10.

How much was the repayment?
…………………………………………………………………………………………….
What was the interval of the repayment?
(1)
Weekly
(1) Bi-weekly
(2) Monthly
(9) Others , please
specify…………….
From which of the microfinance banks did you take loan the last time?
…………………………………………………………………………………………….

11.

12.

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
(0)
18.
(0)
19.
(0)

20.
(0)
21.

Do you have any loan you are servicing currently?
(0)
Yes
(2) No
If “yes”, proceed to question 14.
If “no”, state why you have no loan you are servicing currently? …………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
How much is the loan?
……………………………………………………………………………………………..
From which bank is the loan taken?
……………………………………………………………………………………………..
How much is the repayment?
……………………………………………………………………………………………...
What is the interval of the repayment?
Weekly
(1)
Bi-weekly
(2)
Monthly
(9)
Others
(Specify)………………………………..
Can you say that the loan you obtained from Microfinance Bank has improved your
business as well as raised the standard of living in your family substantially?
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
Where do you source first for funds other than your personal savings whenever you need
to restock or expand your business?
Bank Loans
(1) Family/Friend Support
(2) ROSCA
(3) Cooperative Union
(4)Others
(Specify)………………………………………..………………………………..
Many customers of microfinance banks have used loans obtained from the banks to pay
the school fees of their children.
Totally incorrect (1) Incorrect (2) Undecided (3) Correct (4) Totally correct
Many microfinance customers have obtained financial assistance from their banks to start
small businesses.
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(0) Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
22.
Customers of microfinance banks have used funds borrowed to cultivate maize
farms, vegetable farms, fisheries etc.
(0) Very Rarely
(1) Rarely
(2) Undecided (3) Often (4) Very often
23.

Do you think many customers of microfinance banks have been refused loan because they
have no collaterals?
(0) Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
24.
It is easier to obtain loans from microfinance banks if customers belong to Groups, in which
case, a borrower is guaranteed by the other members of the Group.
(0) Strongly Disagree
(1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
25.
(0)
26.
(0)
27.
(0)
28.
(0)
29.
(0)

Do you agree that pre-borrowing training is necessary for a successful loan usage?
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
Microfinance banks officers monitor the use to which the loans they give to their customers
are applied in order to avoid diversion of funds.
Very Rarely (1) Rarely
(2) Undecided (3) Often (4) Very often
Do you agree that more microfinance banks should be established in the rural areas?
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
Should microfinance banks attend to the poor people only?
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
Do you think that the interest rates charged by the microfinance banks are too high for their
services?
Strongly Disagree
(1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree

30.

The introduction of microfinance in Nigeria has reduced the poverty level in the nation, do
you agree?
(0) Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
31.
In your opinion do customers of microfinance banks repay loans promptly?
(0) Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree
32.
Can you compare your profit profile before and after the period when you were given funds
by your microfinance bank?
(0) Very low
(1) Low
(2) Undecided (3) High (4) Very High

227

Appendix E: Questionnaire: MFBs’ Loan Officers
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, USA
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY
Dear Respondent,
This questionnaire seeks information on “Placing our breast on a hot kerosene lantern”: A
Critical Study of Microfinancialization in the Lives of Women in the Informal Sector in Ibadan,
Nigeria”, being a Doctorate (PhD) Research at the University of South Florida, USA. Your
responses are strictly for research purposes and all responses will be treated confidentially.
Thank you.
Microfinance Banks’ Official/Loan Officers
I.
Personal Information
Please answer the following questions as objectively as you can by marking the answer which
you consider appropriate from the options provided.
Age: (0). 18 – 25yrs (1). 26 – 35yrs
(3). 36 – 45 (3). above 45
Sex: (0). Male
(1). Female
Religion: (0). African Traditional Religion (1). Christianity (2). Islam
Educational Background:
(0). No Formal Education
(1). Primary Education
(2). Secondary Education
(3). National Diploma/NCE
(4). Bachelor/HND
(5). Master’s Degree
(6). PhD
e. Marital Status: (0). Single
(1). Married
(2). Divorced (3). Widowed
a.
b.
c.
d.

f. Residential Address & Business Location…………………….........................................
……………………………………………………………………………………………
g. LGA ………………..………………………………………………………………….....

II.
General.
Please indicate your answer by marking the options provided to the following questions.
1. When was your bank licensed to operate as a microfinance bank?
(0). Up to 2years
(1). 3years
(2). 4years
(3). 5years and above 
2. Altogether, how many accounts has your bank opened to date?
(0). 1 – 100 , (1). 101 – 250 , (2) 251 – 500 (3). 501 – 1000

, (4).1001 & above

3. What percentage of your customers ask for loans and other forms of credit facilities?
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(0). 10%

(1). 20%

(2). 30%

(3). 50%

(4). 60% and above

4. What percentage of those who ask for financial assistance has your bank assisted so far?
(0). 5%
(1). 10%
(2). 20%
(3). 30%
(4). 50%
(5). Over 50%
5. In which subsectors of the economy do most of your customers invest the loan which you
give to them?
(0). Farming
(1). Fishing
(2). Petty Trade
(3) Small Scale Manufacturing
(4). Artisan
(5). Contract
(9) Others (specify)
6. In which sector/s has your bank given most financial assistance, choosing from 5 above?
(0). Farming
(1). Fishing (2). Petty Trade
(3). Small Scale Manufacturing
(4). Artisan
(5). Contract
(9). Others (specify)
7. Do you think that microfinance has improved the lot of the low-income group in Nigeria,
using your bank as an example?
(0). Strongly Disagree
(1). Disagree
(2). Undecided
(3). Agree
(4). Strongly Agree
8. Funds disbursed are applied for the purpose for which they were given?
(0). Strongly Disagree
(1). Disagree
(2). Undecided
(3). Agree
(4). Strongly Agree
9. Do you believe that microfinance is really the answer to poverty alleviation in
Nigeria if properly practiced, using your bank’s experience as an example?
(0). Strongly Disagree
(1). Disagree
(2). Undecided
(3). Agree
(4). Strongly Agree
10. Do you agree that more microfinance banks should be established, particularly in
the rural areas of the country?
(0). Strongly Disagree (1). Disagree
(2). Undecided
(3). Agree
(4). Strongly Agree
11. From your bank’s experience, do you agree that the low-income group repay loans
extended to them by microfinance banks satisfactorily?
(0). Strongly Disagree
(1). Disagree
(2). Undecided (3). Agree
(4). Strongly Agree
12. Do you agree that households use loans given to them for food, children
education, minor house repairs, farming, fishing, health matters and other emergencies?
(1). Strongly Disagree (2). Disagree
(3). Undecided
(4). Agree
(4). Strongly Agree
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13. In your opinion, has the Government done enough to support microfinance sector in
Nigeria?
(0) Yes
(1). No
14. Are your customers mainly women?
(0). Strongly Disagree
(1). Disagree
(4). Strongly Agree

(2). Undecided

(3). Agree

15. Does your bank provide services in the areas of money transfer, savings etc.?
(0). Very rarely
(1). Rarely
(3). Undecided
(3) Often
(4) Very often
16. Does your bank promote small scale Enterprises enough?
(0) Yes
(1). No
If “yes” which of them have you lent to? And if “no” please give reason (s)
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
17. Many microfinance banks are failing presently, what do you think are the main
challenges confronting them?
(0) Inadequate capital
(1) Poor Management (2). Little or no product innovation
(3) Staff incompetence
(4) Loan losses
(8) All the above
Any other reason (please state) …………………………………………………………….
18. Do you agree that many microfinance banks are fail as a result of fraud and insider
abuse?
(0). Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Undecided
(3) Agree (4). Strongly
Agree
19. Has group membership facilitated loan packaging?
(0) Strongly Disagree
(1) Disagree
(2) Undecided
Agree

(3) Agree

(4) Strongly

20. Does your bank have grants and or donations from any organization foreign or local?
(0) Yes
(1) No
21. Are you of the opinion that microfinance banks can really promote business development
and bring about economic development?
(0) Strongly Disagree
(1) Disagree
(2) Undecided (3) Agree (4) Strongly
Agree
22. What is the least amount of loans which your bank grants to customers as a policy?
(0) N1,000
(1) N5,000
(2) N10,000
(3) N20,000
(9) Other (specify)
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23. What is the largest amount of loan granted by your bank to a single customer?
(0) N500,000
(1) N100,000
(2) Over N100,000
24. What is the longest period of repayment allowed for your customers?
(0) 1 month
(1) 3months
(2) 6months
(3) 1year
(9) Others please specify
25. How do you collaterise lending made in your bank?
(0) Guarantee (1) Shares
(2) Landed Property
specify

(3) Clean lending

26. Do you offer any non-financial services to your customers?
(0) Yes
(1) No
If “yes” which of the services?

1
2
3
4
5

Non-Financial Services
Safe Custody Services
Training of Entrepreneurs before lending to them
Advisory Services
Mentoring of existing micro enterprises
Others (please state).
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Please Tick

(9) Other
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